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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

STEPHEN BOSWELL and KARINA
BOSWELL, husband and wife,

)
)
)

)
)
)
)

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

vs.
AMBER DAWN STEELE, and
The Estate of MARY STEELE,

Supreme Court No.

44093

)
)

)
)
)
)

Defendant-Respondents,
_________

CLERK'S RECORD

Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District of the State of
Idaho, in and for the County of Bannock.
Before HONORABLE William H. Woodland, District Judge.
For Appellant:
Kent A. Higgins
Merrill & Merrill, Chartered
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, Idaho 83720-005
For Respondent:
Reed W. Larsen
Cooper & Larsen, Chartered
P.O. Box 4229
Pocatello, Idaho 83205-4229
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Date: 6/21/2016

Sixth Judicial District Court - Bannock County

Time: 02:38 PM

ROA Report

Page 1 of 17

User: OCANO

Case: CV-2012-0004120-PI Current Judge: William H Woodland
Stephen Boswell, etal. vs. Amber Dawn steele, etal.

Stephen Boswell, Karena Boswell vs. Amber Dawn Steele, Mary E Steele
Date

Code

User

9/24/2012

LOCT

MARLEA

CR

Stephen S Dunn

NGOC

MARLEA

New Case Filed-Other Claims

Stephen S Dunn

COMP

MARLEA

Verified Complaint: pa Higgins

Stephen S Dunn

SMIS

MARLEA

Summons Issued

Stephen S Dunn

MARLEA

Filing: A - All initial civil case filings of any type not Stephen S Dunn
llsted in categories 8-H, or the other A listings
below Paid by: merrill and merrill Receipt
number: 0033835 Dated: 9/24/2012 Amount:
$96.00 (Check) For:

ATTR

LINDA

Plaintiff: Boswell, Stephen Attorney Retained Kent Stephen S Dunn
A. Higgins

ATTR

LINDA

Judge

Plaintiff: Boswell, Karena Attorney Retained Kent Stephen S Dunn

A. Higgins
OCANO

Another Summons

Don L. Harding

MARLEA

Filing: 11 - Initial Appearance by persons other
than the plaintiff or petitioner Paid by: cooper
and larsen Recelpt number: 0034379 Dated:
9/28/2012 Amount: $66.00 {Check) For: Steele,
Amber Dawn (defendant) and Steele, Mary E
(defendant)

Stephen S Dunn

ANSW

CAMILLE

Answer and Demand for Jury Trial; aty Reed
Larsen

Stephen S Dunn

ATTR

CAMILLE

Defendant: Steele, Amber Dawn Attorney
Retained Reed W Larsen

Stephen S Dunn

ATTR

CAMILLE

Defendant: Steele, Mary E Attorney Retained
Reed W Larsen

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Notice of service - First set of lnterrog and
requests for production of documents; and this
notice: aty Reed Larsen

Stephen S Dunn

KARLA

Order for Submission of Information for
Scheduling Order /s J Dunn 10/02/12

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Notice of service - Plaintiff first set of lnterrog and Stephen S Dunn
requests for production to defs and this notice of
service ; aty Kent Higgins for plntf

CAMILLE

Acceptance of service - srvd on Mary Steel and
Ambert Steele ; s/ atty Reed Larsen

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Response to order for submission of information
for scheduling order; aty Kent Higgins for
plaintiff

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Notice of service - Plaintiffs responses to defs first Stephen S Dunn
set of interrog. and requests for production to
plaintiffs and this notice: aty Kent Higgins for
plntf

CAMILLE

Notice of service - Second set of lnterrog and
requests for production of documents: aty Reed
Larsen

9/28/2012

10/2/2012

10/12/2012

10/24/2012

ORDR

Stephen S Dunn
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Case: CV-2012-0004120-PI Current Judge: William H Woodland
Stephen Boswell, etal. vs. Amber Dawn Steele, etal.

Stephen Boswell, Karena Boswell vs. Amber Dawn Steele, Mary E Steele
Date

Code

User

10/30/2012

ORDR

KARLA

Order SEtting Jury Trial .s /s J Dunn 10/29/12

HRSC

KARLA

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 07/23/2013 09:00 Stephen S Dunn
AM}

HRSC

KARLA

Judge
Stephen S Dunn

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 01/14/2014 09:00 Stephen S Dunn

AM)
11/1/2012

CAMILLE

Notice of video Trial Deposition of Mary Steele on Stephen S Dunn
11-12-2012 @ 2pm: aty Reed Larsen

11/7/2012

CAMILLE

Motion to disqualify alternate Judge Mitchell W
Brown; aty Kent Higgins for plntf

Stephen S Dunn

11/13/2012

CAMILLE

Objection to order setting Jury Trial; aty Kent
Higgins for plntf

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Brief in support of objectijon to order setting Jury
Trial; aty Kent Higgins for plntf

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Notice of hearing on objection to order setting
Jury Trial;
set for 12-3-2012 @2pm:

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
12/03/2012 02:00 PM) Plaintiffs objection to
order

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Notice of service - Plntfs second set of interrog to Stephen S Dunn
defs and this notice: aty Kent Higgins for plntf

CAMILLE

Notice of service - Plaintiffs responses to defs
Stephen S Dunn
second set of interrog and requests for production
of documents; and this notice: aty Kent Higgins
for plntf

DCHH

KARLA

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled Stephen S Dunn
on 12/03/2012 02:00 PM: District Court Hearing
Held
Court Reporter: Sheri Turner
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less 100
Plaintiffs objection to order

MEOR

KARLA

Minute Entry and Order; Court overrule Plaintiffs
Objection to Sched Order Is J Dunn 12/04/12

12/5/2012

CAMILLE

Notice of service - Answers to plaintiffs first set of Stephen S Dunn
discovery : aty Reed Larsen

12/14/2012

CAMILLE

Second notice of video Trial deposition of Mary
Steele; on 12-18-2012: aty Reed Larsen

12/24/2012

CAMILLE

Motion to Amend Complaint; aty Kent Higgins for Stephen S Dunn
plntf

CAMILLE

Amended complaint and demand for Jury Trial;
aty Kent Higgins for plntf

Stephen S Dunn

OCANO

Brief in Support of Motion to Amend Complaint;
Kent A. Higgins, Attorney for Plntfs.

Don L. Harding

CAMILLE

Return of service - srvd on John Billquist on
7-11-2013

Don L. Harding

11/14/2012

HRSC

11/28/2012

12/4/2012

1/7/2013

Stephen S Dunn

Stephen S Dunn
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Case: CV-2012-0004120-PI Current Judge: William H Woodland
Stephen Boswell, etal. vs. Amber Dawn Steele, etal.

Stephen Boswell, Karena Boswell vs. Amber Dawn Steele, Mary E Steele
Date

Code

Judge

User

1/7/2013

CAMILLE

Return of service - srvd on Chris Kettler on
6-24-2013

Don L. Harding

1/10/2013

CAMILLE

Defendants objection to plaintiffs motion to
amend: aty Reed Larsen

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Memorandum in support of defs objection to
plaintiffs motin to amend; aty Reed Larsen

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Affidavit of Reed Larsen : aty Reed Larsen

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Notice of hearing on motion to amend complaint; Stephen S Dunn
set for p lntfs motion to amend complaint on
1-28-2013 @2pm:

CAMILLE

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 01/28/2013 02:00
PM)

CINDYBF

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment- by pltf thru Stephen S Dunn
PA Higgins.

AFFD

CINDYBF

Affidavit of Kent A Higgins in Support of Motio for Stephen S Dunn
Partial Summary Judgment- by PA Higgins.

AFFD

CINDYBF

Affidavit of Tamara Andersen in Support of
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment- by PA
Higgins.

Stephen S Dunn

CINDYBF

Memorandum Supporting Plaintiffs Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment- by PA Higgins.

Stephen S Dunn

CINDYBF

Notice of Hearing on Motion for Partial Summary Stephen S Dunn
Judgment- Hearing Scheduled (Motion for
Summary Judgment 02/11/2013 03:30 PM)- by
PA Higgins.

CINDYBF

Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Amend
Compliaint- by PA Higgins.

Stephen S Dunn

NOTC

OCANO

Notice of Hearing on Motion to Strike Portionsd
on the Affidavit og Chris Keller. Kent A Higgins,
Attorney for Plntfs.

Don L. Harding

MOTN

OCANO

Motion to Shorten Time For Hearing on Motion to Don L. Harding
Strike; Kent A Higgins, Attorney for Plntf.

MOTN

OCANO

Motion to Strike Portions of the Affidavit of Chris
Kettler; Kent A Higgins, Attorney for Plntfs.

Don L. Harding

CINDYBF

Notice of Service- Plaintiffs Responses to
Defendants Second Set of Interrogatories and
Requests for Production of Documents- served
DA Larsen by PA Higgins.

Stephen S Dunn

CINDYBF

Defendants Reply Brief in Support of Objection to Stephen S Dunn
Proposed Amended Complaint- by DA Larsen.

CAMILLE

Memorandum in opposition to motion to strike
portions of the affidavit of Chris Kettler; aty
Reed larsen

Robert C Naftz

KARLA

Administratvie Order of Reference; matter
referred to Judge Naftz for full resolution;/s J
Dunn 01/29/13

Stephen S Dunn

1/11/2013

HRSC

1/14/2013

HRSC

1/15/2013
1/16/2013

1/17/2013

1/23/2013

1/30/2013

ORDR

Stephen S Dunn
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Case: CV-2012-0004120-PI Current Judge: William H Woodland
Stephen Boswell, etal. vs. Amber Dawn Steele, etal.

Stephen Boswell, Karena Boswell vs. Amber Dawn Steele, Mary E Steele
Date

Code

User

1/30/2013

DISF

KARLA

Disqualification Of Judge - Self

Stephen S Dunn

HRVC

KARLA

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
01/28/2013 02:00 PM: Hearing Vacated

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Motion for disqualification; aty Reed Larsen

Robert C Naftz

CAMILLE

Notice of service - Answers to plaintiffs third set of Robert C Naftz
discovery; and this notice: aty Reed Larsen

HRVC

NICOLE

Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Robert C Naftz
scheduled on 02/11/2013 03:30 PM: Hearing
Vacated

ORDR

NICOLE

Order of Reference; Def. having moved to
disqualify Honorable Robert C. Naftz, he is
disqualified and this matter is referred to the
Honorable Stephen Dunn for reassignment to
another district judge; s/ J. Naft 2-8-13

Robert C Naftz

ORDR

KARLA

Administrative Order of Reference; matter
referred to Judge Brown for complete resolution;
/s J Dunn 02/14/13

Stephen S Dunn

DISQ

KARLA

Disqualification Of Judge

Mitchell Brown

ORDR

KARLA

Amended Admin Order of Reference; matter
referred to Judge Harding for resolution; /s J
Dunn 02/22/13

Stephen S Dunn

2/25/2013

CAMILLE

Motion to disqualify the Honorable Don Harding;
aty Kent Higgins for plntf

Don L. Harding

2/26/2013

CAMILLE

Notice of Deposition of Stephen Boswell: on
3-14-2013@ 9am: aty Reed Larsen

Don L. Harding

OCANO

Notice of Deposition of Katrina Boswell; Reed W. Don L. Harding
Larsen, Attorney for Dfdts.

2/28/2013

CAMILLE

Objection to motion to disqualify the Honorable
Don Harding; aty Reed Larsen

Don L. Harding

3/4/2013

CAMILLE

Response to objection to motion to disqualify the
Honorable Don Harding; aty Kent Higgins for
plntf

Don L. Harding

KARLA

Administrative Order; DENY Plaintiffs Motion to
Disqualify Judge Harding; /s J Dunn 03/05/13

Don L. Harding

CAMILLE

Notice vacating deporition of Karina Boswell; on
3-14-2013:
aty Reed Larsen

Don L. Harding

CAMILLE

Notice vacating deposition of Stephen Boswell;
set for 3-14-2013: aty Reed Larsen

Don L. Harding

CAMILLE

Amended notice of hearing on motion for partial
summary judgment; aty Kent Higgins for plntf

Don L. Harding

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 04/17/201310:00

Don L. Harding

2/1/2013

2/8/2013

2/14/2013

2/22/2013

3/6/2013

ORDR

3/7/2013

3/21/2013
HRSC

CAMILLE

Judge

AM)
CAMILLE

Amended notice of hearing on motion to Amend
Complaint; on 4-10-2013@ 10am: aty Kent
Higgins for plntf

Don L. Harding
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Case: CV-2012-0004120-PI Current Judge: William H Woodland
Stephen Boswell, etal. vs. Amber Dawn Steele, etal.

Stephen Boswell, Karena Boswell vs. Amber Dawn Steele, Mary E Steele
Date

Code

3/26/2013

HRSC

User

Judge

CAMILLE

Affidavit of Javier L Gabiola in support of motion
to vacate hearing on plaintiffs motion for partial
summary judgment; aty Javier Gabiola

Don L. Harding

CAMILLE

Memorandum in support of motion to vacate
hearing on plaintiffs motion for partial summary
judgment; aty Javier Gabiola

Don L. Harding

CAMILLE

Notice of hearing; set for Defs Motion to vacate
hearing on plaintiffs motion for partial summary
judgment on 4-10-2013@ 10am:

Don L. Harding

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 04/10/201310:00

Don L. Harding

CAMILLE

AM)
OCANO

Motion to Vacate Hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion for Don L. Harding
Partial Summary Judgment; Reed W. Larsen,
Attorney for Dfdts.

CAMILLE

Objection to motion to vacate hearing on plaintiffs Don L. Harding
motion for partial summary judgment; aty Kent
Higgins for plntf

BRANDY

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
Don L. Harding
04/10/2013 10:00 AM: District Court Hearing Hel<
Court Reporter:
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearlng
estimated:

CAMILLE

Affidavit of Javier L Gabiola in support of reply
memorandum in support of motion to vacate
summary judgment hearing;; aty Javier Gabiota

Don L. Harding

CAMILLE

Reply Memorandum in support of motion to
vacate summary judgment hearing; aty Reed
Larsen

Don L. Harding

4/16/2013

CAMILLE

Defendants available Trial dates:
Larsen

Don L. Harding

4/17/2013

CAMILLE

Plaintiffs available Trial dates; aty Kent Higgins
for plntf

Don L. Harding

4/18/2013

CAMILLE

Amended complaint and demand for Jury Trial;
aty Kent Higgins for plntf

Don L. Harding

4/26/2013

CAMILLE

Answer to Amended complaint and Demand for
Juryt Trial; aty Reed Larsen

Don L. Harding

4/29/2013

CAMILLE

Memorandum in support of motin to amend
complaint to include claim for punitive damages:
aty Kent Higgins for plntf

Don L. Harding

CAMILLE

Motion to Amend Complaint to include claim for
punitive damages; aty Kent Higgins for plntf

Don L. Harding

4/30/2013

CAMILLE

Notice of service - Plaintiffs fourth set of lnterrog
and this Notice of service: s/ aty Kent Higgins

Don L. Harding

5/14/2013

CAMILLE

Amended Notice of deposition of Karina Boswell
on 5-28-2013 @ 1pm: aty Reed Larsen

Don L. Harding

CAMILLE

Amended notice of deposition of Stephen Boswell Don L. Harding
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User: OCANO

Case: CV-2012-0004120-PI Current Judge: William H Woodland
Stephen Boswell, etal. vs. Amber Dawn Steele, etal.

Stephen Boswell, Karena Boswell vs. Amber Dawn Steele, Mary E Steele
Date

Code

User

Judge

CAMILLE

Minute Entry & Order; court VACATED the
Don L. Harding
hearing on Summary Judgment: parties shall
choose a mediator within 15 days of this hearing:
sf Judge Harding 4-10-2013

CAMILLE

Notice of service - Answers to plaintiffs fourth set Don L. Harding
of Discovery; aty Reed Larsen

5/22/2013

CAMILLE

Amended plaintiffs available Trial dates; aty Kent Don L. Harding
Higgins for plntf

5/23/2013

CAMILLE

Defendants response to plaintiffs Amended
available trial dates: aty Reed Larsen

Don L. Harding

6/5/2013

CAMILLE

Notice of depositin of Amber Steele; on
6-18-2013@ 9am: aty Kent Higgins for plntf

Don L. Harding

6/13/2013

CAMILLE

Amended notice of dpeosition of Amber Steele;
aty Kent Higgins for plntf

Don L. Harding

CAMILLE

Notice of deposition of Chris Kettler; on 7-2-2013 Don L. Harding
@ 1:30 pm: aty Kent Higgins for plntf

6/18/2013

CAMILLE

subpoena for Deposition of Chris Kettler; on
7-2-2013@ 1pm

Don L. Harding

6/19/2013

CAMILLE

Order setting Jury Trial; set for 9-10-2013@
9am: s/ Judge Harding 6-17-2013

Don L. Harding

5/20/2013

HRSC

CAMILLE

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 09/10/2013 09:00 Don L. Harding

AM}
6/26/2013

CAMILLE

Notice of service of offer of Judgment; aty Reed Don L. Harding
Larsen

7/1/2013

CAMILLE

Return of service - srvd on Chris Kettler on
6-24-2013 (subpoena for deposition )

Don L. Harding

7/5/2013

CAMILLE

Request for hearing on motion for partial
summary judgment; aty Kent Higgins for plntf

Don L. Harding

7/9/2013

CAMILLE

Subpoena for deposition of John Biflquist; on
7-17-2013 @9:30: aty Kent Higgins

Don L. Harding

7/10/2013

CAMILLE

Request for pretrial conference; aty Javier
Gabiola

Don L. Harding

CAMILLE

Defendants Response to plaintiffs request for
hearlng on motion for partial summary judgmetn;
aty Reed Larsen

Don L. Harding

CAMILLE

Defendants Motion for summary judgment;
Javier Gabiola

Don L. Harding

CAMILLE

Memorandum in support of defendants motion for Don L. Harding
summary judgments; aty Javier Gabiola

CAMILLE

Affidavit of Javier L Gabiola in support of
Defendants motion for summary judgment;
Javier Gabiola

7/12/2013

7/15/2013

aty

Don L. Harding
aty

CAMILLE

Motion to quash subpoena for deposition of John Don L. Harding
Billquist; aty Reed Larsen

CAMILLE

Notice of hearing; set for 7-16-2013@ 2pm

Don L. Harding

7 of 348

Date: 6/21/2016

Sixth Judicial District Court-Bannock County

Time: 02:38 PM

ROA Report

Page 7 of 17

User: OCANO

Case: CV-2012-0004120-PI Current Judge: William H Woodland
Stephen Boswell, etal. vs. Amber Dawn Steele, etal.

Stephen Boswell, Karena Boswell vs. Amber Dawn Steele, Mary E Steele
Date

Code

7/15/2013

7/16/2013

7/22/2013

7/23/2013

7/24/2013

HRSC

Judge

User

Don L. Harding

CAMILLE

Motion to shorten time; aty Reed Larsen

CAMILLE

Notice of service - Plntfs supplemental answers to Don L. Harding
defs discovery and this notice: aty Kent Higgins
for plntf

OCANO

Return of Service: Served a Subpoena for
Don L. Harding
Deposition to John Billquist on 7-11-13 by serving
to Natalie Billquist, Daughter.

OCANO

Return of Service; Served Subpoena for
Deposition to Chris Kettler on 6-24-13.

Don L. Harding

CAMILLE

Objection to motion to quash subpoena for John
Billquist; aty Kent Higgins for plntf

Don L. Harding

CAMILLE

Affidazvit of Kent Higgins; aty Kent Higgins for
plntf

Don L. Harding

CAMILLE

Order granting defendants motion to shorten time; Don L. Harding
s/ J Harding 7-16-2013

CAMILLE

Minute Entry and Order; Court granted the
Don L. Harding
Motion to quash subpoena , pending motions for
summary judgment shall be heard on 8-5-2013@
10am: sf Judge Harding 7-16-2013

CAMILLE

Affidavit of Javier L Gabiola in support of
defendants Memorandum in opposition to
plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment;
aty Reed Larsen

CAMILLE

Defendants motion to strike objection to plaintiffs Don L. Harding
affidavits supporting motin for partial summary
judgment; aty Reed larsen

CAMILLE

Memorandum in opposition to plaintiffs motion for Don L. Harding
partial summary judgment; aty Reed Larsen

CAMILLE

Memorandum in objection to defendants motion
for summary judgment; aty Kent Higgins for
plntf

CAMILLE

Don L. Harding
Affidavit of Karena Boswell in objection to defs
motion for summary judgment; aty Kent Higgins
for plntf

CAMILLE

Affidavit of Stephen Boswell in objection to defs Don L. Harding
motion for summary judgment; aty Kent Higgins
for plntfs

CAMILLE

Notice of hearing on motion for partial summary
judgment; aty Kent Higgins forplntf

Don L. Harding

CAMILLE

Notice of hearing; set for Defs Motion for
summary judgment on 8-5-2013 at 10am: aty
Javier Gabiola

Don L. Harding

CAMILLE

Memorandum in objection to defs motion for
summary judgment; aty Kent Higgins for plntf

Don L. Harding

CAMILLE

Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary
Judgment 08/05/2013 10:00 AM)

Don L. Harding

Don L. Harding

Don L. Harding
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Case: CV-2012-0004120-PI Current Judge: William H Woodland
Stephen Boswell, etal. vs. Amber Dawn Steele, etal.

Stephen Boswell, Karena Boswell vs. Amber Dawn Steele, Mary E Steele
Date

Code

Affidavit of Karena Boswell in objection to defs
Don L. Harding
motion for summary judgment; aty Kent Higgins
for plntf

CAMILLE

Afidavit of Stephen Boswell in objection to defs
motion for summary judgment; aty Kent Higgins
for plntf

Don L. Harding

CAMILLE

Reply Brief in support of motion for summary
judgment;
aty Kerit Higgins for plntf

Don L. Harding

CAMILLE

Reply Memorandum in support of defs motion for Don L. Harding
summary judgment; aty Reed Larsen

CAMILLE

Defendants Motion to strike objection to plaintiffs
affidavits in objeciton to defendants motion for
summary judgment; aty Reed Larsen

Don L. Harding

CAMILLE

Motion to shorten time re: Defendants Motion to
strike objeciton to plaintiffs affidavits in objection
to defs motion for summary Judgment; aty
Reed Larsen

Don L. Harding

CAMILLE

Defendants request for ocurts ruling on objection; Don L. Harding
aty Reed Larsen

MOTN

BRANDY

Defendant's Motions in Limine; dfdt aty

Don L. Harding

AFFD

BRANDY

Affidavit of Javier Gabiola in Support of
Defendants' Motions in Umine; dfdt aty

Don L. Harding

MEMO

BRANDY

Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motions Don L. Harding
in Limine; dfdt aty

ORDR

BRANDY

Order granting Defendants' Motion to Shorten
Don L. Harding
Time re: Defendants Motion to Strike/Objections
to Plaintiffs' Affidavits in Objection to Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment; dfdt aty

DCHH

BRANDY

Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Don L. Harding
scheduled on 08/05/2013 10:00 AM: District
Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter:
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated:

CAMILLE

expert witness disclosure of Jane Guidinger; aty Don L. Harding
Kent Higgins for plntf

CAMILLE

Expert witness disclosure of Teressa Erickson;
aty Kent Higgins for plntf

CAMILLE

Expert witnes disclosure of Jefrey Stucki DO; aty Don L. Harding
Kent Higgins for plntf

CAMILLE

Expert witness disclosure of Tamara Andersen;
aty Kent Higgins forplntf

Don L. Harding

CAMILLE

Expert witness disclosure of S Angier Wills, Jr.
MD PA ; aty Kent Higgins for plntf

Don L. Harding

CAMILLE

Expert witness disclosure of Tamara Andersen;
aty Kent Higgins

Don L. Harding

7/30/2013

7/31/2013

8/7/2013

Judge

CAMILLE

7/24/2013

8/5/2013

User

Don L. Harding
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Stephen Boswell, Karena Boswell vs. Amber Dawn Steele, Mary E Steele
Date

Code

User

8/8/2013

MOTN

BRANDY

Motion to shorten time for the Defendants to
respond pursuant to rule 34(b); pltf aty

Don L. Harding

BRANDY

Request for Rule 34 Inspection; pltf aty

Don L. Harding

CAMILLE

Supplemental Memorandum in support of defs
Don L. Harding
motin for summary judgment and supplemental
memorandum in opposition to plaintiffs motion for
partial summary judgment: aty Reed Larsen

BRANDY

Brief: filed by plaintiff attorney

Don L. Hard!ng

8/13/2013

BRANDY

Reply to Defendants' Motion in Limine; pltf aty

Don L. Harding

8/15/2013

CAMILLE

Defendants second motions in limine;
Larsen

CAMILLE

Memorandum in support of defendants second
motions in limine; aty Reed Larsen

Don L. Harding

CAMILLE

Affidavit of Javier L Gabiola in support of
defendants second motions in limine: aty Reed
Larsen

Don L. Harding

8/9/2013

8/12/2013

BRFS

Judge

aty Reed Don L. Harding

8/19/2013

MEOR

BRANDY

Don L. Harding
Minute Entry and Order; crt granted motion to
shorten time; oral argument; under advisement; J
Harding 8-5-13

9/10/2013

HRVC

BRANDY

Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on
09/10/2013 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated

CAMILLE

Memorandum Decision and order on Defs and P Don L. Harding
laintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment; Court
will GRANT Defs Motion for Summary Judgment;
s/ Judge Harding 10-29-2013

JDMT

CAMILLE

Order on Defendants and Plaintiffs Motions for
Don L. Harding
summary judgment; (Plaintiffs Matin for
Summary Judgment is DENIED< and Defs Motion
for Summary Judgment is GRANTED): s/ Judge
Harding 10-29-2013

CSTS

CAMILLE

Case Status Changed: Closed pending clerk
action

CAMILLE

Affidavit of Reed Larsen in suport of defs Amber Don L. Harding
Steeles and mary Steeles Memorandum of costs
and atty fees: aty Reed larsen

CAMILLE

Defendants Amber Steeles and Mary Steels
Memorandum of costs and attorney fees: aty
Reed Larsen

Don L. Harding

OBJT

BRANDY

Objection to Defendant's Application for Attorney
Fees and costs; pltf aty

Don L. Harding

BRFS

BRANDY

Don L. Harding
Brief in support of objection to Defendants
Application for attorney fees and costs; aty for pltf

CAMILLE

Notice of hearing on objection to application for
attorney fees and costs; asyt kent Higgins for
plntf

10/30/2013

11/5/2013

11/18/2013

11/20/2013

Don L. Harding

Don L. Harding

Don L. Harding
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Date

Code

User

11/22/2013

HRSC

CAMILLE

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
12/03/2013 10:00 AM)

LINDA

Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Don L. Harding
Supreme Court Paid by: Kent Higgins Receipt
number: 0037668 Dated: 12/3/2013 Amount:
$109.00 (Check) For: Boswell, Karena (plaintiff)
and Boswell, Stephen (plaintiff)

APSC

OCANO

Appealed To The Supreme Court

Don L. Harding

NOTC

OCANO

Notice of Appeal to Supreme Court: Kent A.
Higgins, Attorney for Plntfs.

Don L. Harding

OCANO

Received check 21767 in the amount of $100.00
for deposit of Clerk's Record on 12-3-13.

Don L. Harding

BRANDY

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled
on 12/03/2013 10:00 AM: Hearing Vacated

Don L. Harding

CAMILLE

Reply Brief in support of defs Memorandum of
costs and attorney fees: aty Reed Larsen

Don L. Harding

OCANO

Notice of Hearing on Objection to Application for
Attorney Fees and Costs: Kent A. Higgins,
Attorney for Plntfs.

Don L. Harding

OCANO

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL: Signed
and Mailed to Counsel and SC on 12-10-13.

Don L. Harding

OCANO

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
12/13/2013 10:00 AM) Objection to Application
for Attorney Fees and Cost.

Don L. Harding

OCANO

Defendants Requst for Additional Record and
Transcript; Reed W. Larsen, Attorney for
Dfdts.(Malled copy to SC on 12-12-13)

Don L. Harding

BRANDY

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled Don L. Harding
on 12/13/2013 10:00 AM: District Court Hearing
Held
Court Reporter:
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated:
Objection to Application for Attorney Fees and
Cost.

CAMILLE

Minute Entry & Order, Defs shall be awarded
Don L. Harding
costs as a matter of right in the amount of
$1485.20 Defs shall further be awarded
discretionary costs in the amount of $264.19, the
request for attys for attorney fees is hereby
DENIED:
s/ Judge Woodland 12-13-2013

12/19/2013

CAMILLE

Judgment; ag Amber Steele and Mary Steele for Don L. Harding
$1,749.39: s/ Judge Woodland 12-19-2013

12/20/2013

OCANO

IDAHO SURPEME COURT; Entered order
Remanding to District Court for Entry of Final
Judmgnet. Cases Suspended Until Further
Notice.

12/3/2013

HRVC
12/5/2013
NOTC

12/10/2013
HRSC

12/12/2013

12/13/2013

DCHH

Judge
Don L. Harding

Don L. Harding
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Code

User

Judge

12/24/2013

OCANO

Cert. Copy of Judgment mailed to SC on
12-24-13.

Don L. Harding

1/3/2014

CAMILLE

Motion to reconslder; aty Kent Higgins for plntf

Don L. Harding

CAMILLE

Brief in support of motion to reconsider; aty Kent Don L. Harding
Higgins for plntf

CAMILLE

Motion for reassignment of District Judge; aty
Kent Higgins for plntf

Don L. Harding

BRANDY

Order of assignment; case assigned to Judge
Woodland by TCA

William H Woodland

CAMILLE

Notice of hearing on motion to reconsider;
Kent Higgins for plntf

William H Woodland

OCANO

IDAHO SUPREME COURT; Filed Certified Copy William H Woodland
of Motion to Reconsider and Brief in Support as
filed in Dist. court 1-3-14. Appeal is currently
suspended for filing of Final Judgment.

OCANO

IDAHO SURPEME COURT; Received Certified
William H Woodland
Copy of Motion for Reassignment of Dist Judge
1-6-14 and Order of Assignment filed in Dist.
Court 1-7-14. Hon. Wm. H. Woodland assigned
for all further proceedings as Judge Don Harding
has retired ....

OCANO

IDAHO SUPREME COURT; Entered Order
William H Woodland
Remanding to District Court for A Final Judgment
that Does Not Contain Record of Prior
Proceedings. Thereafter, an Amended Notice of
Appeal Shall be Filed within 21 days listing by
Date and Title the Reporter(s) of Whom a
Transcripts is Requested, and Showing Service to
the Reporter(s).

JDMT

BRANDY

Judgment for dismissal; dismissed with prejudice; William H Woodland
J Woodland 1-16-14

NOTC

BRANDY

Amended Notice of hearing; Motion to reconsider; William H Woodland
pltf aty

CAMILLE

Defendants Memorandum in opposition to motion William H Woodland
to reconsider; aty Javier Gabiola

BRFS

BRANDY

Response Brief in Support of Motion to
Reconsider; pltf aty

William H Woodland

HRSC

BRANDY

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 01/21/2014 02:00

William H Woodland

1/6/2014
1/7/2014

ORDR

1/9/2014

1/15/2014

1/16/2014
1/17/2014

1/21/2014

aty

PM)

2/20/2014

DCHH

BRANDY

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
William H Woodland
01/21/2014 02:00 PM: District Court Hearing Hele
Court Reporter:
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated:

MISC

OCANO

IDAHO SUPREME COURT; Received Certified
Copy of Judgment for Dismissal.

William H Woodland
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Date

Code

User

Judge

CAMILLE

Memorandum Decision denying plaintiffs motion
to reconsider; (Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider
is DENIED}: s/ Judge Woodland 2-24-2014

OCANO

IDAHO SUPREME COURT; Received Certified William H Woodland
copy of Judgment for Dismissal filed in DC
1-15-14. (Counsel Advised that he will be
submitting another Judgment to D.C. Judge which
complies with 54(A). (Please advised as th the
status of filing another judgment in Dist. Court.)

3/14/2014

CAMILLE

Final Judgment; Plaintiffs complaint is dismissed William H Woodland
with prej: s/ Judge Woodland 3-14-2014

3/20/2014

OCANO

IDAHO SUPREME COURT; Received Certified William H Woodland
Copy of Memorandum Decision Denying Plaintiff's
Motion to Reconsider filed in Dist. Court 2-25-14.

OCANO

IDAHO SUPREME COURT; Received Certified William H Woodland
Copy of Final Judgment filed in Dist. Court
3-14-14. Appeal Suspended ...... Filing of Amended
Notice of Appeal Listing Reporters Still Pending ...

4/4/2014

OCANO

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL: Kent A.
Higgins. Attorney for Plntfs.

4/8/2014

OCANO

AMENDED CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF
Wtlliam H Woodland
APPEAL: Signed and Mailed To Counsel and SC
on4-8-14.

4/9/2014

OCANO

CORRECTED AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL; William H Woodland
Kent A. Higgins, Attorney for Pltfs.

2/25/2014

3/12/2014

MISC

William H Woodland

William H Woodland

5/2/2014

MISC

OCANO

CLERK'S RECORD (CD) received in Court
Records on 5-2-14

William H Woodland

5/5/2014

MISC

OCANO

NOTICE OF LODGE: Received in Court Records William H Woodland
on 5-5-14 from Stephanie Morser.

MISC

OCANO

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT received in Court
Records on 5-5-14. for Motion to Quash Held
7-16-13.

William H Woodland

5/6/2014

MISC

OCANO

SENT LETTER FOR BALANCE DUE ON
CLERK'S RECORD TO COUNSEL ON 5-5-14.
(Copy to SC also)

William H Woodland

5/9/2014

MISC

OCANO

Received $13. 65 from Cooper & Larsen for their
portion of clerk's record on 5-9-14.

William H Woodland

5/14/2014

MISC

OCANO

SUPREME COURT RECEIVED LETTER ABOUT William H Woodland
BALANCE DUE FOR CLERK'S REPORT.

6/16/2014

MISC

OCANO

Received check from Merrill & Merrill for the
balance of Clerk's Record on 6-16-14.
(emalled noticie to Dorothy in SC on 6-16-14)

MISC

OCANO

CLERK'S RECORD (cd) AND REPORTER'S
William H Woodland
TRANSCRIPTS MAILED TO COUNSEL: Kent A.
Higgins and Reed W. Larsen on 6-16-14. Due in
Supreme Court on 7-14-14.

William H Woodland
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Stephen Boswell, Karena Boswell vs. Amber Dawn Steele, Mary E Steele
Date

Code

User

6/16/2014

MISC

OCANO

IDAHO SUPREME COURT; Received email from William H Woodland
DC that Fee for Clerk's Record has been
received.

7/15/2014

MISC

OCANO

William H Woodland
CLERK'S RECORD (CD) AND REPORTER'S
TRANSCRIPTS MAILED TO SUPREME COURT
ON 7-15-14.

7/18/2014

MISC

OCANO

IDAHO SUPREME COURT; Received Clerk's
William H Woodland
Record, Reporter's Transdcript, and Exhibits. Set
Due Date Appellant's Brief Due 8-22-14.

4/14/2015

MISC

OCANO

IDAHO SUPREME COURT; Received Notice of William H Woodland
Appeal - Transcripts Request, however, the
partial transcripts requested are not specified by
dates or titles- Entered Order to Augment Prior
(electronic) Appeal No. 41684. ** Dist Clerk hall
prepare a Clerk's Record, but shall not duplicate
any documents included in the electronic Clerk's
Record filed in prior appeal No. 41684.
Suspended for Fourteen (14) days for filing of an
Amended Notice of Appeal to Specify Transcripts
by Dates/Titles and Service upon the Reporter.

4/21/2015

MISC

OCANO

IDAHO SUPREME COURT; Opinion filed 4-21-15. William H Woodland
Summary Judgment Vacated and Case
Remanded.

4/27/2015

MISC

OCANO

IDAHO SUPREME COURT; Acknowledgment of William H Woodland
Receipt: Opinion. Signed and Mailed back to
Supreme Court 4-27-15.

CAMILLE

Order setting Hearing; set for 6-2-2015 @ 9am: William H Woodland
s/ Judge Woodland 5-13-2015

CAMILLE

Hearing Scheduled (Scheduling Conference
06/02/2015 09:00 AM)

5/14/2015

OCANO

IDAHO SUPREME COURT; Entered Order
William H Woodland
Granting Award of Costs. Appellant's
Memorandum of Costs, with Exhibit attached,
was filed on 5-4-15. Respondent's Objection to
Costs was filed May 5, 2015. It hereby is Ordered
that Costs shall be awarded to Appellant and
against Respondent as follows:
Costs: 280.25 Total Awarded: $280.25. Signed
Karel Lehrman, Chief Deputy Clerk for Stephen
W. Kenyon, Clerk

5/20/2015

OCANO

IDAHO SUPREME COURT; Acknowledgment of William H Woodland
Receipt: Remittitur. Signed and Mailed to SC on
5-20-15.

OCANO

William H Woodland
Remittitur: The Court having announced its
Opinion in this cause April 21, 2015, which has
now become final. It is Further Ordered that
Appellant's costs on appeal shall be addressed in
a subsequent order. Signed Stephen Kenyon on
14 of 348
5-14-15.
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Stephen Boswell, etal. vs. Amber Dawn Steele, etal.

Stephen Boswell, Karena Boswell vs. Amber Dawn Steele, Mary E Steele
Date

Code

User

6/2/2015

DCHH

BRANDY

Hearing result for Scheduling Conference
scheduled on 06/02/2015 09:00 AM: District
Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter:
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated:

CAMILLE

Scheduling Order, notice of trial setting and initial William H Woodland
pretrial order; sf Judge Woodland

CAMILLE

Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial 01/19/2016
01:00 PM)

William H Woodland

CAMILLE

Affidavit of Jane Guidinger in support of Motion
for partial summary judgment; aty Kent Higgins
for plntf

William H Woodland

CAMILLE

Memorandum supporting plaintiffs second motin
for partial summary judgment; aty Kent Higgins
for plntf

William H Woodland

CAMILLE

Motion for partial summary judgment; aty Kent
Higgins for plntf

William H Woodland

CAMILLE

Notice of hearing on motion for partial summary
judgment; on 9-29-2015 @ 9am: aty Kent
Higgins for plntf

William H Woodland

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 09/29/2015 09:00

William H Woodland

6/9/2015
HRSC
9/2/2015

HRSC

CAMILLE

Judge
William H Woodland

AM)
CAMILLE

Defendants Motion to strike objection to affidavit
of Jane Guidinger; aty Reed Larsen

CAMILLE

Memorandum in opposition to plaintiffs motion for William H Woodland
partial summary judgment; aty Reed Larsen

CAMILLE

Memorandum in support of Defs Motion to strike
objections to affidavit of Jane Guidinger; aty
Reed Larsen

William H Woodland

CAMILLE

Notice of hearing; set for Defs Motion to strike
objections on 9-29-2015@ 9am:

William H Woodland

9/29/2015

CAMILLE

Minute Entry and Order; Court DENIED the
Motion for Summary Judgment; s/ Judge
Woodland 9-29-2015

William H Woodland

10/21/2015

CAMILLE

Notice of service - First Supplemental Answsers
to plaintiffs First set of Discovery, and this notice
of service: aty Reed Larsen

William H Woodland

10/23/2015

CAMILLE

Defendants Fact and expert witness disclosure;
aty Reed Larsen for def.

William H Woodland

10/26/2015

CAMILLE

Subpoena for deposition of John Billquist; on
11-3-2015 @ 9am: aty Kent Higgins for plntf

William H Woodland

11/5/2015

CAMILLE

Defendants supplemental Fact and expert
witness disclosure; aty Reed Larsen

William H Woodland

11/9/2015

CAMILLE

Subpoena for deposition of John Billquist on
William H Woodland
11-10-2015@ 10am: aty Kent Higgins for plntf

9/16/2015

William H Woodland
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Code
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CAMILLE

Memorandum supporting plaintiffs motion for
partial summary judgment; aty Kent Higgis for
plntf

William H Woodland

CAMILLE

Motion for partial summary judgment; aty Kent
Higgins for plntf

William H Woodland

CAMILLE

Notice of hearing; on motion for partial summary William H Woodland
judgment; set for 12-17-2015@ 10am: aty
Kent Higgins

CAMILLE

Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary
Judgment 12/17/201510:00 AM)

CAMILLE

Notice of appearance of co counsel; aty Richard William H Woodland
Hearn for plaintiff

ATTR

CAMILLE

Plaintiff: Boswell, Stephen Attorney Retained
Richard Avery Hearn

William H Woodland

ATTR

CAMILLE

Plaintiff: Boswell, Karena Attorney Retained
Richard Avery Hearn

William H Woodland

CAMILLE

Amended notice of hearing on motin for partial
summary judgment; aty Kent Higgins for plntf

William H Woodland

CAMILLE

Memorandum in opposition to plaintiffs motin for
partial summary judgment; aty Reed Larsen

Wllliam H Woodland

CAMILLE

Reply Brief in support of motion for summary
judgment;
aty Kent

Wrlliam H Woodland

BRANDY

Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment William H Woodland
scheduled on 12/21/2015 10:00 AM: District
Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: none
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated:

12/22/2015

CAMILLE

Minute Entry and Order; Court took matter under William H Woodland
advisement with a written decision to be issued:
s/ Judge Woodland 12-22-2015

12/28/2015

CAMILLE

Notice of service of offer of judgment; s/ atty
Javier Gabiola

William H Woodland

1/7/2016

CAMILLE

Motion to shorten time;

William H Woodland

CAMILLE

Notice of hearing; set for Defs Motions in Limine William H Woodland
on 1-13-2016@ 9am: aty Javier Gabiola

CAMILLE

Order granting defendants Motion to shorten time; William H Woodland
s/ Judge Woodland 1-7-2016

11/18/2015

HRSC
12/7/2015

12/14/2015
12/21/2015

DCHH

HRSC

CAMILLE

aty Javier Gabiola

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 01/13/2016 09:00

William H Woodland

William H Woodland

AM)

1/8/2016

William H Woodland

CAMILLE

Memorandum in support of Defs Motions in
Limine; aty Javier Gabiola

CAMILLE

Affidavit of Javier L Gabioila in support of
William H Woodland
Defendants Motions in limine; aty Javier Gabiola

CAMILLE

Defendants Exhibit List;

William H Woodland
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1/13/2016

DCHH

BRANDY

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
William H Woodland
01/13/2016 09:00 AM: District Court Hearing Hel<
Court Reporter: Sheri L. Nothelphim
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: More than 100

CAMILLE

Affidavit in support of plaintiffs response to Defs
Motion in limine; aty Richard Hearn for plntf

William H Woodland

CAMILLE

Plaintiffs response to defs Motions in limine RE:
Medical Bills; aty Richard Hearn fa rplntf

William H Woodland

CAMILLE

Plaintiffs proposed Jury Instructions;
Higgins for plntf

William H Woodland

BRANDY

Minute Entry and Order; plaintiffs motion for
William H Woodland
partial summary judgment is denied; J Woodland

CAMILLE

Affidavit of Javier L Gabiola in support of defs
Objection/Motion to quash subpoena for John
Billquist; aty Reed larsen

William H Woodland

CAMILLE

Defs Objection/Motion to quash subpoena of
JOhn Billquist; aty Reed Larsen

William H Woodland

CAMILLE

Request to rule on objections in Chris Kettler
Deposition ;' aty Javier Gabiola

William H Woodland

CAMILLE

Subpoena for Joh Billquist;
plntfs

CAMILLE

Defendants Proposed Jury Instructions; aty Reed Wrlliam H Woodland
Larsen

BRANDY

Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on
01/19/2016 09:00 AM: Jury Trial Started

1/21/2016

CAMILLE

Defendants second supplemental proposed Jury William H Woodland
Instructions;
aty Reed Larsen

1/22/2016

CAMILLE

Mag Log; (4) Minute Entry and Order; Court to
prepare an appropriate judgment for the courts
review and signature: s/ Judge Woodland
1-22-2016

William H Woodland

CAMILLE

Special Verdict; Plaintiffs Exhibit List;

William H Woodland

CAMILLE

Defendants Amended Exhibit List;

William H Woodland

CAMILLE

Original N01 Instruction, Pre Emptory
challenges for qualification to hear jury trial;
seating chart:

William H Woodland

OCANO

Final Seating Chart

William H Woodland

CAMILLE

Affidavit of Reed Larsen in support of Defs
Memorandum of costs;
aty Reed Larsen

William H Woodland

CAMILLE

Defendants Memorandum of Costs;
Larsen

William H Woodland

CAMILLE

Brief in support of objection to defs application for William H Woodland
costs; aty Kent Higgins for plntf

1/14/2016
1/15/2016

1/19/2016

2/2/2016

2/16/2016

MEOR

JTST

Judge

aty Kent

aty Kent Higgins for William H Woodland

aty Reed

William H Woodland
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Judge

CAMILLE

Objection to Defs Application for costs; aty Kent William H Woodland
Higgins for plntf

RESP

AMYW

Response to Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendants'
Application for Costs; atty Reed Larsen for defs

William H Woodland

JDMT

AMYW

Judgment; Judgment is entered in favor of the
Defendants and all of the Plaintiffs' Claims are
dismissed w/prejudice; /s/ J Woodland, 2-19-16

William H Woodland

CSTS

AMYW

Case Status Changed: Closed

William H Woodland

CAMILLE

Memorandum Decision and Order on costs;
(TOTAL cost to Defendants are: $3829.21) s/
Judge Woodland 3-4-2016

William H Woodland

OCANO
OCANO

Appealed To The Supreme Court

William H Woodland

NOTICE OF APPEAL: Kent A Higgins, Attorney
for Appellants Stephen Boswell and Karina
Boswell

William H Woodland

OCANO

Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to William H Woodland
Supreme Court Paid by: Kent A Higgins
Receipt number: 0010646 Dated: 3/30/2016
Amount: $129.00 (Check) For: Boswell, Karena
(plaintiff) and Boswell, Stephen (plaintiff)

OCANO

Received check # 23836 in the amount of
$100.00 for deposit of Clerk's Record.

William H Woodland

TAMILYN

Defenants' Request for Additional Record and
Transcript-thru atty Reed Larsen (Sent copies to
SC on 4-26-16)

William H Woodland

TAMILYN

Judgment-against Plaintiff in the amount of
$3,829.21 s/Woodland 04/08/2016

William H Woodland

4/20/2016

TAMILYN

Amended Request for Additional Record and
Transciprt-by Plaintiffs/Appellants thru atty Reed
Larsen (Sent copies to SC on 4-26-16)

Willlam H Woodland

4/28/2016

TAMILYN

Amended Notice of Appeal-by appellants thru atty William H Woodland
Kent Higgins

TAMILYN

Affidavit of Kent A. Higgins

OCANO

IDAHO SUPREME COURT; Received Request William H Woodland
and Amended Request for Additional Record and
Transcripts, filed Amended Notice of Appeal. Set
Due Date - Transcripts Lodging Date 7-7-16 and
Clerk's Record Due 8-11-16. Docket#44093.

OCANO

CLERK'S RECORD CD RECEIVED 6-21-16.

2/16/2016
2/19/2016

3/4/2016

3/29/2016

APSC

NOTC
3/30/2016

4/7/2016

4/8/2016

JDMT

AFFD
5/6/2016

6/21/2016

MISC

William H Woodland

William H Woodland
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Reed W. Larsen (3427)
Javier L. Gabiola (5448)
COOP.ER & LARSEN, CHARTERED
151 North 3n1 Avenue, 2nd Floor
P.O. Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205·4229
Telephone: (208) 235~1145
Facsimile: (208) 235-1182

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH nJDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
STEPHEN BOSWELL and KARINA BOSWELL, )
husband and wife,
)

Case No. CV-12·4120 SC

)

Plaintiffs,

}
)

v.

)
)

AMBER STEELE and MARY STEELE,

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

)
.)

Defendants.

)

COME NOW Defendants, Amber Stee.le and Mary Steele, deceased, by and through the
undersigned counsel, and hereby provide the following Reply Memorandum in Support of
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment

INTRODUCTION
Defendants are entitled to summaryjudgment, as Plaintiffs cannot meet each element oftheir
claims. As to the strict liability claim, there is no statutory law or case law supporting Plaintiffs'
claim. To the contrary, there is no law in Idaho where strict liability was applied in dog bite or
· premises liability cases. While Plaintiffs cite to otherjuris~ctions, some ofwhich do not apply strict
liability in a case such as this, they cannot, legitimately, dispute _there is no such claim in Idaho. To
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the contrary, and, again, at the hearing on July 16, 2013, Plaintiffs' counsel admitted there was no
law to support their strict li~bility claim. It is unsupported in Idaho and Defendants are entitled to
summary judgment.
Further, as to the negligence and negligence per se claims, again, Plaintiffs cannot meet each
element, as is their burden. Plaintiffs have not disputed that there was no adjudication, nor any
complaints, that Zoey was vicious or dangerous. Further, the undisputed facts of the case show that
it was Mr. Boswell's actions, i.e. his comparative fault, that caused the bite. Mr. Boswell
approached Zoey, who Mary had confined in her home behind a gate, with ·a closed fist, 1 and on his
own, without notifying Mary. 2 Also, Plaintiffs do not dispute either that Mary and Amber kept Zoey
confmed in the basement ofthe home or behind the gate inside the home. Plaintiffs admitted, which
they do not dispute, they did not believe Zoey to be dangerous or vicious or that Mary or Amber were
negligent. Plaintiffs also did not refute the case law establishing that there is no private cause of
action in the statutes alleged by Plaintiffs' in their complaint.
Finally, as to the premises liability claim, Plaintiffs do not dispute the holding of Wilson v.

Bogart, 81 Idaho 535,347 P.2d 341 (1959), which negates Mr. Boswell's claim he was an.invitee.
There is no dispute Mr. Boswell was a "member of the family" and as such a social guest, which is
what the Wilson court held. Moreover, Plaintiffs do not show that Mr. Boswell conferred any
monetary benefit to Mary, and it is clear he was not an invitee. For these reasons, Defendants are

1Defendants

have concurrently filed an objection to Mr. Boswell's affidavit, wherein he
contradicts his sworn deposition testimony that he approached Zoey with a closed fist.
posited that after Mr. Boswell was bitten, Zoey "continued to wrestle and chew
[his] bloody piece of skin...." Plaintiffs' Brief, at I. This contradicts what Mr. Boswell stated
to Mrs. Boswell, as, according to Mrs. Boswell, Mr. Boswell told her Zoe "push[ed] the skin
around on the floor with her nose." Karena Boswell Depo., p. 24, ll. J9~20.
2Plaintiffs
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entitled to summary judgment.

ARGUMENT
A.

AS PLAINTIFFS' COUNSEL PREVIOUSLY ADMITTED, IDAHO IS NOT
A STRICT LIABILITY STATE, AS THERE IS NO LAW IN IDAHO
ALLOWING SUCH A CLAIM IN DOG BITE OR PREMISES LIABILITY
CASES.

Plaintiffs' counsel admitted to the Court at a prior hearing there was no Idaho case law where
strict liability was applied to a dog bite or premises liability case. Plaintiffs cannot dispute that the
Idaho courts have never adopted or applied strict liability to dog bite or premises liability cases.
Plaintiffs do not dispute that Idaho only adopted the concept of strict liability in cases .dealing with
a seller of a defective product to a consumer. See, Shields v. Morton Chemical Company, 95 Idaho
674,518 P.2d 857 (1974).
Despite Plaintiffs' admission Idaho has never adopted a strict liability theory to dog bite or
premises liability cases, Plaintiffs, once again, apply theories that are inapplicable and which they
have not pied in their complaint. Plaintiffs cite to Idaho Code§ 6-210.3 which pertains to the imputed
liability of a minor to his/her parents. Plaintiffs never pied this in their complaint. Further, the
statute itself is not a strict liability statute, as by its own terms, a plaintiffmust still establish the child
acted "willfully." It is patently obvious Plaintiffs misapply this statute, and it has no bearing
whatsoever in this case.
Plaintiffs further try to side step the unequivocal fact that Idaho has never adopted strict
liability to dog bite or premises liability cases, by relying upon a non-binding case discussing

3

Plaintiffs' brief at 2.
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nuisance.

4

However, Plaintiffs' reference to that citation made it a requirement that the dog's·

vicious tendencies be known. 5 Further, Plaintiffs do not dispute that Pocatello City Code, Sections
6.04.0SOA, B and C provide that a person cannot harbor a dangerous animal only after an animal is
"adjudicated" as dangerous. 6 Plaintiffs also do not dispute that provocation is a defense to the

Plaintiffs' brief at 3.

4

Since Plaintiffs failed to show any law in Idaho applying strict liability.in dog bite or
premises liability cases, Plaintiffs attempt to deflect from this by citing the Court to non-binding
case law/statutes of other states. It appears Plaintiffs obtained these citations from some legal
compilation or treatise, and did not carefully read or scrutinize them. Again, the glaring fact
Plaintiffs cannot escape is that Idaho is not a strict liability state, along with Hawaii,
Kentucky, North Dakota (see, Sendelbach v. Grad, 246 N.W. 2d 496, 501 (N.D.
1976)(premises liability) and Vermont. Indiana presumes a dog is harmless and applies
strict liability only where a letter carrier is involved. Cooks v. Whitsell-Sherman, 796 N.E. 2d
271, 275-76 (Ind. 2003). Nevada actually requires 2 bites in an 18 month period, without
_provocation (N.R.S. 202.500)(2013). Rhode Island only applies strict liability if a dog gets
out of its enclosure. DuBois v. Quilitzsch, 21 A.3d 375,380 (Rl. 2011).
6

Additionally, there are states that require the plaintiff show the owner knows or
reasonably knows the dog is vicious or dangerous, and, of those, South I>akota-Gehrts v.
Batteen, 620 N.W. 775, 778 (S.D. 2001) and Tennessee, Fletcher v. Richardson, 603 S;W.2d
734, 735-36) held that the requisite knowledge was a negligence, not strict liability, theory.
In Alaska, siunmatyjudgment was granted to the defendant animal owner, since the plaintiff
knew of the animal's dangerous propensities (Hale v. O'Neill, 492 P.2d 101, 104 (Alaska 1971).
New Mexico has a simil&r law to Alaska. Smith v. Village ofRuidoso, 994 P.2d 50, 54 (1999).
Other states have laws allowing for defenses of provocation, comparative fault and
assumption of risk theories in such cases (Priebe v. Nelson, 140 P.3d 848,849 (California
2006); Russo v. Zeigler, 67 A.3d 536 (Delaware Sup. Ct. 2013); District of Columbia (D.C. Code
§ 8-1902(b)(l)(B); Florida, Fla. Stat. Ann. §767.04 (2013) (comparative fault applies);
VanBeheren y. Bradley, 640 N.E. 2d 664, 666-67 (Ill. Ct. App. 1994); Fouts v. Mason, 592
N.W.2d 33,36 (Iowa);.Pepper v. Triplet,864 So. 2d 181, 191-92 (Louisiana2003); Audette v.
Comm., 829 N.E.2d 248, 255 (Massachusetts 2005); Hill v. Sacka, 666 N.W. 2d 282, 287-88
(Michigan 2003); Engquist v. Loyas, 803 N. W. 2d 400, 403 (Minnesota 2011 ); Nebraska. Rev.
Stat. 54-601(b)(2013); Bohan v. Ritzo, 679 A.2d 597,601 (New Hampshire 1996). See also
Plaintiffs' cites to Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania and South Carolina at p. 8.
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aforementioned city code, as well as Idaho Code§ 25-2805.
Plaintiffs give short shrift to McClain v. Lewiston Interstate Fair and Racing Association,
17 Idaho 63, 104 P.2d 1015 (1909), and, admit, strict liability was not pled in 1909 in McClain.
Strict liability was not a recognized legal theory in 1909, and is not the holding ofthe McClain court,
as clearly indicated therein, when the McClain court discusses its holding as opposed to a discussion
of the Decker v. Gammon, 44 Me. 322, 69 Am. Dec. 99, the case Plaintiffs reference. Again, the

McClain court stated:
The dog is generally recognized as. an essential part of every well-regulated
· family, and of a higher degree of intelligence than other domestic animals,
and given privileges not generally conceded to other members of the animal
family. But we are inclined to the opinion that notwithstanding this fact, and
notwithstanding the fact that the dog occupies a higher position in the social
world of the animal family, and an important one in human affairs, still that
the owner of such animal should not be excui;ed from liability for injuries
done by the dog when invading the rights of person ·or property. This
position that the dog has well eamed, by reason of his heroic acts and deeds
of valor, might be a reason for exacting from the owner a higher duty as to
responsibility for the dog's acts, but it certainly is not a reason why the owner
of such animal should be not equally responsible for the wrongs done by a
dog as for wrongs done by other domestic animals. And we believe, both
upon reason and authority, that when a dog invades and trespasses upon the
legal rights of a person and injures person or property, and such invasion and
trespass is the result ofthe negligence ofthe owner, the owner is liable for the
damages done.
17 Idaho at 81-82 [widerscore supplied]. McCain never adopted or applied strict liability to dog bite
or premises liability cases. Further, ifldaho were adopting a strict liability standard in 1909, the court
certainly would not have phrased its holding in terms ofthe status ofthe allegations in the complaint
which were negligence and trespass by a dog and its owner. And, again, under Plaintiffs' en-oneous
position, like the facts in this case, a person could reach their hand into a dog pen, receive a dog bite
and then have no responsibility for their own behavior that initiated the incident.

The
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aforementioned Pocatello City Codes and I.C §25-2805 further support Defendants' position, since
they have provocation exceptions. Further, Idaho's tort system has never endorsed such lack of
personal responsibility. See Idaho Code§ 6-801 et. seq. For these reasons, the Court should grant
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and dismiss Plaintiffs' strict liability claim with
prejudice.
B.

PLAINTIFFS STILL HAVE NOT SHOWN THEY CAN ESTABLISH THE
ELEMENTS OF THEIR NEGLIGENCE AND NEGLIGENCE PER SE
CLAIMS, AND FAIL TO ADEQUATELY DISPUTE THERE IS NO
PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION ALLOWED BY THE STATUTES
ASSERTED BY THEM.

1.

Plaintiffs have not established each element of their common -law negligence
claim.

Again, for a valid claim of negligence, Plaintiffs must show (1) a duty, recognized by law,
requiring the defendant to confonn to a certain standard of conduct; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a
.

.

causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or
damage. Boots v. Winters, 145 Idaho 389,392, 179 P3d 352,355 (Ct. App. 2008)(citing, Nation
v. State, Dept of Corrections, 144 Idaho 177, 189, 158 P.3d 953,965 (2007)). Plaintiffs have not

met their burden, and have not disputed that Mary put up warning signs; that she and Amber did not
know Zoey to be dangerous or vicious; that prior to the incident, there had been no complaints or any
adjudication that Zoey was dangerous or had bitten anyone without provocation; that Zoey nipped
at Chris Kettler, but only because Zoey saw Ms. Kettler reach or move towards Amber and was
being protective of her; that Mary and Amber never saw Zoey bear her teeth, snarl or lunge at
someone; that Mary had a fenced-in back yard to keep Zoey on her property; and that Zoey stayed
in the basement or was behind the gate in the kitchen, where she was at the time ofthe incident. See,
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Memorandum in Support ofDefendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 2-4.

Further, Plaintiffs do not dispute that Mr. Boswell, on his own, and without Mary's
knowledge or her at her request, approached Zoey, who was behind the gate, with his right
hand in a closed fist. Stephen Boswell Depa., p. 29, l. 7-p. 33, 1.5. Mr. Boswell reached to Zoey and
she bit him. They do not dispute Mr. Boswell admitted that there was no reason for him to go beyond
the gate, and that Mary never asked him to go to Zoey, and he decided on his own to go to Zoey.
Mary Steele Depo., p. 12; p. 40, ll. 14-18; Exh. B., p. 25, ll.22-24.

Even more telling is that both Plaintiffs admitted that they knew that Mary and Amber
kept Zoey in the basement, and did not think Mary did anything wrong in keeping Zoey in a
fenced in back yard or behind the gate in her_ house. Stephen Boswell Depa., p. 13, ll. 6-7; p. 16,
ll.11-19; KarenaBoswellDepo.,p.19, ll.2-6;p. 42, l.10-p. 43, l.3. Moreover,Mr.Boswelladmitted

he did not believe Mary was negligent, as he testified, "'I don't think she [Mary] did anything
wrong." StephenBoswellDepo.,p. 35, l.25-p.35, [.].[Emphasis added]. Mrs. Boswell admitted she
still was around Zoey and did not have any concerns, could not say Zoey' s conduct was predictable
and could not be critical of Mary's actions. Karena Boswell Depo., p. 17, ll.19-23; p. 42, l.J 0-p. 43,

l.3; p. 33, ll.1-8. For these reasons, as Plaintiffs cannot meet the elements oftheir negligence claim,
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment.
2.

Plaintiffs do not dispute there has been no adjudication of Zoey as vicious and
Mr. Boswell provoked Zoey.

Plaintiffs do not dispute that Pocatello City Code Sections 6.04.0SOA, B and C provide that
a person cannot harbor a dangerous animal only after an animal is "adjudicated" as dangerous.
Further, section 6.05.060 mandates restraint of a dangerous animal where "the owner/custodian of
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any animal convicted of a violation of the dangerous conduct prohibitions . . .." [Emphasis

supplied].

Likewise, I.C. §25-2805 provides that a vicious dog is a dog, "which, when not

physically provoked, physically attacks, wounds, bites or otherwise injures any person who is not
trespassing .... " and that, "[p]ersons guilty of a violation of this subsection ... shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor." [Emphasis supplied].
In this matter, Plaintiffs provide no evidence disputing that there has been no adjudication
that Zoey was found.to be dangerous or vicious. Further, Mr. Boswell admitted, on his own, and
without telling Mary, he approached Zoey, with a closed fist (despite attempting to contradict this
testimony in his inadmissible affidavit), and put his closed fist to her face. This certainly qualifies
as provo.cation, thereby negating any basis for Plaintiffs; negligence per se claims. Thus, Plaintiffs'
negligence per se ·claim should be dismissed with prejudice.

3.

There is no private cause of action under Idaho Code §25-2805 or Pocatello City
Codes §§6.04.050 and 6.04.060.

Plaintiffs fail to adequately refute Defendants' position there is no private cause of action.
It is clear why Plaintiffs do not refute this position, as it is patently obvious, in reviewing the city
codes and Idaho statute asserted by Plaintiffs, there is no private cause of action, either express or
implied. "When a statute is silent regarding private enforcement, courts may recognize a private
right only when it is necessary to assure effectiveness of the statute." Foster v. Shore Club Lodge,

Inc., 127 Idaho 921,908 P.2d 1228 (1995); White v. UnigardMut. Ins. Co., 112Idaho 94,101,730
P.2d 1014, 1021 (1986)). Likewise, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that there was no private
cause of action for an insured who sought to sue its insurer under criminal statutes for obstruction
of justice, bribery and corrupt influences, reasoning that those statutes were not designed to protect
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any special class of persons, only the general public, and that there was no legislative intent to create
a private cause of action through those statutes. Yoakum v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 129 Idaho 171,
176,923 P.2d 416,421 (1996). Plaintiffs do not refute the holdings of these cases. 7 It is clear that
a private cause of action is unnecessary to give effect to §§25-2805 or Pocatello City Codes §§
6.04.050 and 6.04.060. Those statutes do not e,stablish any right of Plaintiffs, either express or
implied, and are expressly limited to criminal sanctions. Plaintiffs' attempt to invoke a private right
under the statutes is an attempt to assert a criminal statute in a civil action, which was expressly
prohibited by the Court in Yoakum, supra. If the Idaho legislature or Pocatello City wanted to
provide for a private cause of action doe LC. §25-2805 and Pocatello City Codes §§6.04.050 and
6.04.060. they could have expressly provided for civil remedies. However, those entities did not;
rather, only set forth criminal remedies. As a result, since those statutes do not provide for a private
cause of action, Plaintiffs claims against Defendants must be dismissed.
C.

THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT THAT MR.
BOSWELL WAS NOT AN INVITEE.

Mr. Boswell was not an invitee; rather, he was a social guest or licensee. Again, in Wilson
v. Bogart, 81 Idaho 53 5, 545, 347 P .2d 341 (1959), a social guest to the property is a licensee, even

if the guest provides an intangible social benefit to the host As a social guest, or licensee, a
landovmer is only required to share with the licensee knowledge ofdangerous conditions or activities
on the land. Evans, 112 Idaho at 401, 732 P.2d at 370 [Emphasis supplied]. See also, Mooney v.

Robinson, 93 Idaho 676, 471 P.2d 63 (1970)("The rendition by a social guest of an incidental
economic benefit to the occupier of the premises will not change the licensee's status to that of an
0nce again, Plaintiffs cite the Court to no Idaho law, rather, non-binding law. See
Plaintiffs' Brief, at 11.
7
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invitee.)).
In this case it is undisputed Mr. Boswell was Ms. Steele's son-in-law. Mary Steele Depo.,
p. 6, 11.7-9. It is undisputed Mr. Boswell was taking Ms. Steele home after a family gathering.
Stephen Boswell Depo., p.23, l.17-p.24, 1.23. It is further undisputed neither Ms. Steele nor Mr.

Boswell were conferring upon each other any economic benefit; r~ther Mr. Boswell was a "family
member" who took Ms. Steele to and from her home for a family gathering. Karen Boswell Depo.,
p.48, l.4-p. 50, l.J 5. This is exactly what the Wilson court contemplated as a social guest. Mr.

Boswell was not receiving any remuneration. Ms. Steele was not conducting any business on her
property. Therefore, the Court should grant the Defendants summary judgment and dismiss
Plaintiffs' premises liability/invitee claim.
D.

PLAINTIFFS DO NOT DISPUTE THAT DEFENDANT AMBER STEELE
DID NOT OWN THE PROPERTY WHERE THE INCIDENT OCCURRED,
AND SHE IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFFS'
PREMISES LIABILITY CLAIM.

Plaintiffs have not put forth any facts disputing Amber Steele was not an owner of the
premises where the incident occurred. They also fail to cite to any case law contrary to the case law
cited by Defendants that only a landowner owes a duty to a person entering the premises, subject to
the person's status as an invitee, licensee·or trespasser. Memorandum in Support ofDefendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 15-16. As Amber Steele did not own the premises, Plaintiffs'

premises liability claims against her should be dismissed.
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CONCLUSIONBased on the foregoing, Defendants respectfully request that the Court grant their Motion for
Sununary Judgment and dismiss Plaintiffs' claims with prejudice.
DATED this2.f day of July, 2013.
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on thisd:1.--dayof July,2013, I served a true and correct copy
of the above and foregoing document to the following person(s) as follows:

H-

Kent A. Higgins
Merrill & Merrill, Chartered
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991

[J

[l
[]

U.S. Mail/Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivery
Overnight Mail
Facsimile\ 232-2499
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NOTE: one duplicate copy of all motions, and any opposition thereto, together with supporting
memorandum, affidavits and - documents,
brandy(ii),bannockcounty. us
0

and

trial

brief,
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emailed to

.
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Kent A. Higgins
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED
109 North Arthur - 5th Floor
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991
(208) 232-2286
(208) 232-2499 Telefax
ISB#: 3025

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, 1N AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
STEPHEN BOSWELLand KARINA
BOSWELL, husband and wife,

)

)
)

Plaintiff,
AMBER STEELE, The Estate
MARY STEELE,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. cv-12;.4120 oc
MOTION TO RECONSIDER

COMES NOW the Plaintiffs, Stephen Boswell and Karina Boswell, by and through their
through her counsel of record, Kent A. Higgins of Merrill & Merrill, Chartered, pursuant to IRCP
Rule 59 to hereby move this Court to reconsider its Order quashing the subpoena of John Billquist
on July 16, 2013, and its Memorandum Decision & Order on Defendant's and Plaintiffs' Motions
for Summary Judgment dated October 29, 2013, on several grounds.
1.

The Findings of Fact do not apply the proper standard;

2.

The Court has not addressed Plaintiffs' argument that Idaho would adopt the

Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 509 (1977) and Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 513, or the
·Restatement (Third) of Torts, Phys. & Emot. Harm, § 23 (2010), as to liability of dog owners;
Motion to Reconsider
0:\90\9034\Pleadings\Motion to Reconsider. wpd
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3.

The Court has not addressed the Plaintiffs' argument that Idaho would adopt the

majority point of view followed by 47 of the 50 states and the District of Columbia pertaining to dog
owner liability;
4.

The Court has not addressed Plaintiffs' argument that the Court would follow the

Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 513, pertaining to premises liability;
5.

The Courthouse erroneously overlooked duties of a dog owner owed to potential dog

bite victims, duties enumerated in Plaintiffs' pleadings, and thus erroneously concluding that no
issue of fact exist;
6.

The Court has not analyzed the law of neighboring states and has concluded, without

expert opinion; that, reaching ones hand toward a dog is as a matter of law, provocative for purposes
of Pocatello Municipal Code § 60.04.050(A)(2) and (E);
7.

The Court has stricken·· the Affidavit of Tamara Andersen without a reason

recognizable by law, and without providing Plaintiffs an opportunity to cure as the Court should have
done in the interests of justice;
8.

The Court has disallowed the deposition of John Billquisf.~espite the fact he has

made himself a fact witness.
This Motion is made for these reasons and those addressed in the accompanying brief.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, the undersigned, do hereby certify that a true, full and correct copy of the foregoing
document was thiS;..:'{ ..£: day of January, 2014, served upon the following in the manner indicated
\./
'
below:
Reed W. Larsen
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED
P.O. Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205~4229

[ -1/~.S. Mail
[

./
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[

] Hand Delivery
J Overnight Delivery
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
STEPHEN BOSWELL and KARINA
BOSWELL, husband and wife,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)
)

)
)
AMBER STEELE, The Estate of
MARY STEELE,
Defendants.

Case.No. CV-12-4120 OC

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
RECONSIDER

)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiffs, Stephen Boswell and Karina Boswell, respectfully request that this court
reconsider its Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendants' and Plaintiffs' Motions for
Summary Judgment

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following are material and undisputed facts regarding Plaintiffs' claim against the
Defendants, Amber Steele and the Estate of Mary Steele:
1. Defendant, Mary Steele, owned the property located at 1115 Verdugo in Pocatello,Idaho.
Affidavit ofJavier L. Gabiola in Support ofDefendants' Motion for Summary Judgment ("Gabiola
A.ff.",) Ex A p.5 11.5~1 I.
Brief in Support of Motion to Reconsider
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2.

Defendant, Amber Steele, was Mary's granddaughter and resided with her at that

address. Id. Ex A, p. 11-12.
3.

Amber owned a Scottish Terrier named Zoey that also resided at Mary's residence.

1, Ex A.p.6, ll. 24-25.
4.

Mary Steele harbored the dog named Zoey.

5.

Prior to the incident where Mr. Boswell was bit on October 8, 2011, there have been

at least two incidents where Zoey has bit somebody. The first known incident, according to the
records, was when Zoey bit Amber's friend, Chris Kettler, at a barbeque party held at Mary's house.
The bite drew blood, and was bandaged.
6.

The second known incident, according to the record, is based on Ms. Boswell's

testimony that she witnessed one of Amber's friends get bit by Zoey at a party at Mary's house. The
friend's wound also drew blood.
7.

Mary had a fenced-in backyard sufficient to keep Zoey on her property. Id. Ex. A,

0 11, ll. 5-9. There was also a gate in the kitchen to keep Mary's dog from making a mess on the
carpet. For the most part, Amber kept Zoey in a room in the basement when Amber was out of the
house.

Id. Ex. C, p. 7-8.

8.

Mr. Boswell had spent some time with Zoey before the incident. Id., Ex. B p.12, ll

7-14. Zoey let Mr. Boswell pet her and she had played on his lap. Id. Ex. A. p. 26-27.
9.

. On the day ofthe incident, October 8, 2011, Mr. Boswell gave Mary a ride home after

a visit at the Boswell's home. Mr. Boswell went inside Mary's home with Mary.
10.

When Mr. Boswell and Mary entered the.home, Amber was not in the house. Id., Ex.

A, p. 32. Id.11. 8-10. Zoey and Mary's dog were in the kitchen behind the gate, Zoey was barking.
Id. Ex. A, p. 6, 11. 21-25.

11.

Mr. Boswell walked over to the gate to pet Zoey, who was on the other side of the

gate. He extended his right hand to Zoey. As he reached his hand towards the dog, Zoey bit his hand
· and took a hunk of flesh from Mr. Boswell's hand.
12.

Mr. Boswell went to the hospital to have his injuries treated. A report was made by

animal control officer, Tamara Andersen.
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ARGUMENT

Plaintiffs rely upon their briefings and the summary judgment pleadings for the appropriate
standards of review and for the issues on reconsideration.
SUMMARIZE

The court's Decision ought to be reconsidered for the following reasons:
The Court Erred in the Standards Applied to Its Findin&s of Fact

In determining its Findings of Fact for granting summary judgment, the Findings should be
liberally construed in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is granted. Porter v.

Basset, 146 Idaho 399 (208); Stafford v. Klosterman, 134 Idaho 205 (1999).

All doubtful

inferences should be resolved in their favor. In several instances, the Court did the opposite. For
example in Findings No. 5, the court said
Prior to the incident where Mr. Boswell was bit on October 8, 2011, there have been
two incidents where Zoey has bit of"nipped: at som~body.
Taken in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, the findings should read:
Prior to the incident where Mr. Boswell was bit on October 8, 2011, there have been
at least two known incidents where Zoey bit somebody.
The record shows that Zoey had, at least twice, inflicted a wound sufficient to draw blood
and require bandaging.
The finding continues:
Zoey saw her move towards Amber and bit her because "Zoey was being protective"
of Amber.
With no more expert opinion than that of Chris Kettler, who provided no foundation for her
expertise on dogs, the court accepted - as fact - that the dpg was only being protective, as if that
made any difference. At the same, time the court rejected the testimony of Tamara Andersen, the
Bannock County Animal Control Officer, who gave solid foundation of her expertise on dogs.
In finding number 11, the court said:
Zoey and Mary's dog were in the kitchen behind the gate, Zoey was barking and
growling.
According to Mr. Boswell's testimony,
the dog was not growling,
but was barking and
.
.
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wagging its tail. The court gave no reason for rejecting Mr. Boswell's version as patently
unbelievable by a jury. If not patently unbelievable, then the finding should have been as Steve
Boswell reported it.
Finding number 12, reads:
Mr. Boswell voluntarily, and without Mary's knowledge, walked over to the gate to
pet Zoey, who was on the other side of the gate.
The court's findings ignores even Mary Boswell's testimony that it was common practice for Steve
Boswell to open the gate and let Mary's dog into the living room whenever he brought Mary to the
house.
Finding number 12 continues:
He extended his right hand to Zoey in a "closed fist."
The finding ignores both the Affidavit of Stephen Boswell clarifying his deposition answer
and the physical evidence, that the injury was to the back of Steve's hand and not to the knuckles.
Findings number 14 reads:
Mr. Boswell has admitted that he did not think Zoey was a dangerous or vicious dog
before the incident and that Mary did not do anything wrong in keeping the dogs
behind the gate in the kitchen. Id., Ex. B,'p. 34-35.
The findings ignores Stephen Boswell's an~wer in his deposition immediately following his
statement that he did not think Mary did anything wrong, wherein he stated:
A.
Q.
A.
Q.

The reason the word negligent was used is probably because I had never been told not
to have any association with the dogs.
And it is your testimony that Mary should have somehow told you that?
I believe she should.
Well, if she knew that the dog had bit somebody before, she should have told me.

The Court Erred in its Findines of Law
Plaintiffs stand by their position that the law in Idaho holds a dog owner strictly liable for
injuries caused by the dog where the owner knows or has abnormally dangerous propensities. The
court summarily dismissed Plaintiffs' position stating, "Furthermore, Plaintiffs cannot cite to any
authority that expressly in implicitly establishes that Idaho has adopted strict liability in dog bite
cases." · Plaintiffs cited McClain v. Lewiston Interstate Fair and Racing Association, 17 Idaho 63,
Brief in Support of Motion to Reconsider
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104 P.2d 1015 (1909), because in McLain, the court said, "for unless the owner knew that the beast
was vicious, he is not liable. If the owner had such knowled"e, he is liable."
While the court discussed other aspects of the McLain, case, the Court did not address that
one pertinent declaration. Even if the statement is dicta, it is certainly never contradicted in Idaho
law. Furthennore, at least two publish~d authoritative articles find that Idaho is a strict liability state,
based on the McLain decision..
Cause of Action Against Owner, Keeper or Harborer ofDomestic Animal to Recover
for Personal Injuries Caused by Animal Allison E. Butler, Causes of Action 2d 293
(Originally published in 2007).
Cause of Action for Loss of or Injury to Animal by an Animal Adam P. Karp, J.D.,
M.S. Causes of Action 2d 281 (Originally published in 2008).
The Supreme Court of Oregon,in Hunt v. Hazen, 197 Or. 637,254 P.2d 210 (1953), cited the
McLain case in support of their own state position of strict liability.

This court also summarily disregarded, without any mention, the fact that the Restatement
of Torts provides as follows:
(1)

(2)

A possessor of a domestic animal that he knows or has reason to know has
dangerous propensities abnormal to its class, is subject to liability for harm

done by the animal to another, although he has exercised the utmost care to
prevent it from doing the harm.
This liability is limited to harm that results from the abnormally dangerous
propensity of which the possessor knows or has reason to know.

Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 509 (1977).

Similarly, the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 513 provides:
The possessor of a wild animal or an abnormally dangerous domestic animal who
keeps it upon land in his possession, is subject to strict liability to persons coming
upon the land in the exercise of a privilege whether derived from his consent to their
entry or otherwise.
The Third Restatement takes it a step further to make it clear we are talking about strict
liability:
An owner or possessor of an animal that the owner or possessor knows or has reason
to know has dangerous tendencies abF.tormal for the animal's category is subject to
Brief in Support of Motion to Reconsider
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strict liability for physical harm caused by the animal if the hann ensues from that
dangerous tendency.
Restatement (J'hird) of Torts, Phys. & Emot. Harm,§ 23 (2010).

The court never addresses those, even though Idaho has, over ninety-nine percent of the time,
adopted the Restatement of Torts at every given opportunity.
The court summarily rejected, without even addressing the fact, that 47 out of the 51 states
and the District ofColumbfa (48, ifldaho is included) adopt the strict liability approach in dog bite
cases.
For these reasons, the court's opinion need to be reversed, or at least re-addressed, and an
explanation given why the Court believes Idaho would reject the Restatement of Torts and reject the
majority rule of most states throughout the nation.
The Court's Opinion on Negligence Needs to be Re-addressed.

The court's opinion does not directly address the issues of duty and breach thereof, but
instead mistakenly mixes the issues of negligence with the issues of premises liability. The court ·
finds the Plaintiffs in error in their argument that Plaintiff Stephen Boswell was an invitee, finding
that Stephen was only a licensee. And based on that alleged error in Plaintiffs' argument, the court
rejects the issue of negligence altogether. The court's opinion never discusses whether Mary and
Amber owe any duty to Steve as a licensee. The Court's opinion never discusses whether a·duty is
owed to Steve as a person irrespective of premise liability. For example, in Therman v. Saffo, 238
Ga. App. 687, 520, S.E. 2d. 43, (1999), .the Georgia Supreme Court found that the injured party was
but a social guest in the home. But the court nonetheless reversed summary dismissal of a dog bite
negligence action on the basis that the facts presented a jury question as to whether the home owner
should have anticipated an attack on a guest, and whether the home owner should have warned the
guest, or taken other actions to prevent her from being attacked.
Plaintiffs have cited several basis for negligence in a dog bite case in previous briefing.
The court's opinion granting Summary Judgment to the Defendants discussed none ofthese.
Both Amber Steele and Mary Steele knew that the dog had bitten before. Whether they exercised
the same degree of care and diligence and took the same precautions as would a reasonably prudent
person under the same circumstances ought to be questions of fact. Why this issue of fact did not
preclude summary judgment was not discussed by the court.
Brief in Support of Motion to Reconsider
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The Court Needs to Readdress Its Decision on the Issue of Premises Liability

Concerning the issue of premises liability, the court did not address that under the
Restatement Second of Torts on premises liability.for dog.bite is as follows:
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 509 (1977).

Similarly, the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 513 provides:
The possessor of a wild animal or an abnormally dangerous domestic animal who
keeps it upon land in his possession, is subject to strict liability to persons coming
upon the land in the exercise of aprivilege whether derived from his consent to their
entry or otherwise.
Accordingly, it makes no difference whether Stephen Boswell was an invitee, or a licensee.
As noted above, the court finds Stephen Boswell to be a licensee on the narrow, defenseMfavorable
finding, that Steve had taken Mary to the Boswell home. That finding ignor~d the fact that Steve
,.

was providing a benefit to Mary of providing her transportation at Mary's request. Nevertheless,
irrespective of whether Steve was an invitee or a licensee, he was on the property with license, and,
if the Restatement is the applicable law, Mary and Amber Steele are responsible for Steve's injuries.
The court never addressed, never discusses, and never explained why it rejects the Restatement of
Torts.
Negligence Per Se

Pocatello City Code § 6.04.0IO(c) defines a vicious animal as: "any animal which bites
inflicts injury, assault, or otherwise attacks a human being or domestic being or livestock without
justifiable provocation." The Code section does not require prior knowledge of a bite; the code
section does not require any prior adjudication of viciousness; the code section does not require
anything other than that the dog inflicts injury. It is indisputable that Zoey inflicted injury on Steve
Boswell. Thus the _only defense is that the dog was unjustifiably provoked, or that the dog is
justified in this action based on the provocation.
The court did not address the opinions of the Montana Supreme Court which provides as
follows:
Similarly, Stroop's extending his hands and forearms into the Days' property was not
provocation. There was no testimony that Stroop thrust his hands toward the dog or
make any quick or threatening gestures. As discussed, below, Stroop's hands were
lawfully on the Days' property. Mere presence on the property of another does not
Brief in Support of Motion to Reconsider
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amount to provocation. See Smith v. Pitchford (Ill. Ct.App. 1991 ), 219 Ill. App. 3d
152, 161 Ill. Dec.767, 579 N.E. 2d 24. Conduct such as Stroop resting his anns on
the fence and allowing his hands and foreanns to dangle over the Days' property
cannot be considered provocation under any reasonable interpretation of that term.
Stroop v. Day, 271 Mont. 314, 319, 896 P.2d 439, 442 (1995).

In other words, the Supreme Court of Montana found as a matter of law that approaching a
dog across the fence with one's hand, is as a matter of law, not justifiable provocation. This court
found, as a matter of law, that it is justifiable provocation. The court's opinion makes no effort to
reconcile its position with that of the State of Montana.
Plaintiffs also believe that the court's position, that approaching a dog with a closed fist, is
on its face, as a matter of law, justifiable provocation for a dog to take a hand off, is overly
deferential to the defense-favorable finding that Steve Boswell approached the dog with a closed fist.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, among many others that were addressed in the multiple briefs that have
been filed, the court's Memorandum Decision and Order granting summary judgment needs to be
corrected to deny summary judgment to Defendants. It also needs to be corrected to acknowledge
the validity of the Affidavit of Tamara Anderson, John Billquist's deposition needs to be allowed.
And finally, the court should grant the partial summary judgment requested by the Plaintiffs.
Respectfully submitted this :-;?i&.1aay of January,2014.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
STEPHEN BOSWELL and KARINA BOSWELL, )
husband and wi.fe,
)

Case No. CV-2012-4120-PI

)

Plaintiffs,

)
)

V.

JUDGMENT FOR DISMISSAL

)

)

AMBER STEELE and MARY STEELE,

)
)
)

Defendants.

Based upon the Court's Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendants' and Plaintiffs'
motions for summary judgment entered October 30, 2013, in which the Court granted Defendants
Estate of Mary Steele's and Amber Steele's motion for summary judgment against Plaintiffs Stephen
Boswell and Karina Boswell, and good cause appearing therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJlJDGED, AND DECREED that Piaintiffs' claims against
Defendants Estate of Mary Steele and Amber Steele are dismissed with prejudice.
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if)~WOODLAND~-Ji~()
ILLIAM H.
District Judge

JUDGMENT FOR DISMISSAL- I

43 of 348

COURT'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

/,!:)

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of January, 2014, I served a conformed copy
of the above and foregoing document to the following person(s) as follows:
Reed W. Larsen
Cooper & Larsen, Chartered
P.O. Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229
Kent A. H1ggins
Merrill & Merrill, Chartered
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991

JUDGMENT FOR DISMISSAL - 2

44 of 348

(

·•
~.....

It""·,.~

Reed W. Larsen (3427)
Javier L. Gabiola (5448)
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED
151 North 3rd Avenue, 2nd Floor
P .0. Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229
Telephone: (208) 235-1145
Facsimile: (208) 235-1182

·-

~--·

",""':···<

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
Case No. CV-2012-4120-PI

STEPHEN BOSWELL and KARINA BOSWELL, )
)
husband and wife,
)

)
)
)

Plaintiffs,

v.
AMBER STEELE and MARY STEELE,
Defendants.

DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO
RECONSIDER

)
)
)
)

COME NOW Defendants Amber Steele and Mary Steele, deceased, by and through the
undersigned counsel, and submit this Reply Brief in Support of Defendants' Memorandum of Costs
and Attorney Fees.

I. INTRODUCTION
The Court must deny Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration, as the Court correctly and
properly applied the summary judgment standard, rejected ·Plaintiffs' unfounded positions

as to

negligence, premises liability (intertwined with the negligence claim as further argued hereing)
negligence per se and their continued, and unfounded belief, Idaho is a strict liability state. It is not,
and the Court correctly decided the issues. Plaintiffs do not present any new or additional facts or
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arguments to the Court; rather, they ask the Court to, once again, rehash the same issues. The Court
properly granted summary judgment, as, at the end of the day, Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden
of establishing a genuine issue of material fact existed to preclude summary judgment

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Plaintiffs have filed a motion to reconsider, pursuantto I.R.C .P. 11 (a)(2)(B), which provides:
Motion For Reconsideration. A motion for reconsideration of any interlocutory
orders of the trial court may be made at any time before the entry of final judgment
but not later than fourteen (14) days after the entry of the final judgment. A motion
for reconsideration of any order of the trial court made after entry of final judgment
may be filed within fourteen (14) days from the entry of such order; provided, there
shall be no motion for reconsideration of an order of the trial court entered on any
motion filed under Rules 50(a), 52(b), 55(c), 59(a), 59(e), 59.1, 60(a), or 60(b).
In considering a motion for reconsideration, a court may take into account any new o_r
additional facts presented by the moving party. Coeur d'Alene Mining Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of
North Idaho, 118 Idaho 812,824,800 P.2d 1026, 1038 (1990); Noreen v. Price Dev. Co., 25 P.3d

129, 135 Idaho 816 (Idaho Ct. App. 2001). The burden is on the moving party to bring to the trial
court's attention any new facts. Coeur d'Alene Mining Co., 118 Idaho at 823, 800 P.2d at 1037.
In seeking reconsideration, while a party is not required to present new evidence, it must still
demonstrate ·"errors oflaw or fact in the initial decision." Johnson v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 468, 472473, 147 P.3d 100, 104-105 (Ct. App. 2006). The decision to grant or deny a motion to reconsider
is left to the trial court's discretion. Johnson, 143 Idaho at 473, 147 P.3d at 105.
With regards to summary judgment, tt is axiomatic that in a motion for summary judgment,
the non-moving party "has the burden of presenting sufficient evidence to establish a triable issue
which arises from the facts, and a genuine issue of fact is not created by a mere scintilla of
evidence." Jarman v. Hale, 122 Idaho 952, 955-956, 842 P .2d 288, 291-292 (Ct. App. l 992)(internal
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citations omitted). "If the moving party fails to challenge an element or fails to present evidence
establishing the absence of genuine issue of material fact on that element, the burden does not shift
to the nonmoving party, and the nonmoving party is not required to respond with supporting
evidence." Smith, supra, 128 Idaho at 719,918 P.2d at 588 (citing Thomson, 1'26 Idaho at 530, 887
P.2d at 1038)). Further, "a nonmoving partis failure to make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to that party's case, on which that party will bear the burden of
proof at trial, requires the entry of summary judgment. Jarman, supra, 122 Idaho at 955-956, 842
P.2d at 291-292. (Internal citations omitted). Thus, where the non-moving party fails, by way of
affidavit or deposition, to make a sufficient showing to establish an essential element to its case,
"there can be no ,genuine issue as to any material fact,' since a complete failure of proof concerning
an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial."
Id

Here, again, Plaintiffs simply failed to meet their burden on summary judgment. In an
attempt to assuage their failure, they are now, without merit, telling the Court it was wrong. The
Court properly applied the rules and standards in reaching its decision. Thus, Plaintiffs' motion must
be denied.

III. ARGUMENT
A.

The District Court properly applied the summary judgment standard in
granting summary judgment to Defendants.

Defendants take exception to Plaintiffs' position on this, as the record belies their unfounded
claim the Court improperly applied the summary judgment standard. The Court will find that all of
the supposed issues raised by Plaintiffs lack any merit.
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1. Zoey resided with Mary Steele.
On page 2 of their brief, Plaintiffs assert Mary Steele "harbored" the dog. There was no
testimony Mary Steele harbored Zoey. Amber Steele was Zoey's owner and both of them resided
at Mary's residence. See Affidavit of Javier L. Gabiola in Support of Defendants' Motion for

Summary Judgment, Exh. A (Mary Steele Depa.), p. 5, ll.5-p. 6, /. 25; p. 11, l.21-p. 12.,l.l.

2. The District Court properly gave inferences to Plaintiffs as to "bite" or "nipped."
Next, Plaintiffs assert an issue as to whether Zoey "bit" or "nipped." This argument, also,
lacks any merit. The "nipped" conclusion stemmed from the incident with Chris Kettler, who
averred in her affidavit, without objection1, Zoey "nipped at my hand." Affidavit ofChris Kettler,

p. 2, , carryover paragraph. Plaintiffs offered no evidence to dispute Zoey nipped at Ms. Kettler.
Further, the Court stated in its decision that on two prior occasions Zoey bit or "nipped'' which was,
proper, again, based on Ms. Kettler's unrefuted testimony. The Court gave the inference .to
Plaintiffs, yet still, due to Plaintiffs' failure to prove otherwise, found their claims wanting.

3. The District Court properly considered Ms. Kettler's observations.
Ms. Kettler' s conclusion Zoey was being protective of Amber Steele when she was bitten,
was based on Ms. Kettler' s observations, which the Court found credible in accepting, and denying
Plaintiffs' motions to strike. It is well-settled the Court's role in a motion to strike is committed to
its sound discretion-that is, the admission of evidence is within the Court's discretion. See

generally, White v. Mock, 140 Idaho 882,888, 104 P.3d 356,362 (2004)(standard of review for a
trial court's admission of evidence is an abuse of discretion standard). Additionally, the Defend ants

Plaintiffs take issue with the Court's decision as to Ms. Kettler's affidavit and their
incorrect position the Court accepted Ms. Kettler' s observation that Zoey nipped at her because
she was being protective, but have not objected to Ms. Kettler's observation Zoey nipped at her.
1
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filed their objection to Plaintiffs' motion to strike, which is considered. Defendants asserted Ms.
Kettler's affidavit complied with Rule 56(e), whlch provides as follows:
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal lmowledge,
shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show
affinnatively that the ·affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated
therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in
an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may
pennit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to
interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment
is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest
upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's pleadings, but the party's
response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the party does
not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against
the party.
Ms. Kettler' s affidavit complied with Rule 56(e) as it was based on her _personal knowledge
and observations ofZoey. Ms. Kettler's affidavit does exactly that, sets forth her opinions based on
her observations, not what was on the mind of the dog when it bit her. Her averments were based
on her personal observation and knowledge, was being friendly and that there were no problems.
Kettler Alf, p.1. Ms. Kettler also averred that she observed Zoey being protective of Defendant

Amber Steele, that Zoey did not initiate any vicious tendencies, and_having been around Zoey, she
observed that Zoey was a very good dog and protective of the Defendants when she got into their
space. Id, p.2. This was also supported by Ms. Kettler's deposition testimony, to which Plaintiffs
never objected. See Affidavit of Javier L. Gabiola in Support of Defendants' Opposition to
Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Exh. 2 (Kettler Depo), p. 13, l.19-p. 19, 1.3.

Further, Ms. Kettler testified her opinion as to what a protective dog is which also was not objected
to by Plaintiffs. Id., Exh. 2, p. 24, l.,21-p.27, I.JO. The Court properly considered Ms. Kettler's
affidavit and deposition testimony.
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4. The District Court properly excluded Ms. Andersen's affidavit.
Ms. Andersen's affidavit failed to comply with Rule 56(e) and I.R.E. 702. The admission
of lay and expert testimony "is governed by the rules of evidence regarding the opinion testimony
of lay witnesses and experts under Idaho Rules ofEvidence 701 and 702. " I.R.E. 702 provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.

Expert testimony that is based on speculation is not admissible under Rule 702. Speculation, as it
relates to expert testimony is defined as "the art of theorizing about a matter as to which evidence
is not sufficient for certain knowledge." Karlson v. Harris, 140 Idaho 561,564, 97 P.3d 428,432
(2004).
An expert opinion that is speculative or unsubstantiated by facts in the record
is inadmissible because it would not assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or determine a fact that is at issue. Expert opinion that merely
suggests possibilities would only invite conjecture and may be properly
excluded."
Id [Emphasis added] [Internal citations omitted]. See also Jones v. Crawforth, 14 7 Idaho 11, 205

P.3d 660 (2009) (expert opinions are only admissible if they assist the trier of fact in understanding
the evidence or determining an issue of fact); Weeks v. E. Idaho Health Servs., 143 Idaho 834, 838,
153 P.3d 1180, 1184 (2007) (expert opinion that is speculative, conclusory or unsubstantiated by
facts in the record does not assist the jury and is inadmissible).
Even a cursory review of Ms. Andersen's affidavit supports the Court's decision to strike it,
which it properly did within its discretion. Paragraphs 12-18 of Ms. Andersen's affidavit were
conclusory, lacked foundation and were based on speculation. Further, in paragraph 12, Ms.
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Andersen's statement was based on her unfounded premise Amber Steele was not honest with her,
which is a credibility issue, not something to which Ms. Andersen can provide testimony. It was also
based on speculation and properly stricken. Also, paragraphs 13-17 were based on pure speculation.
Ms. Andersen never examined or conducted any personal evaluation of Zoey, and, in essence, she
tred to say that Zoey had the propensity or habit of biting people, without foundation, which led to
Mr. Boswell's being bitten. This opinion violated IRE 404. Ms. Andersen.apparently did not
supplement her affidavit, as after she submitted it, she could have read the deposition of Stephen
Boswell, who admitted he approached and reached over to Zoey with a closed fist. The District
Court correctly granted the motion to strike, and explained its reasons, that Ms. Andersen did not
investigate the prior bite, never cited Amber for violating the city code, based her opinion on Ms.
Kettler's affidavit and did not further study Zoey's behavior or consult with other witnesses. See;

Memorandum Decision and Order, pp. 9-10,
5.

,r6.

Whether Zoey was barking or growling does not preclude Mr. Boswell's
admissions she was barking, that he approached Zoey, voluntarily and on his
own accord, that he approached her with a closed fist and, ultimately failed to
put forth evidence Defendants knew Zoey was dangerous or vicious.

Mr. Boswell admits, at page 3 of Plaintiffs' BriefthatZoeywas barking behind the gate when
he approached her. Regardless, whether she was barking and growling is another red herring, since
the record was not disputed Zoey was barking. And, the Court correctly found, at page 9, para. 5 of
its decision that Mr. Boswell on his own accord went to Zoey when she was barking:
Furthermore, there is no dispute that Mr. Boswell voluntarily, and on his own accord,
approached Zoey at the gate while she was barking, and.reached towards Zoey, who
was behind the gate at the time, with a closed fist.
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Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendant's and Plaintifft' Motion for Summary Judgment,
p. 9,

,s.

Plaintiffs' supposed issue on this matter should be disregarded by the Court.

Further, the issues as to Findings 12 & 14 are red herrings. As to the latter, Mr. Boswell
admitted Mary did nothing wrong when he testified, "I don't think she did anything wrong."

GabiolaAjf., Exh. B(StephenBoswell Depo},p. 34, l.24-p. 35, l.1. As to Finding 12,Mr. Boswell's
testimony, which was undisputed, was that Zoey was behind the gate in the kitchen when he walked
over to the gate to pet her. He also admitted there was no reason for him to go to her, and Mary
never asked him to go to Zoey. Mr. Boswell testified to these admissions, as follows:
· Q. When you dropped Mary off, tell me what

happened.
·
A. Opened the door, walked in, saw the dogs
behind the gate -Q. So at that point you saw both dogs behind the
gate?
A. Yes.

Q. And were they contained behind the gate?
A. Yes.

Q. Was there any reason for you to go beyond the
gate as part of dropping Mary off?
A. No, both dogs were excited to see me and Mary.
Q. Was there any reason for you to go beyond the
gate as part of dropping Mary off?
A. I always meet Mary's dog.
Q. So other than the meet the dog, was there any
other reason to go to where the dogs were confined
behind the gate?
A. No.

Q. Mary didn't ask you to do anything?
A. No.

Q. And as you were going, what was Mary doing as
she walked in the door?
A. She was taking her coat off.
Q. And at that point in time you saw both dogs
behind the gate?
A. Yes.
Q. And the gate was serving as its function to
keep the dogs confined?
MR. HIGGINS: Objection, calls for a legal
conclusion.
A. Basically the gate was so that the dogs would

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO RECONSIDER- PAGE 8

52 of 348

not go in and wet on the carpet in the living room.
Q. And it was working, they were staying in the

kitchen?
A. Yes.
Q~ And the purpose of the gate that we see in
Exhibit No. 1 and 2 is to keep the dogs confined in the
kitchen?
MR.·HIGGINS: Objection, calls for
speculation.
A. Yes.
Q. And Mary hadn't asked you to go into the
kitchen; correct?
A. No.
Q. And there was no reason for you to go into the
kitchen?
A. I was not going in the kitchen. I was going
to the gate. ·
Q. And there was no reason for you to go to the
gate?
MR. HIGGINS: Objection, asked and answered.
Q. As part of dropping Mary·off, was there any
reason for you to go to the gate?
MR. HIGGINS: Objection, asked and answered.
Q. You may answer the question.
A. Jus·t to greet the dogs.
Q. And that was something that was solely in your
decision to do?
A. Yes.
Q. No one had asked you to do it?
A. No.
Q. And no one had directed you to do it?
A. No.
Q. That was purely your decision.
A. Yes.

Gabiola Ajf., Exh. B., p. 29, !. 7-p. 31, l.22.
In addition, Plaintiffs still cling to the idea that, despite the undisputed fact Mr. Boswell

gave sworn deposition testimony, on May 28, 2013, that he approached Zoey with a closed fist,
he can try to change his sworn deposition testimony through a subsequent affidavit(which he
filed after Defendants filed their motion for SU1lll11aty judgment on July 23, 2013). Again, Mr.
Boswell's own undisputed testimony was he approached Zoey with a closed fist:
Q. So where was your hand?
A. In.front of the gate.
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Q. And did the dogs smell your hand?
A. Zoe, being larger than the other dog, had its
paws on top· of the gate, I put forth my hand
(indicating) .
Q. Was your hand open or was it in a closed fist?
A. Closed fist.

Gabiola Aff., Exh. B., p. 32, ll.3-10._ And, Defendants objected to Mr. Boswell changing his
deposition testimony with a subsequent affidavit, thereby creating a sham affidavit. Idaho courts
disapprove of self-created issues of material fact through affidavits that contradict prior sworn
testimony. See, Tolmie Farms, Inc. v. J.R. Simplot Co., 124 Idaho 607,610,862 P.2d 299,302
(1993); In the Estate ofKeeven, 126 Idaho 290,298,882 P.2d 457,465 (Ct.App. 1994). 2 Mr.
Boswell's affidavit was a "sham" affidavit.
In addition, IRCP 30(e) requires witnesses to submit changes, and the reasons therefore,
within 30 days from being sent their deposition transcripts:
When the testimony is fully transcribed the deposition shall be submitted to the witness
for examination and shall be read to or by the witness, unless such examination and
reading are waived by the witness and by the parties. Any changes in form or substance
which the witness desires to make shall be entered upon the deposition by the officer
with a statement of the reasons given by the witness for making them. The deposition
shall then be signed by the witness, unless the parties by stipulation waive the signing or
the witness is ill or cannot be found or refuses to sign. If the deposition is not signed by
the witness w.ithin 30 days of its submission to the witness, the officer shall sign it and
state on the record the fact of the waiver or of the illness or absence of the witness or the
fact of the refusal to sign together with the reason, if any, given therefor; and the
deposition may then be used as fully as though signed unless on a motion to suppress
under Rule 32(d)(4) the court holds that the reasons given for the refusal to sign require
rejection of the deposition in whole or in part.

2

While the Idaho Supreme Court recently held in Arregui v. Gallegos-Main, 2012 Opinion No. 75 that the
sham affidavit doctrine has not been adopted in Idaho, the Court did hold in Tolmie Farms, supra, that "the
purpose of summary judgment is served by a rule that prevents a party from creating sham issues by offering
contradictory testimony .... "
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[Emphasis supplied].

Mr. Boswell did not comply with IRCP 30(e), as Mr. Boswell did not

submit the changes to his deposition within 30 days of being sent (sent on June 7-affidavits
signed July 22), nor did he give any reason for his belated, untimely changes. Even if Mr.
Boswell had, Plaintiffs still cannot escape the glaring fact that his subsequent affidavit was a
sham affidavit. On the current motion, the Court should view it no differently.
B.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY FOLLOWED IDAHO LAW,
WHICH HAS NEVER RECOGNIZED STRICT LIABILITY IN DOG BITE
OR PREMISES LIABILITY CASES.

The District Court correctly concluded Plaintiffs [did not] cite to any authority that
expressly or implicitly establishes that Idaho has adopted strict liability in dog bite cases. Much
like the Plaintiffs argued in their prior submissions, they never cited one Idaho case, including
McClain, infra, where strict liability was recognized as a claim in a dog bite or premises liability

case in Idaho. Plaintiffs continuously assert that the District Court should have considered nonbinding, foreign law. 3 The fact that there may be case law in Oregon or Montana does not
change the fact that such law is non-binding authority, and the only authority that is binding is
Idaho law. The Court certainly recognized this, and, further rejected Plaintiffs strained reading of
the holding in McClain. At pages 6-7 of its Decision, the Court analyzed McClain, and cited to
the following passage therein:
If domestic animals, such as oxen and horses, injure anyone, in person or property,
if they are rightfully in the place where they so· the mischief, the owner of such
animals is not liable for such injury, unless he knew that they were accustomed to
do mischief. And in suits for such injuries, such knowledge must be alleged, and proved.
For unless the owner knew that the beast was vicious, he is not liable. If the owner had
such knowledge he is liable.

Which, contrary to Plaintiffs' position, does not establish that almost every state in the
Union have adopted strict liability in dog bite or premises liability cases. See footnote 4, infra.
3
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The owner of domestic animals, if they are wrongfully in the place where they
so any mischief, if liable for it, though he has no notice that they ·had been
accustomed to do so before. In cases of this kind the ground of the action is, that
the animals were wrongfully in the place where the injury was done. And it is not
necessary to allege or prove any knowledge on the part of the owner, that they has
previously been vicious.
Where it is alleged, as in the case at bar, that the animal is wrongfully at the place where
the mischief is done, the owner is liable for the damage done, if any, although he had no
notice that such animal possessed the trait or characteristic of doing the particular thing
which caused the injury. The right of action arises by reason of the fact that as
against the plaintiff the animal causing the injury is a trespasser, is unlawfully at the
place where the injury occurs and at which place the plaintiff has a legal right to be.

Memorandum Decision, pp. 6-7 (citing, McClain v. Lewiston Interstate Fair and Racing Assoc.,
17 Idaho 63, 104 P.2d 1015, 1020-21 (1909). Further, the Court properly explained how
McClain did not establish strict liability:
It appears to the Court that McClain does not establish recovery based on strict
liability. The question presented in McClain is whether the animal trespassed or not.
If the animal has trespassed, then the owner is strictly liable. If the animal has not
trespassed and is lawfully where it is entitled to be, then the owner is only liable if
they have knowledge of the vicious or dangerous character of the animal. There is
no dispute in the record that Zoey was rightfully in Mary's kitchen. Amber stayed
in Mary's home and Mary consented that Amber could keep Zoey in her home.
At the time of the bite, Zoey was in the kitchen behind the gate. Furthermore,
Plaintiffs cannot cite to any authority- that expressly or implicitly establishes that
Idaho has adopted strict liability in dog bite cases. If Plaintiffs are to recover, it
will be if the Defendants were negligent.

Memorandum Decision, p. 7. It was readily apparent to the District Court that Plaintiffs failed to
cite to any Idaho law where strict liability has been adopted in dog bite cases or premises liability
cases. 4 The only time strict liability is applied is in products liability cases. See, Shields v.
4As

indicated by Defendants in prior briefing, Plaintiffs still attempt to deflect from their
failure to cite to Idaho law recognizing strict liability in dog bite or premises liability cases by
citing the Court to non-binding case law/statutes of other states. Idaho is not a strict liability
state, along with Hawaii, Kentucky, North Dakota (see, Sendelbach v. Grad, 246 N.W. 2d
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Morton Chemical Company, 95 Idaho 674,676,518 P.2d 857,859 (1974). The District Court
properly followed Idaho law, which does not recognize strict liability in cases other than products
liability, in dismissing Plaintiffs' strict liability claim.

C.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ON PLAINTIFFS' NEGLIGENCE AND PREMISES LIABILITY CLAIMS.
Plaintiffs assert the District Court failed to directly address the elements of negligence

and mixed it with premises liability. Again, Plaintiffs' position is untenable.
At page 7, para. 7 of the Decision, the Court correctly outlined the elements of negligence,
citing to Boots v. Winters, 145 Idaho 389, 392, 179 P.3d 352, 355 (Ct. App. 2008). The Court
then, properly, stated "Mary did not have a recognizable duty_ to Mr. Boswell." Memorandum
496, 501 (N.D. 1976)(premises liability) and Vermont. Indiana presumes a dog is harmless
and applies strict liability only where a Jetter carrier is involved. Cooks v. Whitsell-Sherman,
796 N.E. 2d 271, 275-76 (Ind. 2003). Nevada actually requires 2 bites in an 18 month period,
without provocation (N.R.S. 202.500)(2013). Rhode Island only applies strict liability if a
dog gets out of its enclosure. DuBois v. Quilitzsch, 21 A.3d 375,380 (R.I. 2011).
Additionally, there are states that require the plaintiff show the owner lmows or
reasonably knows the dog is vicious or dangerous, and, of those, South Dakota-Gehrts v.
Batteen, 620 N.W. 775, 778 (S.D. 2001) and Tenn~see, Fletcher v. Richardson, 603 S.W.2d
734; 735-36) held that the requisite knowledge was a negligence, not strict liability, theory.
In Alaska, summary judgment was granted to the defendant animal owner, since the plaintiff
knew of the animal's dangerous propensities (Hale v. O'Neill, 492 P.2d 101, 104 (Alaska 1971).
New Mexico has a similar law to Alaska. Smith v. Village ofRuidoso, 994 P.2d 50, 54 (1999).
Other states have laws allowing for defenses of provocation, comparative fault and
assumption of risk theories in such cases (Priebe v. Nelson, 140 P.3d 848,849 (California
2006); Russo v. Zeigler, 67 A.3d 536 (Delaware Sup. Ct. 2013); District of Columbia (D.C. Code
§ 8-1902(b)(l)(B); Florida, Fla. Stat. Ann. §767.04 (2013) (comparative fault applies);
VanBeheren v. Bradley, 640 N.E. 2d 664, 666w67 (Ill. Ct. App. 1994); Fouts v. Mason, 592
N.W.2d 33,36 (Iowa); Pepper v. Triplet,864 So. 2d 181, 191-92 (Louisiana 2003);Audette v.
Comm., 829 N.E.2d 248, 255 (Massachusetts 2005); Hill v. Sacka, 666 N.W. 2d 282, 287-88
(Michigan 2003); Engquist v. Loyas, 803 N.W. 2d 400,403 (Minnesota 2011); Nebraska. Rev.
Stat. 54-60l(b)(2013); Bohan v. Ritzo, 679 A.2d 597,601 (New Hampshire 1996). See also
Plaintiffs' cites to Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania and South Carolina at p. 8.
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Decision, p. 7,

18.

The Court then, as it properly should have, discussed the issue of premises

liability, iri relation to the duties owed to an invitee and licensee. Id., p. JO, ,r,rB-10. What
Plaintiffs fail to recognize is that premises liability is a form of negligence, and the duty owed is
- detem1ined on the status of the person entering the premises, i.e. invitee, to whom the owner
owes a duty to keep the premises safe and warn of hidden or concealed dangers and licensee, or
social guest, to whom a landlord only owes a duty to disclose known dangerous conditions or
activities on the land. The Court went through this analysis, citing to Bates v. EIRMC, 114 Idaho
252, 253, 755 P.2d 1290, 1291 (1988), Wilson v. Bogert, 81 Idaho 535, 545, 347 P.2d 341, 347
{1959) and Pincockv. McCoy, 48 Idaho 227,281 P.2d 371 (1929), and determined, based on the
undisputed facts in the record, that Mr. Boswell was not an invitee, but a licensee or social guest,
as he was not conferring any business, commercial or monetary or other tangible benefit to Mary
Steele. Memorandum Decision, p. I I,

,r.

I 0. The Court then went on to properly determine that

Plaintiffs failed to establish evidence that Mary breached her duty, as the record was undisputed
that Zoey was behind a gate in the kitchen, in an enclosed area, where she was supposed to be,
and it was Mr. Boswell who approached Zoey, on his own accord, reached his hand to Zoey and
was bitten. Memorandum Decision, p. I I,

,r. 11.

Again, the Plaintiffs failed to meet their

burden on summary judgment, and there was no error committed by the Court.
D.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED PLAINTIFFS'
NEGLIGENCE PER SE CLAIM.

As to this issue, again, the Court properly entered summary judgment. Plaintiffs failed to
raise a genuine issue of material fact the defendants knew Zoey was dangerous and that she was
vicious. The record supports the Court's decision.
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Plaintiff make their argument by not citing to the entire content of Pocatello City Code
6.04.010 which, the Court cited to in its decision, as follows:
A. Any animal which, when unprovoked by ·teasing, taunting, or a threatening manner

by any person, approaches said person in an apparent attitude of attack upon the streets,
sidewalks, public grounds or places, common areas within subdivisions or mobile home
or recreational vehicle parks, commons grounds of apartment buildings, condominiums,
or townhouse developments, or private property riot solely owned or possessed by the
owner or custodian of the animal.
B. Any animal with a known propensity, tendency, or disposition to attack unprovoked,
to cause injury, or to otherwise endanger the safety of human beings or domestic animals
or livestock; or
C. Any animal which bites, inflicts injury, assaults, or otherwise attacks a human being or
domestic animal or livestock without justifiable provocation;

Pocatello City Code 6.04.010 [emphasis suppliedl See Memorandum Decision, p.

sirn2-3. The

Court further acknowledged that Pocatello City Code6.04.050(A) provides that it is an owner or
custodian or a dangerous animal may be cited for a misdemeanor and the dog seized or
impotmded.. The Court further acknowledged that Pocatello City Code 6.04.050(B) prohibits a
person from harboring a vicious animal, ''with a known propensity, tendency or disposition to
attack unprovoked,[ .. .].Memorandum Decision, p. 8, 'i13. The Court further cited to Idaho Code
§25-2805(2), which provides:
Any dog which, when not physically provoked, physically attacks, wounds, bites or
otherwise injures any person who is not trespassing, is vicious. It shall be unlawful for the
owner or for the owner of premises on which a vicious dog is present to harbor a vicious
dog outside a secure enclosure.· A secure enclosure is one from which the animal cannot
escape and for which exit and entry is controlled by the owner of the premises or owner
of the animal. Any vicious dog removed from the secure enclosure must be restrained by
a chain sufficient to control the vicious dog. Persons guilty of a violation of this
subsection, and in addition to any liability as provided in section 25-2806, Idaho Code,
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. For a second or subsequent violation of this subsection,
the court may, in the interest of public safety, order the owner to have the vicious dog
destroyed or may direct the appropriate authorities to destroy the dog. [Emphasis
supplied].
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The Court then went on to properly note, that the record was void of any facts showing
Amber or Mary knew Zoey was vicious or· dangerous or that the attack was unprovoked. This
comports with the aforementioned codes and statute. Sections 6.04.0SOA, B and C provide that a
person cannot harbor a dangerous animal only after an animal is "adjudicated" as dangerous.
Further, section 6 .05 .060 mandates restraint of a dangerous animal where "the owner/custodian
of any animal [is] convicted of a violation of the dangerous conduct prohibitions .... "
Likewise, §25-2805 provides that a vicious dog is a dog, "which, when not physically

provoked, physically attacks, wounds, bites or otherwise injures any person who is not
trespassing .... " and that, "[p]ersons guilty of a violation of this subsection ... shall be guilty of
a misdemeanor." [Emphasis supplied]. Again, there was no factual dispute that there had been no
adjudication that Zoey was found to be dangerous or vicious. Further, Mr. Boswell admitted, on
his own, and without telling Mary, he approached Zoey, with a closed fist, and put his closed fist
to her face. This certainly qualifies as provocation, thereby negating any basis for Plaintiffs'
negligence per se claims, which the Court properly recognized as undisputed.
Additionally, Plaintiffs' position that the Court should have addressed non-binding
decisions from Montana lacks merit. Again, that decision is non-binding, and not consistent with
Idaho law. The Plaintiffs' motion must be denied.

E.

THE COURT PROPERLY QUASHED THE DEPOSITION OF JOHN
BILLQUIST.

Plaintiffs offer no argument to support their motion to reconsider the Courts' quashing
the subpoena for Mr. Billquist' s deposition. See, Minute Entry & Order dated July 16, 2013.
Simply put, the Court was correct in prohibiting that deposition.
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As defendants previously argued the subpoena should be quashed for the following
reasons:
1.

Mr. Billquist was working in his capacity as a representative and employee of

Defendants' insurance carrier State Farm Insurance Company and investigated and conducted an
interview of Plaintiff Stephen Boswell on October 9, 2011, one day after the incident that gives
rise to Plaintiffs' allegations set forth in their Complaint. State Farm and Mr. Billquist were not
parties to this case;
2.

Mr. Billquist was not a named witness in this matter;

3.

Any work performed or statements taken or performed by Mr. Billquist on behalf

of State Fann Insurance Company, was done pursuant to and in his capacity as representative of
State Farm. As such, Mr. Billquist could not be forced to attend a deposition under the work
product generated in anticipation oflitigation privilege. The Idaho Supreme Court has held such
activities qualifies as work product and is protected under that privilege. See Dabestani v.

Bellus, 131 Idaho 542, 545, 961 P.2d 633, 636 (1998)(Court affirmed trial court's ruling that a
statement taken by an insurance adjuster of a party to an accident was not discoverable).
4.

Additionally, Plaintiffs' subpoena was served July 9, 2013, requesting the

deposition of Mr. Billquist on July 17, 2013, and not served to provide Defendants with
reasonable notice, as required by I.R.C.P. 30(b)(l). Prior to serving the subpoena, Plaintiffs did
not inquire of Defendants' counsel as to any objections they would have, their availability or that
of Mr. Billquist, to attend a deposition. Mr. Billquist is retired and his availability is uncertain.
5.

It is clear that Plaintiffs seek to depose Mr. Billquist regarding the statement he

took of Mr. Boswell. For the reasons previously stated, Plaintiffs' subpoena violates Rule
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30(b)(l) and Rule 45. Mr. Billquist was not required to sit for a deposition, and even ifhe were,
Plaintiffs did not provide reasonable notice for his deposition.
The District Court properly concluded Mr. Billquist was not required to sit for a
deposition. Furthermore, Plaintiffs offer no legitimate basis seeking reconsideration of the
Court's order, and their motion must be denied.
Ill
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CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Defendants respectfully request that the Court deny Plaintiffs'
motion to reconsider.
/,

DATED this' tr· day of January, 2014.

COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED
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By ··...
~ -ii?
,;,.· _ _ / REED W. LARSEN

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Jb

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of January, 2014, I served a true and correct
copy of the above and foregoing document to the following person(s) as follows:
Kent A. Higgins
Merrill & Merrill, Chartered
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991

)4:_
[]
[]
))(

U.S. Mail/Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivery
Overnight Mail
Facsimile\ 232-2499

NOTE: one duplicate copy of all motions, and any opposition thereto, together with supporting
memorandum, affidavits and documents, and trial brief, shall be emailed to
brandw@bannockcounty.us
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Kent A. Higgins
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED
109 North Arthur-5th Floor
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991
(208) 232-2286
(208) 232-2499 Telefax
ISB#: 3025
Attorneys for Plaintiff's

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTii JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE
'

~

.

STATE 01:;, 1DAH01 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

I

STEPHEN BOSWELL and KARINA
BOSWELL,' husband and wife,
Plah1tif'f,
AMBER STEELE,
MARY STEELE,
Defendants.

'

)
)

) Case No. CV-12-4120 QC
)
) RESPONSE BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
) MOTION TO RECONSIDER
)
)
)
)
)
)

ARGUMENT
"Bit" or "nipped,i; "closed fist''. or ~c\.ltled up fingers" - is that really what the defense

thinks this case is about? If it is, there certainly must be case law somewhere that says a "nip" that

draws blood.is harmless but a bite that draws blood is a dangerous propensity. Or there must be case
law or precedent that say holding one~s closed hand to a dog is hannless bllt holding one•s closed

fist to a dog is by judicial notice~ and as a mat-te.r of law -justifiable provocation for a dog to take
one's hand off.

To the contrary, the only statement of law that comes close is the state111e11t by the Montana
S1.tpreme Court that says when am.an reaches his hand across the fence to approach a clog. it is as a
Rcspo,u11i Brief in Support of Motion to Reeonsider
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matter oflaw lJJll. a provocation such as would Justify the dog to injure the man. Stroop v. D•Y, 221
Mont. 314,319,896 P.2d 439,442 (1995).

STRICT LIABILITY IN TORT
Plaintiffs do. illdeed. stai1d by their position that Idaho shares the majority, and common law
view, the view set forthi11 the Restatement of Torts 2nd~ that 11 a. possessor of a domestic animal that
he knows or has reason to know has dangerous propensities abnormal to its class, is suqject to
liability for harm done by the animal to another, although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent
it from doing the harm."
Restatement (Second) of Torts

§ 509 ( 1977).

The defense calls Plaintiffs assessment of the law variously as an "unfounded belief1

•

"frivolous, unreasonable and without foundation. etc•." Yet not once in their briefing have they
addressed the three Restaterne11.ts of the Law of Torts that address this subject:
(1)

A possessor of a domestic animal that be knows or has reason to know

has dangerous propensities abnormal to its class, ~ subject to liability
for harm done by the animal to another, although be hns exercised the
utmost care to prevent it from <Jojng the harm.
(2) · This liability is limited to harm that results from the 11bnormnlly
dangerous propensity of which the possessor lmows or has reason to

)mow.
Restatement (Second) of Tarts, § 509 (1977).

Similarly, the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 513 provides:

The possessor of a wild animal or an abnormally dangerous domestic animal
wl10 keeps it upon land in bis possessiont is sub,jeet to strict liability tQ persons
coming upon the land in the exercise of a privilege whether derived from his
consent to their entry or otherwise.
The Third Restatement talces it a step further to make it clear we are talking about strict
liability:

An owner or possessor of an animal tl1at the owner or possessor knows or bas ·
reason to know has dangerous tendencies abnormal for the animal's category
is subject to strict liability for pl1yskal harm caused by tl1e animal it' the harm
ensues from that dangerous tendency.
·
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Restatarnent (Third) of Torts, Phys. & Emot, Harm, § 23 (2010).

Not once have they explained why Idaho would reject the Restatement of Tol'tS Second or
Third. even if this is an issue of first impression.

But thi.s is not an issue of first impression. The Iclaho Supreme Court declared "unless the
'

owner knew that the beast was vicious, he is not liable. If the owner had such knowledge. he is
liable. At least three other authorities read the McLain decision the same way as Plaintiffs.
Allison E, Butler, Causes of Action 2d 293 (Originally published in 2007); Adam
P. Karp, J.P.~ M.S. Causes of Action 2d 281 (Originally published in 2008); Hunt

v. Hazen. 197 Or. 637,254 P.2d 210 (1953). (The Causes of Action and the Hunt
v. Hazen opined.)

All tlll'ee reach the same conclusion - a conch.JSion defense calls a "not well plead", "not
viable1\ ''unfounded belief•, '"tUlS1.1pported". ":fi:ivolous, unreasonable, and without folmdation."

The lv!cClain case .has had its fair share of publicity in treatises on the s1ibject. Consider the
tbllowi11g qnotes:

~'..4 e.er.,on iniiired bv a domestic animal mav bring a comm,on-la;m .rttrict liabilitp
action against the ow11.e; or keegu of t/1,e animal.. Mt:Clatn v.. Lewl•ton
Interstate ,air & Racing Ass'"' 17 Idaho 63. l 04 P. 1015 (l 909), Ill order to
establish aprima fa.cie case in a common-law strict /iablli'ty action the plaintiff mtist
prove that he or she was injured 'by a domestic animal, that the animal had dangerous
propensities, and that the defendant knew of the animal's propensities prior to the
time the injury was suffered. The fact that the owner exercised care in keeping the
animal is not defense. Mt:Claln, above."
33 Cal1ses of Action 2d 293 (Originally published in 2007), (Emphasis added).
"Contrast this with Idaho. whicl, estahlitl/,es common law strict IiabiliO!, witl,out
proo,[lluB. the defendant/ailed to exe1·cise reasonable care: denwnstraJil'l.g rcien.ter

i., all tlud i..fl required.

Mcclain v~ Lewiston /nterstatfl Fair & Raoing Asso'~

17 Idfl11o 63, 104 P. 1015 (1909)."'

38 Causes of Action 2d 281 (Originally published in 2008). (Emphasis added).
"Strict Common Law Liability: A con,mon l'1W strict liability actio1, mav be brour.ht
against tlie owner or keepe~ ofthe animgl MCCiain v. Lewiston 1ntorstatt1 Fair
& Rac:/ng Ass'n, 17 Idaho 63, 104 P. 1015 (1909). In.order to establish a prima
facie case, the plaintiff must prove injury by a domestic animal, having dru.1gerous
propensities that the defendant kuew of prior to the time the injury was suffered."
38 Causes of Action 2d 281 (originally published in 2008). (Emphasis added).
Response Brief in Support of Motion to lheo,naicler

66 of 348

Currently, animals- mindst bodies, and all~ are personal propel'ty under the law, ancl
as with all personal property a.re treated as having owners. Animal owners, in t\un,
are those upon whose shoulders rest the obligation to adhere to social nonns :resulting
from owuership. As owned objects, animals are currently free ofpersonal obligation.
In essence, animals have tli.e unfettered freedom. to do whatever it is they wish to do
... ; it is tl,ose wlio awn the animals who are trug fettered bv aasuniing the legal
respansibllify for t/1e animals• actions. Mot:/aln v. Lewiston Interstate Fair &
. RaolngAss'tl, 104 P.1015. 1021 (Idaho 1909).
Georde D11clder, Ph.D., Esq. Animal Wrongs: On Holding Animals to (tmd Excusing Them from)
Legal Responsibility/or Their Intentional Acts. 2 J Animal L. & Eth. 91, 121 (2007).
The McClain d.ecision has also attah1ed its share ofnotoriety by the Supreme Courts ofother
states. Consider the :following;
Tiu~ essence ofthe action Is not owaershv,. but the kegping and harbo1·in2 of an a.tdmal,
knowi1r.g it to be viciot#$.. One wllo keeps a savage dog is bound to secure it against it doing
mischief. Vide Quilty v. Battie, supra; Oakes v. Spaulding. 40 Vt. 347, 94 Am.Dec. 404;
Smith v. Royer~ 181 Cal, 165, 183 P. 660; McClain v. Lewislon Interstate Fair & Racing
Ass'n, 17 Idaho 63~ 104 P. 1015, 25 L.R.A.• N.S. 691~ 20 Ann. Cas. 60; Lanna v. Konen~
119 Cami. 646, 478 A 425.
,
Barber v. Hochstrasser,

136 N.J.L. 76, BO, 54 A.2d458, 460 (sup. Ct. 1947).

Tl,e gl§t ofan action lquJamages by a 1,icious_ dog_, wlr.o propensities are known.,
is not ne:ligence in the_ manner ofkeeJinc the do:; it i.r keeping_Jhe dog at all; and
the action is founded upon tl1e theory of maintenauce of a m.1isanoe, not negligence.
Jaco· v. Baker, 174 Or. 191, 148 P.2d 938. The essence of the attion is not
ownership, but the keepil1g and hatbori11.g of an animal, knowing it to be vicious.
One who keeps a savage dog is bound to secure it against its doing mischief. Vide
Quiltyv. Battie, [135N.Y. 201, 32N.E. 7, 17 L.R.A. 521] supra; Oakesv. Spaulding,
40 Vt. 347, 94 Am.Dec. 404; Smith v. Royer. 181 Cal. 165, 183 P. 660; MoCtaln v.
Lewiston Interstate Fair & Rat:lng An'n, 17 Idaho 63, 104 P. 1015, 25 L.R.A.,k
N.S. ·691., 20 Ann Cas. 60; Lanna v. Konen, 119 Conn. 646~ 178 A 425.' Barber V;
Hockstrasser, 136 N.J.L. 76, 54 A.2d 458,460.
Hunt v. Hazen, 197 Or. 637, 639-40. 254 P.2d 210,211 (1953).

Either each and every one of these treatises and legal opiliions are wrong, or the defense i.s

wi·ong.
Even if it were true that Idaho is not a stdct state, Pocatello i!. a strict liability city.
Pocatello Municipal Code Section 6.04.010 provides:
Rest>om1e Brief in Support of Motion to Rueom;ider
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Dangerous Animal:
B.

Any animal with a kn.own propensityt tendency, or disposition to attack unprovoked.
to cause injury, or to otherwise endager the safety of human beings or domestic
animals or livestock.; or

C

Any animal whicl1 bites. inflicts injury, assaults. or otherwise attacks a human being
or domestic animal or livestock without justifiable provocation; or

Pocatello Munici,Pal Code Section 6.04.0SO(E) provides:
E.

Owner Liability: An adult owner/cl.l.Stoclian of a dangerous animal shall be
liable for all injin·ies and property damage sustained by any person or
domesti.o animal caused by an unprovoked attack by any dan.ge1·ous animal,
plus all costs, civiljudgmentor penalties. criminal fines, final terms. and any
other penalties and orders. In the event that the owner/custodian of lhe
vicious animal is a minor, the minoes parent or guardian shall be so liable.

Idaho either is or i.sn 't a strict UabiUty state. Even if it were true that Idaho has not yet
declared itself as a s_tri.ct liability state, it doesn't follow logical reasoning that therefore Ida.ho must
be a non-strict Jiability state. At best it means that Idaho is not declared. That would leave it for the
court to decide.
The onty argwnent the defense has eyer presented as to why Idaho would Jg! he a strict
..

liability state is their argument that Idaho 9!II recognizes strict liability in product cases. But
Idaho's two other statutes on vicious dogs prove that is just not the least bit true.

1'".he owner, possessor, or harborer ot' any dog or animal that kills~ worries, or wounds
any livestock and poultry which are raised and kept in captivity fqr domestic Ol'
com.111ercial purposes, is liable to the owner of the same for the damages and costs
of suit, to be recovered before any court of competent jurisdiction:
Idaho Code §25-2806.

Any dog which, wl1en not physically provoked. physically attacks, wmmds, bites or
otherwise i.ajures any person who is not trespussing, is vicious. It shall be unlawful
for the owner or for tbe owner of premises on which a vicious dog is present to
harbor a vicious dog outside a secure enclose. A secure enclosure is one from which
the_animal ca1mot escape and for which exit and entry is controlled by the owner of
the premises or owner of t11e animal.
Idaho Code §15-2805(2).
Response Brief-in Support qf Motion to Roeon11id11r
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At ·the vecy least it is a matter of first impression whether Idaho is a strict liability state. It
wouldn't be the first time tltat a court had to decide what law applied in Idaho.

PREMISE LlABILITY
Woukl the defense please take a position on the Restatement (Second) of Torts §513 1 which
states:·

The possessor of an abnormally da11gerOl.1S dog who keeps it upon land in his
possession, is subject to strict liability to persotts coming upon tl1e lattd in the
exercise of a privilege whether derived frotn his consent to th.eir entry or otherwise.
All the defense has to do is just address it just straig.ht up, rather than dredge through the
distinctions between an invitee and licensee. All the defense has to do is explain to the court why
Idaho would never adopt the Restatement (Second) of Torts §513. Actuallyi Idaho would follow
the Restatement of Torts. This issue has been addressed enough times in briefs that, by now, the
defense should be able to submit somethin~ anything, a citation from another state, a statute, a

treatise- certainly there must be something to substantiate the defense's position that it all hinges
on whether Steve Boswell was an invitee or licensee.
The Restatement makes no such c\istincti.on.

NEGLIGENCE
Plaintif& have cited authorities that the negligence of dog owners lies in areas of :
(a)

Failing to talce reasonable preca\1tions to secw.'e the dog from attacking, biting and
mauling the Plaintiff;

(b)

Failing to adequately restrain. leash, cage or otherwise secure such dog when
Defendants knew or had reason to lmow of the dog's prior vicious propensities and
the likelihood of it attacking. biting and mauling Stephen Boswell;

(c)

Inadequately trainiI1g and/or supervising and/or tending the dog;

(d)

In otherwise negligently failiug to exercise that degree ofcare. diligence; caution and

reasonable precautions as would be demonstrated by a reasonably prudent person
under. the same or similar circumstances so as to prevent any risk of foreseeable

harm to the Plaintiffs.

Defendants have cited none that would suggest that those acts of negligence are irrelevant.
Response Briefin Support of Motion to Re11on11ider
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Neither the court's prior opinion, nor the defense has yet explained why 11011e of those things matter.

NEGLIGENCE PER SE
Pocatello Municipal Code 6.04.010 provides as follows:
Dangerous Animnh
A.
Any_ animal, which, when unprovoked by teasing, taunting, or a threatening
manner by any person, approaches said person in an apparent or perceived
attitude of attack upon the streets, sidewalks, pubilcgroDDds or places, cominon
areas within subdivisions or mobile home or recreational vehicle parks,
commons IJ"ounds of apartment bwldinp, condominiums, or townhouse
developments, or private property not solely owned or possessed by the owner
or custodian ot· the anlmnl,
B.
Any animal with a known propensity, tendency, of disposition to attack
unprovoked, to cause injury, or to othenvis~ endanger the safety of human
beings or domestic animals or livestock; or
C.
Any animal which bites~ inflicts injuryt assaultst or otherwise attacl,s a human
being or domestif animal or livestock without justifiable provocation; or
D,
Any animal owned or harborered primarily or in part for the purpose of
fighting or any animal tr1dned for fighting; o:r\
E.
Any dog which has been trained as an attack dog, ex(:ept dogs used by law
enforcement agencies.
1"'he defense accuses the Plaintiffs of misleading the court by not quoting the entire code

section in our previous brie£ Tbe only one .misleading the court is anyone who refuses to
acknowledge the very important word at the end ofparagraph 2, at the end of paragraph 3~ and at the
end ofparagraph 4, That word is "ort\ Jtts a little word. but it is a very important word. We lmow
that the defense wishes it read "and'\ but it doesn't read "and". It reads 1'or". So becat.tse it reads

"or" and not 4'and'' the defense doesn't get its wish that Zoey must have been previously adjudicated

a.s vicious or that the Plaintiffs must clearly prove that the owner and harborer, both had prior
knowledge ofvi.cious propensities.

The defense doesn't get that. W11en we react the statute the way it is written with ''or'' - and
that is the way it is written - when we read it just like it is written. then a vicious animal is defined
as "any animal which bites and in:tliots injury, assaults, or otherwise attacks a human being or
domestic animal or livestock without justifiable provocation." And that is exactly what Zoe did..

Now~ even the coure s prior opinion recognized that the defense's argum.ent ofthe necessity

of pdor adj1.1dication was incorrect. The defense had already argued that many times before, the
court did not buy into it. The court's opinion concerning negligence per se rests solely on the notion
Response .Brief in Su1~p11rt of Motion to n.ecoru1ider
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that holding one's fist towards a dog is as a matter oflaw justifiable provocation for the dog to take
one's hand off, irrespective of the dog's prior history.
Justifiable provocation is the Defen.dants' only defense to negligence per se. So, it all boils
dowit to justifiable _provocation. Steve Boswell drove his mother-in-law back to her hoiise, he heard
the barking dogs behind the gate; he saw the dogs wagging their tails; he approached the gate as he

had many times before; he reached Iris hand toward Zoey.
There are some thin.gs of which a court can take judicial notice. The sui1 rises in the east; icy
roads are slick; falling objects ttavel downward; but can the court nile that a closed fist (even if it
were one) is, as a matter o:f law a threat to a dog such as always justifies the dog. to reta]iate

viciously? Even if Steve Boswell was judicially estopped from telling a jury what ''closed tlst'
meaut to him when he said it in his deposition 1 he co1.1ld never explain why his ltand was closed.
It is overreaching the parameters ofjudicial notice to rule as a matter oflaw, that a closed fist ·
is so threatening to a domestic animal that the dog should be justified in taking one's hand, off. Such
a determination should be at least supported by expert testimony and left to a jury to decide.
If this case tum.s on whether holding one's hattd in a fist in front of a dog is atways justifiable
provocation, or even justifiable provocation in this instance, the1t at least let's let is tum on that issue,
Let's let a jury decide that. Let's let them listen to tl1e evidence and the experts and those who know

what a man 1.s fist n1eans to a dog.
The Idaho Supreme Court recently reaffinned ''the overriding policy to have issues between
litigants decided 011 the merits." First Fed. Sav. Bank of Twtn Falls v. Riedesel Eng'g, Inc., 154
Idaho 626,630,301 P.~d 632,636 (2012). That is all the Plaintiffs ask.

Respectfully submitted this 171h day of January. 2014.

MERRILL & MERRILL. CHARTERED
By:

d<-..:.. , ,· ~-

, Kent A. Higgins
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I. the undersigned, do hereby certify that a tme, full and correct copy of the foregoing
document was this 17th day of January, 2014, served. upou the following in the manner indicated.
below:

Reed W. La1·sen
COOPER & LARSEN. CHARTERED
P.O. Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229
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Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Telefax 235-1182
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Kent A. Higgi.ns
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BANNOCK COUNTY
CLERK OF THE COURT

2014 JAH 21 PM 3= 3 l
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL rns-mlttfE~OLERK~--·

'

FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF BANNOCK
STEPHEN BOSWELL, ETAL.

I

Plaintiff,

Case No: CV-2012-0004120-PI

vs.

MINUTE ENTRY & ORDER

AMBER DAWN STEELE, ETAL.,
Defendant.
THE PARTIES came before the Court on the 21st day of January, 2014 for hearing
on Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration. Kent A. Higgins appeared in person on behalf of
the Plaintiff. Javier Gabiola appeared in person on behalf of the Defendant. The parties
waived the use of a Court Reporter.
Hearing proceeded before the Court on the record. The Court heard argument from
both counsel regarding the pending motion and objections thereto. After hearing from
counsel, the Court took the matter under advisement.
DATED this 13th day of January, 2014.

WILLIAM H. WOODLAND
District Judge

''\.___
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of January, 2014 I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document upon each of the following individuals in the
manner indicated.

Kent Higgins
PO Box 991
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991

~ U.S. Mail
DE-Mail
D Hand Deliver
0Fax:

Javier Gabiola
PO Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229

~U.S. Mail
DE-Mail
D Hand Deliver
0Fax:
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN fl~',
A, fit2lwf
_IO V . ;

(,,,-t:f-~:f\

FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF BANNOCK

STEPHEN BOSWELL and KARINA
BOSWELL, husband and wife,
Case No:

CV-2012-0004120-PI

Plaintiffs,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
TO RECONSIDER

vs.
AMBER DAWN STEELE and MARY STEELE,
Defendants.

Defendant Amber Steele is the owner of a Scottish Terrier dog named Zoey. Amber
lived in the home of her now deceased grandmother, Mary Steele.
In October 2011, Plaintiff Stephen Boswell had given his mother-in-law, Mary a ride
home from the Boswell home. When Boswell entered Mary Steele's home, the dog Zoey was
confined in a kitchen behind a gate. Boswell approached the dog and reached across the gate
with his hand and was bitten on the back of the hand and sustained serious injuries. There is
some dispute in the record whether the hand was in a closed fist but there is no dispute that
Boswell reached towards and across the gate with his hand extended.
The record shows that Zoey had previously bitten two individuals. Both of these bites
drew blood, but were. considered minor by the recipients and did not require medical
attention. Neither bite was reported to any governmental agency. Both of these prior
incidents were known by both Defendants before Boswell was injured.

Case No.: CV-2012-0004120-PI
Memorandum Decision Denying Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider
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A "Beware of Dog'' sign was outside the front of Mary Steele's home in plain view and
Boswell had earlier spent time with Zoey, had petted Zoey and had played with Zoey on his
lap. Boswell stated that before he was injured, he did not think Zoey was dangerous or vicious.
In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs assert that Defendants are liable under the
following causes of action.
Count I

STRICT LIABILITY

Count II

UNREASONABLE RISKS (NEGLIGENCE)

Count III

PREMISE LIABILITY (INVITEE)

Count IV

PREMISE LIABILITY (SOCIAL GUEST)

CountV

NEGLIGENCE PER SE

As to Count I ~ Strict Liability, Plaintiffs assert that the weight of authority outside the
State of Idaho would under the facts of this case support a finding of strict liability. Plaintiff
also cites the statement for the proposition that strict liability standards should be applied by
the trial court. The application of strict liability standards under the facts of this case has been
well argued by both parties. McClain vs Lewiston Interstate Fair and Racing Association, 17

Idaho 63 is cited by Plaintiff for the proposition that strict liability should apply in this case.
The Court therein clearly did not hold that strict liability is the law in Idaho in a dog bite case
such as the instant action. No Idaho case law in the subsequent one hundred plus years has
been cited as adopting this position no matter how the law in other states may have
developed. lt is not the trial courts responsibility to move the law beyond that which the
Idaho Supreme Court have previously determined .
Count III and Count IV alleging negligence is pied in alternate theories as to the duty
owed by Defendant's previous owner to Plaintiffs visitor. In Mooney v. Robinson. 93 Idaho
676 the Court concluded that even though the parties had conducted some business between
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them, the Plaintiff as a social guest is a licensee. In the instant case Plaintiff extended an
incidental economic benefit to the Defendant Mary Steele by giving her a ride from his home
to her home. However, he was a social guest and thus a licensee. Mary Steele's duty was as
that to any other licensee.
In Count V Plaintiff alleged that Defendants have violated the Idaho Code and a
PocatelJo City ordinance by harboring a vicious animal and thus should be found negligent per
se.
It is well established that in order for negligence per se to apply, a plaintiff must show
that: (1) the statute or regulation clearly defines the required standard of conduct; (2) that
statute or regulation is intended to prevent the type of harm the defendant's act or omission
caused; (3) the plaintiff is a member of the class of persons the statute or regulation was
designed to protect; and (4) the violation was the proximate cause of the injury. See e.g. Tones v

Starnes. 150 Idaho 257, 262, 245 P.3d 1009, 1014 (2011); O'Guin v. Bingham County. 142 Idaho
49, 52, 122P.3d 308,311 {2005); Ahles v. Tabor.136 Idaho 393,395, 34 P.3d 1076, 1078 {2001).
Plaintiff is not necessarily required to show that the Defendant had been charged or convicted
of a violation of a statute to be successful in using negligence per se. He must meet each of the
above requirements.
Idaho Code 25-2805 states "any dog which when not physically provoked, physically
attacks, wounds, bites or otherwise injures any person. who is not trespassing, is vicious. It
shall be unlawful for the owner or for the owner of premises on which a vicious dog is present
to harbor a vicious dog outside a secure enclosure. A secure enclosure is one of the premises
or owner of the animal." Under this code section Boswell cannot bring negligence per se claim
because they have not shown that Steele violated this statute. Regardless of whether or not

Case No.: CV-2012-0004120-PI.
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there was provocation, the evidence shows that the dog was kept in a "secure enclosure." It
was behind a gate in the kitchen and it was Boswell who approached the dog across the gate.
Pocatello City Code 6.04.050 reads as follows:
Dangerous Conduct by Animal Prohibited: the owner or custodian of any animal which
commits any of the acts define in this chapter as "dangerous" [listed below] may be
cited for a misdemeanor and the animal control department may seize and impound
the animal until the matter has been adjudicated.
Specifically prohibited are the following acts:

1. If unprovoked by teasing, taunting, or a threatening manner by any person
approaching said person in an apparent attitude of attack upon the streets,
sidewalks, public grounds or places, common areas within subdivision or mobile
home or recreation vehicle parks, common grounds of apartment buildings,
condominiums, or townhouse developments, or private property not solely owned
or possessed by the owner or custodian of the animal; or
2. Biting, inflicting injury, assaulting or otherwise attacking a human being or
domestic animal or livestock without justifiable provocation.
It does not appear that Pocatello City Code requires previous adjudication to show that
a dog is considered vicious, the question is whether the dog was provoked or not. The first
prong of negligence per se analysis requires that "regulation clearly defines the required
standard of conduct." The Pocatello City Code does not define what constitutes "provocation",
nor does it define "threatening manner by any person."
The City Code does not define the conduct with enough specificity to bring a viable
negligence per se claim. Prong (4) of negligence per se, requires that the "violation was the
proximate cause of the injury." The record shows that the dog did not "approach" Boswell in
an apparent attitude of attack. In fact, Boswell approached the dog and extended his arm
beyond the gate that was enclosing the dog in the kitchen. If Plaintiffs Steele did violate the
Pocatello City Code, that conduct was not a "proximate cause" of Boswell's injury.
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As the home owner and resident, Plaintiffs only duty to Plaintiff as a licensee was to
disclose known dangerous conditions or activities. Evans v. Park, 112 ldaho 400
Although Defendants knew of the prior bites by the dog, they also knew of the
circumstances of these bites and were not on notice that they were harboring a dangerous
animal. In addition, the injuries received by the Plaintiff occurred as the result of his
approaching the dog which was behind a closed gate. Plaintiffs actions were a proximate
cause of his own injuries.
Plaintiff has also raised in paragraph 7 and 8 of his motion to reconsider that the
affidavit of Tamara Andersen was stricken without reason and that the deposition of John
Billquist should have been allowed.
The 29 October 2013 decision of Judge Harding and basis explained therein why the
affidavit of Tamara Andersen was stricken, has been considered in response to the motion to
reconsider. The basis for that ruling is supported in that decision and will not be altered.
Whether Tamara Andersen would have cited the dog owner for prior bites is not necessarily
relevant to whether Plaintiffs' complaint is sustainable. Likewise the quashing of the Billquist
deposition was proper as the record is clear that neither the attorney/client or the work
product privilege was waived.
Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED

thi.J.jay ofFebru;,ry, 2014.

£:.~i!lr!/2<4~
District Judge
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _ _ . ay of February, 2014 I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document upon each of the following individuals in the
manner indicated.

Kent Higgins
PO Box991
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991

cg] U.S. Mail
DE-Mail

·o Hand Deliver
0Fax:

Javier Gabiola
PO Box4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229

IZI U.S. Mail
DE-Mail
D Hand Deliver

0Fax:·
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Reed W. Larsen (3427)
Javier L. Gabiola (5448)
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED
151 North 3"1 Avenue, 2"d Floor
P.O. Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229
Telephone: (208) 235-1145
Facsimile: (208) 235-1182
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
STEPHEN BOSWELL ::nd i(AR!NA BOSWELL, )
husband and wrfe,
)

Case No. CV-201.2-4120-PI

)

Plaintiffs,

)

FINAL JUDGMENT

)
)
)
)
)
)

V.

AMBER STEELE and \1ARY STEELE.

Defendanb.
___________
________
,,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that judgment is hereby
entered for Defendants .Mary Steele and Amber Steele against Plaintiffs Stephen Boswell and

Karina Boswell and Plaintiffs' Complaint is dismissed with prejudice.

.

i)-L~,/..

DA TED this/_!f-..clay of F!i~IJaf'Y'"";'"1014.
.,..........
.

~

:

JilJliu1.t1.., Wt{/ri1~,j~~/ WILLIAM H. WOODLAND
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P.O. Box 991
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Kent A. Higgins
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED
109 North Arthur- 5th Floor
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991
(208) 232-2286
(208) 232-2499 Telefax
ISB#: 3025
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
STEPHEN BOSWELL and KARINA
BOSWELL, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,

AMBER STEELE,
The Estate of MARY STEELE,
Defendants/Respondents.

TO:
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)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-12-4120 QC
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL

THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS
Amber Steele, The Estate of Mary Steele
AND THEIR ATTORNEY
Reed W. Larsen
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED
P.0. Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229
AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT
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NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:

1.

The above named appellants, Stephen Boswell and Karina Boswell, appeals against

the above named respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Memorandum Decision and
Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Judgment entered in the above entitled matter on the 30th of
October, 2013; the Memorandum Decision Denying Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider entered
February 25, 2014; and, final Judgment entered March 17, 2014
2.

The parties have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the order described

in paragraph I above is appealable pursuant to Rule 1l(a)(l) of the Idaho Appellate Rules.
3.

The issues of this appeal are as follows:
(a)

Did the District Court err in denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment

(b)

Did the District Court err in granting Defendant's Motion to quash deposition
subpoena of John Billquist.

(c)

Did the District Court err in striking the Affidavit of Tamara Andersen.

(d)

Whether the District Court abused it discretion in its Findings of Fact,
paragraphs 11, 12 and 14.

(e)

Did the District Court err in ruling that negligence is not an issue of fact.

(f)

Did the District Court err in its rulings as a matter oflaw that approaching a
dog with a closed hand is provocation.

(g)

Did the District Court err in ruling as a matter of law that a dog "bite" or
"nip: that draws blood but does not require medical attention is not evidence
of a dangerous propensity.

(h)

Did the District Court erred in granting Defendants' Cross Motion for
Summary Judgment.

4.

Has an order been entered sealing all or any portions of the record? No.

5.

A partial reporter's transcript is requested of the hearing on Motion to Quash

Subpoena of John Billquist held on July 16, 2012 at 2:00 p.m ..
6.

The appellants request the following documents to be included in the clerk's record

Amended Notice of Appeal
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in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R., and any exhibits attached to the

documents:
a.

Brief in Support of Motion to Amend Complaint

b.

Defendants' Objection to Plaintiffs' Motion"to Amend Complaint

c.

Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Objection to Plaintiffs' Motion to
Amend

d.

Affidavit ofReed W. Larsen with Exhibit 1 - Mark Steele deposition; Exhibit
2 - Affidavit of Chris Kettler

e.

Reply Brief in Support of Motion to amend Complaint

f.

Motion for Partial Swnmary Judgment

g.

Memorandum Supporting Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

h.

Affidavit of Kent A. Higgins in Support of Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment

1.

Affidavit of Tamara Andersen in Support of Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment

J.

Motion to Strike Portions of the Affidavit of Chris Kettler

k.

Notice of Hearing on Motion to Strike Portions of the Affidavit of Chris
Kettler

1.

Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Strike Portions of the Affidavit of
Chris Kettler

m.

Request for Hearing on Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

n.

Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Request for Hearing on Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment

o.

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment

p.

Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment

q.

Affidavit of Javier Gabiola in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment

r.

Notice of Hearing to Quash Subpoena of John Billquist

s.

Motion to Short Time

t.

Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Shorten Time

Amended Notice of Appeal
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u.

Objection to Motion to Quash Subpoena for John Billquis

v.

Affidavit of Kent A. Higgins

w.

Minute Entry and Order 07/16/13

x.

Memorandum in Objection to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment

y.

Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment

z.

Affidavit of Javier L. Gabiola in Support of Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment

aa.

Defendants' Motion to Strike/Objections to Plaintiffs' Affidavit Supporting
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

bb.

AffidavitofKarenaBoswell in Objection to Defendants' Motion to Summary
Judgment

cc.

Affidavit of Stephen Boswell in Objection to Defendants' Motion to
Summary Judgment

dd.

Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment

ee.

Defendants' Motion to Strike/Objections to Plaintiffs' Affidavits in Objection
to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment

ff.

Defendants' Motions in Limine

gg.

Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motions in Limine

hh.

Affidavit of Javier L. Gabiola in Support of Defendants' Motions in Limine

ii.

Request for Rule 34 Inspection

JJ.

Motion to Shorten time for the Defendants to Response Pursuant to Rule 34

(b)
kk.

Order to Shorten Time for the Defendants to Respond Pursuant to Rule 34(b)

11.

Supplemental Memorandum in Support ofDefendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment and Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs'
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

mm.. Brief

nn.

Reply to Defendants' Motion in Limine

oo.

Defendants' Second Motions in Limine

Amended Notice of Appeal
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pp.

Affidavit of Javier L. Gabiola in Support ofDefendants' Second Motions in
Limine

qq.
7.

Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Second Motions in Limine

The appellant requests ·the following documents, charts, or pictures offered or

admitted as exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme Court.
As designated in Paragraph 6.

8.

I certify:

(a)

That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of whom a

. transcript has been requested as named below at the address set our below:
Linda Larsen
Bannock County Courthouse
624 E. Center
Pocatello, ID 83201

(b)

That the clerk of the district court or administrative agency has been paid the

estimated fee for preparation of the reporter's transcript.
(c)

That the estimated fee for preparation ofthe clerk's or agency's record has been paid.

(d)

That the appellate filing fee has been paid.

(e)

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule

20 (and the attorney general ofldaho pursuant to Section 67-1401(1), Idaho Code.
DATED this

1/

~day of April, 2014.

MERRIIL&MERR1LL, CHARTERED
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, the undersigned, do hereby certify that a true, full and correct copy of the foregoing
document was this 'y,r,l, day of April, 2014, served upon the following in the manner indicated
below:
/'

Reed W. Larsen
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED
P.O. Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205~4229

[ v] U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Delivery
[ ] /Telefax

Linda Larsen
Bannock County Courthouse
624 E. Center
Pocatello, ID 83201
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STEPHEN BOSWELL and KARENA
BOSWELL, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.

AMBER DAWN STEELE, the Estate of
MARY STEELE,
Defendants-Respondents.
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)
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)
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Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, State of Idaho,
Bannock County. Hon. Don Harding, District Judge. Hon. William H.
Woodland, District Judge.
Summary judgment vacated, case remanded.
Merrill & Merrill; Kent A. Higgins, Pocatello, for appellants. Kent A. Higgins
argued.
Cooper & Larsen; Reed W. Larsen, Pocatello for respondents. Reed W. Larsen
argued.
WALTERS, Judge Pro Tern
Stephen and Karena Boswell (the Boswells) appeal from the district court's order
granting summary judgment to Amber Dawn Steele and the Estate of Mary Steele 1 (the Steeles),
and the denial of the Boswells' motion to reconsider. They also appeal from the district court's
decision to strike an animal control officer's affidavit, and the court's order denying their motion
to compel a deposition of an insurance adjuster. In their amended complaint, the Boswells
alleged strict liability, negligence, premises liability, and negligence per se as causes of. action.
The claims stated in the complaint stem from Stephen Boswell being bitten by Amber Steele's
dog. We vacate the judgment and remand this case to the district court.

Mary Steele passed away subsequent to the Boswells filing their claims.
1
t
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I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
After Amber's dog bit Stephen, the· Boswells filed a complaint alleging the various
causes of action. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The district court concluded the
following facts were undisputed:2 Mary Steele owned a house in Pocatello where she lived with
her granddaughter, Amber Steele. Mary owned a Shih Tzu and Amber owned a Scottish Terrier,
Zoey. Both dogs lived with the Steele$ at the residence. A fence wrapped around the backyard
to keep the dogs on the property. Mary also placed "Beware of Dog" signs on the gates of the
property. For the most part, Amber kept Zoey in a room in the basement when she left the
house. When Zoey was kept upstairs, Mary used a gate to keep her dog and Zoey in the kitchen.
On the day of the bite, Stephen drove Mary, his mother-in-law, home after she visited
with the Boswells at their home. When· Stephen and Mary entered the residence, the two dogs
were in the kitchen behind the gate.

Zoey was barking and growling.

Without Mary's

knowledge, Stephen walked over to the gate and ex.tended his right hand to Zoey with a closed
tist. As he reached his hand towards Zoey, the dog bit a piece of flesh off of the back of his
hand. Stephen went to the hospital to have his injuries treated.. An animal control officer made a
report of the incident. Stephen's wife, Karena, told the. officer she previously witnessed Zoey
bite an individual, but the animal control officer did not include this in her report. In his
deposition, Stephen admitted that before the incident took place, he did not think Zoey was_ a
dangerous or vicious dog. He also said he believed that Mary did nothing wrong in keeping the
dogs behind the gate in the kitchen.
Prior to biting Stephen, there were two other incidents where Zoey bit or nipped at
someone. The first incident occurred when Zoey bit one of Amber's friends at a barbeque party·
held at Mary's house. The friend was playing ball with Zoey and at one point went to pick the
ball up under Amber's legs. ·As Amber's friend reached for the ball, Zoey bit her hand. The
friend indicated a belief that Zoey was being protective of Amber. The bite drew some blood,
but was easily cleaned and bandaged. As described by Karena, the second incident occurred at
another party at Mary's house. A different friend of Amber's was bit by Zoey. The bite drew

2

Although the district court concluded these· facts were undisputed, as we explain below, a
number of material facts are in dispute.

2
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blood, but did not require medical attention and was described as not being a big deal.3 The two
incidents were not reported to authorities or animal control, there was no need for medical
attention, and no lawsuits were filed.
Based on these facts, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Steeles.
The district court also struck an affidavit of the animal control officer and denied the Boswells'
request to depose an insurance adjuster. The case was then reassigned to another district judge.
The Boswells filed a motion to reconsider, which was denied. The district court entered a
judgment in favor of the Steeles, dismissing the Boswells' claims. The Boswells timely appeal.
II.

ANALYSIS
Summary judgment under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) is proper only when there
is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. On appeal, we exercise free review in determining whether a genuine issue of material fact
exists and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Edwards v.

Conchemco, Inc., 111 Idaho 851,852, 727 P2d 1279, 1280 (Ct. App. 1986). When assessing a
motion for summary judgment, all controverted facts are to be liberally construed in favor of the
nonmoving party. Furthermore, the trial court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of
the party resisting the motion. G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 517, 808
P.2d 851, 854 (1991); Sanders v. Kuna Joint School Dist., 125 Idaho 872, 874, 876 P.2d 154,
156 (Ct. App. 1994}.
The party moving for summary judgment initially carries the burden to establish that
there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he or she is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Eliopulos v. Knox, 123 Idaho 400, 404, 848 P.2d 984, 988 (Ct. App. 1992). The burden
may be met by establishing the absence of evidence on an element that the nonmoving party will
be required to prove at trial. Dunnick v. Elder, 126 Idaho 308, 311, 882 P.2d 475, 478 (Ct. App.
1994). Such an absence of evidence may be established either by an affirmative showing with
the moving party's own evidence, or by a review of all the nonmoving party's. evidence and the
contention that such proof of an element is lacking. Heath v. Honker's Mini·Mart, Inc.,
134 Idaho 711, 712, 8 P.3d 1254, 1255 (Ct. App. 2000). Once such an absence of evidence has
The district court noted that the two incidents may have been the same event, but the
court considered them as different incidents for the purposes of summary judgment.

3
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been established~ the burden then shifts to the party opposing the motion to show, via further
depositions, discovery responses, or affidavits, that there is 'indeed a genuine issue for trial or to
offer a valid justification for the failure to do so under I.R.C.P. 56(f). Sanders, 125 Idaho at 874,
876 P .2d at 156.
The United States Supreme Court, in interpreting Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c),
which is identical in all relevant aspects to I.RC.P. 56(c), stated:
In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary
judgment, after adequate time for di.$covery and upon motion, against a party who
fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element
essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof
at trial. In such a situation, there can be ''no genuine issue as to any material
fact," since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the
nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. The
moving party is "entitled to a judgment as a matter of law" because the
nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element
of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986) (citations omitted). The language and
reasoning of Celotex has been adopted in Idaho. Dunnick, 126 Idaho at 312, 882 P.2d at 479.
The Boswells' amended complaint alleged strict liability, negligence, premises liability,
and negligence per se. Based on its view of undisputed facts, the district court concluded that the
Steeles were entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. We address each claim in turn.

A.

Liability for Domestic Animals
The Boswells contend that the Idaho Supreme Court adopted "strict liability" for dog

bites whe~e the owner of the dog knows of the animal's vicious tendencies. The Boswells rely
on McClain v. Lewiston Interstate Fair & Racing Ass'n, 17 Idaho 63, 104 P. 1015 (1909). In

McClain, the Idaho Supreme Court reviewed a number of errors alleged by the appellants who
were found liable for the actions of a dog. The plaintiff, Benjamin McClain, was a jockey who
was invited to the fairgrounds by the Lewiston Interstate Fair & Racing Association to take part
in horse racing. Defendant Norman Vollmer took his greyhound dog to the fairgrounds. The
fairgrounds' gatekeeper told Vollmer that dogs were not permitted to run loose on the grounds
and warned of the danger of allowing a dog to run loose. The racing association also had a rule
against allowing animals other than those racing to be on the fairgrounds. Despite this notice,
the dog was brought onto the fairgrounds where McClain was engaged in a speed competition.
During the race, the greyhound broke free and crashed into the horse McClain was riding. This
4
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caused McClain to be thrown to the ground. lfhen another horse, which had been following
closely behind, ran into McClain's horse knocking the horse on top of McClain. The jury found
Vollmer and the racing association liable for McClain's injuries.
The defendants argued on appeal that the complaint failed to allege the defendants knew
of tendencies possessed by the dog that would lead to injury. The defendants relied on Wardv.
Danzeizen, 111 Ill. App. 163 (Ill. App. Ct. 1903), for the proposition that "the owner of
domesticated animals is not liable for injuries done by them, unless he is proved to have had
notice of the inclination of the particular animal complained of to commit such injuries, there
being no presumption that animals of that species are vicious or dangerous.'' Id at 165. The
Idaho Supreme Court conceded that this was a correct statement of the law under the facts of that
case, but noted that McClain's case was distinguishable. McClain, 11 Idaho at 79, 104 P. at
1020. The distinction was that Vollmer's dog was not permitted to be on the fairground
property; it was a trespasser. The Cowt then expressed what it viewed to be the .correct
statement of law governing domestic animals: ·
If domestic animals, such as oxen and horses, injure anyone, in person or
property, if they are rightfully in the place where they do the mischief, the owner
of such animals is not liable for such injury, unless he knew that they were
accustomed to do mischief. And in suits for such injuries, such knowledge must
be alleged and proved. For unless the owner knew that the beast was vicious, he
is not liable. If the owner had such knowledge, he is liable.
The owner of domestic animals, if they are wrongfully in the place where
they do any mischief, is liable for it, though he had no notice that they had been
accustomed to do so before. In cases of this kind the ground of the action is, that
the animals were wrongfully in the place where the injury was done. And it is not
necessary to allege or prove any knowledge on the part of the owner, that they had
previously been vicious.
Id at 79, 104 P. at 1020 (quoting Decker v. Gammon, 44 Me. 322,328,329 (1857)). Because
the greyhound was a trespasser while causing the injury, it was not necessary for the plaintiff to
allege knowledge of any vicious tendencies. However, the Cowt also noted that the trespass
would have to be "the result of the negligence of the owner" in order to establish liability.
McClain, 11 Idaho at 82, 104 P. at 1021. Further, the complaint actually did describe how
greyhounds have a tendency to take part in chasing animals, and this information was "proper as
bearing upon the question of negligence." Id at 83, 104 P. at 1022. Finally, the Court held that
there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's conclusion of negligence, and affirmed the
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jury instructions that required a showing of negligence. Id. at 95, 98·99, 104 P. at 1026, 1027·
28. From all this, it is apparent the Court did not adopt a "strict liability" cause of action in
McClain, but instead affirmed liability stemming from a negligence cause of action.

On the other hand, the Court adopted a rule of law lacking the ordinary care scienter
requirement of negligence when owners of domestic animals know of vicious tendencies. In
cases where a domestic animal is not trespassing, the owner of the animal is liable for injuries
caused if the owner knew or should have known of the animal's vicious or dangerous tendencies.
McClain, 17 Idaho at 79, 104 P. at 1020. Absent from the rule is any requirement to show a

failure to exercise ordinary care.
This rule was again recently affirmed by the Idaho Supreme Court. Braese v. Stinker

Stores, Inc., 157 Idaho 443, 337 P.3d 602 (2014). In Braese, the Court affinned the grant of
summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Stinker Stores, Inc. .The plaintiff in that case
alleged the store breached a duty of care by allowing a dog to remain in its st.ore. The store
allowed dog owners to bring their dogs into the store.

The plaintiff was injured when a

customer's dog jumped up on him and knocked him over. The Court first concluded that the
store did not have a duty because allowing dogs into the store did not create an unreasonable risk
to the public. This is because ''[u]nder common law, all dogs, regardless of breed or size, are
presumed to be harmless domestic animals." Braese, 157 Idaho at 445,337 P.3d at 604 (quoting
4 Am. Jur. 2d Animals § 75 (2007)). There was no evidence presented to establish that allowing
dogs into the store would be contrary to the presumption that dogs are harmless; thus, the store
did not create an unreasonable risk of harm. The Court next addressed whether allowing the dog
to remain in the store breached a duty based on the known behavior of the animal. The Court
again favorably quoted from American Jurisprudence: "In the absence of statute to the contrary,
an owner is liable for injuries caused by a domesticated animal where the owner knew or should
have known of the animal's vicious or dangerous propensity." Braese, 157 Idaho at 446, 337
P.3d at 605 (quoting 4 Am. Jur. 2d Animals§ 67). Therefore, "[a] store owner would also have a
duty to protect its patrons from a dog that the store owner knew or should have known was
vicious or had a dangerous propensity." Braese, 157 Idaho at 446, 337 P.3d at 605. Notably, the
Court did not mention the need to show a failure to exercise ordinary care under these
circumstances. Because there was no evidence the store employees knew the dog might jump up
on customers, the store did not have a duty to protect the customer from the dog.

6
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The Boswells identify secondary sources, as well as other jurisdictions, that refer to the
fonn of liability described in McClain for owners with knowledge of an animal's dangerousness
as "strict liability." We do not think it necessary to adopt that label. It is sufficient to say that
the Idaho Supreme Court has adopted a rule that an owner of a domesticated animal will be
liable for injuries it causes if the owner had prior knowledge, or should have known, of the
animal's dangerous propensity. It is the elements of the cause of action that are significant, not a
label of strict liability or negligence. 4
Turning to the Boswells' amended complaint, the Boswells alleged that the Steeles knew
Zoey was a vicious animal and that Mr. Boswell had been bitten by the dog. The Boswells
presented testimony that Zoey had bitten two other individuals prior to Zoey biting Stephen. The
Steeles allege the prior incidents complained ofby the Boswells were not bites, but the dog was
merely being protective by nipping at the individuals. Whether these incidents constituted notice
of vicious propensity is a question for the jury. The incidents, though not severe, resulted in
injury evidenced by bleeding and the need to clean the wounds. The Boswells pied a cause of

action _and sufficiently supported it with evidence to sµrvive summary judgment.
Next, the evidence of whether Stephen provoked Zoey was disputed. Stephen indicated
that when he entered the house, ''both dogs were excited to see [him] and Mary," indicating Zoey

"was whining, wagging her tail, excited." He also explained he extended his hand towards the
dog in a manner to allow the dogs to sniff his hand. As described by Stephen, the dog bite was
unprovoked. 5 Assuming without deciding that provocation or providing adequate warnings
would be a defense, the district court erred in granting summary judgment on this cause of
action.

4

The distinction between a strict liability cause of action and a negligence cause of action
may lie in the type of contributory negligence allowed as a defense. Compare Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 515 with 4 Am. Jur. 2d Animals § 67. However, this Court has not been
asked to address the law governing any defense to liability in this case, and we make no
comment on its application.
5

This is in contrast to what this Court has previously held to be provocation. In Boots ex
rel. Boots v. Winters, 145 Idaho 389, 395, 179 P.3d 352, 358 (Ct. App. 2008), this Court
concluded the boy "provoked the brown dog's attack by kicking the fence and swinging his
jacket at the dog."

7
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B.

Negligence
The Boswells also alleged simple negligence. In Idaho, a cause of action for negligence

requires proof of the following: (1) the existence of a duty, recognized by law, requiring the
defendant to conform to a certain standard of conduct; (2) breach of that duty; (3)

a

causal

connection between the defendant's conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or
damage. Black Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc. v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, N.A., 119 Idaho 171,
175-76, 804 P.2d 900, 904-05 (1991); Sanders v. Kuna Joint School Dist., 125 Idaho 872, 874,
876 P.2d 154, 156 (Ct. App. 1994). The Boswells alleged in their amended complaint that the
Steeles breached a duty by failing to properly secure the dog, train or supervise the dog, and
otherwise exercise ordinary care under the circumstances.
The district court granted summary judgment against the Boswells concluding that they .
failed to show the Steeles owed a duty of care. The Steeles argue swnmary judgment was proper
because Mary put up "Beware of Dog" signs, the Steeles did not know Zoey was dangerous, and
Stephen approached the dog voluntarily with a closed fist while the dog was growling and
barking.
The district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the Steeles. The
Boswells provided evidence that Zoey had bitten on two previous occasions. Though the Steeles
allege these incidents were not biting incidents, again, whether these incidents provided notice of
vicious propensity is a question for the jury. Additionally, whether putting up generic warning
signs and keeping an alleged vicious dog behind a small gate is sufficient to meet this duty

(

would be a question for the jury. Finally, whether Stephen provoked the dog was disputed.
Therefore, the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the Steeles on the
Boswells' claim of negligence.
C.

Premises Liability

The Boswells also claimed Mary violated her duty as a homeowner by keeping a vicious
dog on her property. The duty owed by owners and possessors of land depends on the status of
the· person injured on the land--that is, whether he or she is an invitee, licensee, or trespasser.

Ball v. City of Blacifoot, 152 Idaho 673, 677, 273 P.3d 1266, 1270 (2012); Robinson v. Mueller,
156 Idaho 237, 239-40, 322 P.3d 319, 321-22 (Ct. App. 2014). An invitee is one who enters
upon the premises of another for a purpose connected with the business conducted on the land, or
where it can reasonably be said that the visit may confer a business, commercial, monetary, or
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other tangible benefit to the landowner. Holzheimer v. Johannesen, 125 Idaho 397, 400, 871
P.2d 814, 817 {1994).

A landowner owes an invitee the duty to keep the premises in a

reasonably safe condition or to warn of hidden or concealed dangers. Id. A licensee is a visitor
who goes upon the premises of another with the consent of the landowner in pursuit of the
visitor's purpose. Id; Evans v. Park, 112 Idaho 400,401, 732 P.2d 369, 370 (Ct. App. 1987).
Likewise, a social guest is also a licensee. Holzheimer, 125 Idaho at 400, 871 P.2d at 817. The
duty owed to a licensee is narrow. A landowner is only required to share with the licensee
knowledge of dangerous conditions or activities on the land. Evans, 112 Idaho at 401, 732 P .2d
at 370.
The Boswells challenge the district court's conclusion that Stephen had the status of a
social guest. They argue that Stephen conveyed a tangible benefit to Mary by driving her home.
However, this fails to recognize that Stephen did not enter the residence as part of driving Mary
home. Even assuming providing a ride home can be characterized as a tangible benefit, Stephen
·did not enter the house as part of driving Mary home. Thus, Stephen entered as a social guest.
The district court granted summary judgment on this claim because it concluded that
Mary did not have knowledge of the dog's viciousness and because the dog was properly secured
behind the gate in the kitchen. The Boswells argue there was sufficient evidence to put before
the jury the question of whether Mary failed to warn Stephen of Zoey's dangerous propensities.
As we h~ve already concluded, the two previous biting incidents provided disputed evidence as
to whether Mary was on notice that Zoey had vicious tendencies. Mary having failed to warn
Stephen that Zoey may unexpectedly bite provides sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude
Mary breached a duty to warn Stephen. Further, Mary's placing the warning signs on her gates
does not establish, as a matter of law, that she fulfilled her duty to warn. She testified that the
signs were put up to dissuade the neighborhood youth from coming onto her property. Whether
the warning signs were sufficient to warn Stephen of the danger of the dog is a question for a

jury. Additionally, Stephen testified he had a number of interactions with Zoey, and only knew
the dog to be friendly. Absent information that a dog may bite unprovoked, it can be easily
inferred froin the evidence presented by the Boswells that because Mary allowed Stephen into
the house, the signs were inapplicable to him.

The district court also put great weight on

Stephen's comments that he did not feel Mary did anything wrong in how she secured Zoey.
This ignores that Stephen's claim stems from the failure to warn of the dog's dangerousness, not
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in how the dog was secured. Because the Boswells put forward sufficient evidence that Mary
failed to warn Stephen of a known dangerous dog, the district court erred in granting summary
judgment as to the Boswells' premises liability claim.
D.

Negligence Per Se
"[I]n Idaho, it is well established that statutes and administrative regulations may define

the applicable standard of care owed, and that violations of such statutes and regulations may
constitute negligence per se." Sanchez v. Galey, 112 Idaho 609, 617, 733 P.2d 1234, 1242
(1986). "The effect of establishing negligence per se through violation of a statute is to
conclusively establish the first two elements of a cause of action in negligence." Slade v. Smith's

Mgmt. Corp., 119 Idaho 482,489,808 P.2d 401,408 (1991).
In order to replace a common law duty of care with a duty of care from a
statute or regulation, the following elements must be met: (1) the statute or
regulation must clearly define the required standard of conduct; (2) the statute or
regulation must have been intended to prevent the type of harm the defendant's
act or omission caused; (3) the plaintiff must be a member of the class of persons
the statute or regulation was designed to protect; and (4) the violation must have
been the proximate cause of the injury. [Ahles v. Tabor, 136 Idaho 393, 395, 34
P.3d 1076, 1078 (2001)] (citing Sanchez v. Galey, 112 Idaho 609, 617, 733 P.2d
1234, 1242 (1986)).

O'Guin v. Bingham Cnty., 142 Idaho 49, 52, 122 P.3d 308,311 (2005). The interpretation of a
statute is an issue of law over which we exercise free review. Aguilar v. Coonrod, 151 Idaho
642, 649-50, 262 P.3d 671, 678-79 (2011). Such interpretation must begin with the literal words
of the statute; those words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute
must be construed as a whole. Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg'[ Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 893,
265 P.3d 502, 506 (2011). It is well established that where statutory language is unambiguous,
legislative history and other extrinsic evidence should not be consulted for the purpose of
altering the clearly expressed intent of the legislature. Id Only where a statute is capable of
more than one conflicting construction is it said to be ambiguous and invoke the rules of
statutory construction. L & W Supply Corp. v. Chartrand Family Trust, 136 Idaho 738, 743, 40
P.3d 96, 101 (2002). If it is necessary for this Court to interpret a statute because an ambiguity
exists, then this Court will attempt to ascertain legislative intent and, in construing the statute,
may examine the language used, the reasonableness of the proposed interpretations, and the
policy behind the statute. Kelso & Irwin, P.A. v. State Insurance Fund, 134 Idaho 130, 134, 997

10
98 of 348

P.2d 591, 595 (2000). Where the language of a statute is ambiguous, constructions that lead to
absurd or unreasonably harsh results are disfavored. See Jasso v. Camas County, 151 Idaho 790,
798,264 P.3d 897, 905 (2011).
The Boswells relied on various code sections from the Pocatello Municipal Code (PMC)
and Idaho Code§ 25-2805. The district court concluded that the PMC did not apply to Zoey's
conduct because the Steeles did not have knowledge that Zoey was a vicious or dangerous dog
and because the dog was provoked. Likewise, the court concluded the Idaho Code section did
not apply because the dog was provoked. In denying the Boswells' motion for reconsideration,
the district court concluded the _ordinance was not sufficiently clear as to what constitutes
provocation or what would constitute a threatening manner by a person, and that violations of the
ordinance would not be the proximate cause of Stephen's injury because he voluntary
approached the dog and extended his hand beyond the gate.6
Pocatello Municipal Code 6.04.0SO(A) states;
A. Dangerous Conduct By Animal Prohibited: The owner or custodian of
any animal which conunits any of the acts defmed in this chapter as "dangerous"
may be cited for a misdemeanor and the animal control department may seize and
impound the animal until the matter has been adjudicated. The conduct shall not ·
be deemed dangerous if the victim (person, domestic animal, or livestock) was
committing a tort against the animal's owner/custodian, or committing a trespass
or other tort on the premises of the animal's owner/custodian. Specifically
prohibited are the following acts:
1. If unprovoked by teasing, taunting, or -a threatening manner by any
person, approaching said person in an apparent attitude of attack upon the streets,
sidewalks, public grounds or places, common areas within subdivisions or mobile
home or recreational vehicle parks, common grounds of apartment buildings,
condominiums, or townhouse developments, or private property not solely owned
or possessed by the owner or custodian of the animal; or
·
2. Biting, inflicting injury, assaulting, or otherwise attacking a human
·being or domestic animal or livestock withoutjustifiable provocation.

The Steeles argue the Boswells' negligence per se claims were also properly dismissed
because the criminal statutes relied on do not expressly create a private cause of action. See
Yoakum v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 129 Idaho 171, 176, 923 P.2d 416, 421 (1996) (holding no
private cause of action arising from various criminal statutes). However, the Boswells do not
argue the Pocatello Municipal Code and Idaho Code sections only expressly provide a private
cause of action. Rather, they also rely on the code sections under a negligence per se cause of
action to show that the Steeles violated an established duty.
6
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The ordinance lists a number of acts that are prohibited as dangerous and are relevant to this
case, such as biting, inflicting injury, assaulting, or otherwise attacking a human. Zoey ripping
off the back of Stephen's hand applies as a dangerous act. under the ordinance. Thus, the only
question is whether Zoey was provoked.
We first note, contrary to the district court's conclusion, that the ordinance clearly defines
the standard of conduct. Even if provocation was not sufficiently clear from the plain meaning
of the word, the statute further provides clarity by explaining in subsection one that provocation
can include "teasing, taunting, or a threatening manner." As to whether Zoey was provoked, the
Steeles argue that the undisputed evidence shows Stephen provoked Zoey by approaching the
dog with a closed fist while Zoey was barking and growling~ However, as we have already
concluded, this evidence was disputed. Stephen's testimony that the dog was excited to see him
and was wagging her tail was sufficient to put this fact at issue. Extending a closed hand
towards what appears to be a friendly dog to allow the dog to- sniff the hand does not
undisputedly amount to provocation. Therefore, the district court erred in granting summary
judgment as to the negligence per se claim relating to PMC 6.04.050(A).
Next, in the Boswells' amended complaint they rely on PMC 6.04.060, which sets out
requirements for harboring a dangerous animal:
A. Restraint Requirements: The owner/custodian of any animal convicted
of a violation of the dangerous conduct prohibitions set out in this chapter shall
complete the requirements of this subsection and subsection B of this section
within thirty (30) days of the date of such conviction. .Every dangerous animal
shall be securely confined by its owner/custodian within a building or secure
enclosure as set out herein, and whenever off the premises of its owner/custodian,
shall be either caged or securely muzzled and restrained by an adult with a chain
or tether having a minimum tensile strength of three hundred (300) pounds and
not more than three feet (3 ') in length, and shall be under the direct control and
supervision of the adult owner/custodian of the dangerous animal. Every person
· harboring a dangerous animal is charged with an. affinnative duty to confine the
animal in such a way that persons and other animals do not have access to such
animal. To be considered secure, a facility must be constructed in a manner
capable of containing the animal. It shall be a completed structure with a securely
attached roof of durable material which is secured to a foundation or concrete pad,
or it shall be a chainlink structure which includes a securely attached roof, and
which is embedded into the ground to a depth of no less than one foot (l '). Both
the completed structure and the chainlink structure shall be at least six feet (6') in
height and shall include a locking mechanism which shall be kept locked at all
times the animal is within said facility.
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·The district court did not provide specific ·analysis why a claim based upon this code section
should be dismissed, and the Boswells have provided limited briefing on this section on appeal.
Although the dog was secured in such a fashion as to present no danger to people outside of the
house, the enclosure within the Steeles' home was not sufficiently secure to protect people that
the Steeles allowed to enter the house, whether as invitees or licensees. Because Mary pennitted
Stephen to enter her home, the relevant question becomes whether the gate that confined the dog
to Mary's kitchen met the ordinance requirement that the animal be confined "in such a way that
persons ... do not have access to such animal." Plainly, the evidence shows that it did not.
Therefore, the district court erred in granting summary judgment on this cause of action because,
on the evidence presented, the Steeles have not demonstrated that they are entitled to judgment
as a matter oflaw.
Idaho Code§ 25-2805 also relates to securing a vicious dog. Idaho Code § 25-2805(2)
provides:
(2) Any dog which, when not physically provoked, physically attacks,
wounds, bites or otherwise injures any person who is not trespassing, is vicious.
It shall be unlawful for the owner or for the own~r of premises on which a vicious
dog is present to harbor a vicious dog outside a secure enclosure. A secure
enclosure is one from which the animal cannot escape and for which exit and
entry is controlled by the owner of the premises or owner of the animal. Any
vicious dog removed from the secure enclosure must be restrained by a chain
sufficient to control the vicious dog. Persons guilty of a violation of this
subsection, and in addition to any liability as provided in section 25-2806, Idaho
Code, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. For a second or subsequent violation of
this subsection, the court may, in the interest of public safety, order the owner to
have the vicious dog destroyed or may direct the appropriate authorities to destroy
the dog.
The statute first defines what a vicious dog is, and then sets out the requirements of how
such a dog must be secured. Whether the dog was vicious and whether it was properly confined
in a secure enclosure, as contemplated by the statute, are questions for the jury. Thus, the district
court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the Steeles on the Boswells' negligence
per se claim stemming from Idaho Code § 25-2805(2).
E.

PMC 6.04.050(E)
The Boswells argue that PMC 6.04.0SO(E) creates a private cause of action where an

owner of a dangerous animal causes injuries. Pocatello Municipal Code 6.04.0SO(E) states:
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E. Owner Liability: An adult owner/custodian of a dangerous animal shall
be liable for all injuries and property damage sustained by any person or by any
animal caused by an unprovoked attack by any dangerous animal, plus all costs,
civil judgments or penalties, criminal fines, final terms, veterinary fees, shelter
impound fees, and any · other penalties· and orders. In the event that the
owner/custodian of the dangerous animal is a minor, the minor's parent or
guardian shall be so liable.
The PMC 6.04.010 defines dangerous animal as:·
DANGEROUS ANIMAL:
· A. Any animal which, when unprovoked by teasing, taunting, or a
threatening·manner by any person, approaches said person in an apparent attitude
of attack upon the streets, sidewalks, public grounds or places, common areas
within subdivisions or mobile home or recreational vehicle parks, commons
grounds of apartment buildings, condominiums, or townhouse developments, or
private property not solely owned or possessed by the owner or custodian of the
animal.
B. Any animal with a known propensity, tendency, or disposition to
attack unprovoked, to cause injury, or to otherwise endanger the safety of human
beings or domestic animals or livestock; or
C. Any animal which bites, inflicts injury, assaults, or otherwise attacks a
human being or domestic animal or livestock without justifiable provocation; or
D. Any animal owned or harbored primarily or in part for the purpose of
fighting or any animal trained for fighting; or
E. Any dog which has been trained as an attack dog, except dogs used by
law enforcement agencies.
Exceptions:_ An animal will not be considered dangerous if it engages in
any of the above listed actions toward a person or animal that is either:
a) committing a trespass or other tort upon the premises of the animal's owner or
custodian, or b) committing a crime against the animal's owner or custodian. An
animal will not be considered dangerous if any of the above actions occur when
the animal is being teased, tormented, or abused, or if the actions were in reaction
to either a crime committed by a person or an attempt by the person to commit a
crime.
Upon reviewing the ordinance, it is apparent that PMC 6.04.050(E) creates a private
cause of action when a dangerous animal, as defined in PMC 6.04.010, causes injury. The
district court does not appear to have addressed this ordinance as a standalone cause of action.7
The Steeles argue that none of the Pocatello ordinances provide a private cause of action, express
7

In their amended complaint, the Boswells included the ordinance under the headings
strict liability, negligence per se, and premises liability. By reversing the dismissal of this
portion of the Boswells' amended complaint, we simply hold that the ordinance provides a
standalone cause of action.
14
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or implied. However, the plain language of this ordinance expressly states that an owner of a
dangerous animal that causes injury "shall be liable." As to whether Zoey was provoked, the
Steeles argue that the undisputed _evidence shows Stephen provoked Zoey by approaching the
dog with a closed fist while Zoey ':"as barking and growling. However, as we have already
concluded, this evidence was disputed. Stephen's testimony that the dog was excited to see him
and was wagging her tail was sufficient to put this fact at issue. Extending a closed hand
towards what appears to be a friendly dog to allow the dog to sniff the hand does not
undisputedly amount to provocation.

Additionally, as discussed previously, it is disputed

whether Zoey had previously bitten others unprovoked. Thus, it is disputed whether Zoey would
be considered a dangerous animal under this code section. Therefore, the district court erred in
granting summary judgment and dismissing the Boswells' claim as it relates to this ordinance.
F.

Other Claims ·or Error

The Boswells argue the district court erred in striking an affidavit of the animal control
officer when considering the motion for summary judgment. The animal- control officer testified
that she had reviewed the affidavit of Amber's friend where she described how Zoey bit her, and
the officer concluded that based on her training and experience the bite constituted a previous
bite and showed that Zoey had a dangerous propensity. Given that we have reversed the district
court on all claims that would need to rely on information regarding Zoey's dangerous
propensity, we need not address this issue.
Finally, the Boswells argue that the district court erred in quashing the subpoena to
depose an insurance adjuster. The district court concluded that information possessed by the
insurance adjuster was work product and unavailable for discovery. In a letter to the Boswells'
attorney rejecting a demand for damages made by the Boswells, the adjuster described a previous
incident where Zoey had been provoked and nipped at an intoxicated individual, but did not bite
that person. The described incident varied from the one conveyed by Amber's friend, and the
one described by Mary. The Boswells argue that deposing the insurance adjuster could lead to
discoverable evidence, namely information about this possible other biting incident.
The scope of discovery is governed by I.R.C.P. 26(b)(l), which includes discovery of
"any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action
. . . ." One form of protected information is the work product doctrine, which stems from
l.R.C.P. 26(b)(3). That rule states in relevant part:
15
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Trial Preparation--Materials.
Subject to .. the provisions of
subdivision (b)(4) of this rule, a party may obtain discovery of documents and
tangible things otherwise discoverable under subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and
prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for
that other party's representative (including the party's attorney, consultant, surety,
indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a showing that the party seeking·
discovery has substantial. need of the materials in the preparation of the party's
case and that the party is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial
equivalent of the materials'by other means.
In Sanders v. Ayrhart, 89 Idaho 302, 312, 404 P.2d 589, 594-95 (1965), the Idaho
Supreme Court reviewed interrogatories relating to preliminary information, which the Court
characterized as outside of the attorney's work product:
The remaining interrogatories are concerned with names and addresses of
witnesses contacted by the defendant, his attorney or his indemnitor; the existence
and location of any photographs of the scene of the accident; and whether
defendant or his attorney had copies of the police report of the accident.
Defendant argues that these interrogatories are an intrusion into the work product
of defendant's investigators and attorney and therefore improper. Defendant's
position is not well taken. The questions are of a preliminary nature designed to
determine whether information protected by I.R.C.P. 26(b) is available. In State
ex rel. Pete Rhodes Supply Co. v. Crain, 373 S.W.2d 38 (Mo. 1963), the court, in
interpreting a rule similar to I.R.C.P. 26(b), held that names and addresses of
witnesses to an accident known by a party or his attorney did not involve the
"work product" of his cowisel. The trial cow1 did not err in requiring defendant
to answer these interrogatories without a showing of undue hardship or injustice.
Sanders, 89 Idaho at 312,404 P.2d at 594-95. The Boswells argue they should be able to depose

the insurance adjuster in order to determine the source of the information disclosed in the letter.
If the Boswells are correct that the insurance adjuster knows of an additional individual bitten by
Zoey, then they are entitled to learn this information and it is not work product.
The Steeles argue that the Idaho Supreme Cow1 has indicated that statements made to an
insurance adjuster are work product and protected from discovery. In Dabestani v. Bellus, 131
Idaho 542, 545, 961 P.2d 633, 636 (1998), the Idaho Supreme Court agreed that a statement
made to an insurance adjuster was protected as work product and free from discovery. However,
unlike the referenced statement in Dabestani, here the Boswells seek information regarding the
identity of a potential witness that could help prove their various claims. The district court's
order quashing the subpoena prohibited the insurance adjuster's deposition in its entirety and was
premature. Rather, the work product objection is the type that could be made during the
16
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deposition itself as questions are presented. Accordingly, the district court erred in quashing the
Boswells' subpoena to depose the insurance adjuster.

G.

Attorney Fees
Both parties request attorney fees on appeal under Idaho Code § 12-121. That section

allows an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party. Attorney fees under section 12-121
"may be awarded by the court only when it finds, from the facts presented to it, that the case was
brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation."

I.R.C.P.

54(e)(1 ). Although the appellants and not the respondents are the prevailing parties, we do not
find that the defense of the appeal was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.
Therefore, neither party is awarded attorney fees on appeal.

IIL
CONCLUSION
The district court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of the Steeles as to the
Boswells' negligence per se claims arising from PMC 6.04.060 and Idaho Code § 25-2805. The
district court also erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the Steeles on the claim
alleging owner liability for injury caused by an animal known to have vicious tendencies, the
negligence claim, the premises liability claim, the negligence per se claim stemming from PMC
6.04.050(A), and the cause of action arising under PMC 6.04.050(E). · Furthermore, we also
reverse the district court's order quashing the subpoena of the insurance adjuster. Therefore, we
vacate the judgment and remand this case to the district court. Costs are awarded to appellants;
no attorney fees are allowed.
Chief Judge MELANSON and. Judge LANSING CONCUR.
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Kent A. Higgins
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED
109 North Arthur - 5th Floor
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991
(208) 232-2286
(208) 232-2499 Telefax
ISB#: 3025
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
STEPHEN BOSWELLand KARINA
BOSWELL, husband and wife,

)
)

)
Plaintiff,
AMBER STEELE,
MARY STEELE,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-12-4120 OC
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Pursuant to Rule 56, Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiffs move this Court for partial
summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs on their claims of liability for owning or harboring a
domestic animal with known vicious tendencies; for statutory liability or negligence per se under
Idaho Code § 25-2805; and for statutory liability under Pocatello Municipal Code § 6-04.010 et seq.
against Defendants' Third, Fourth and Fifth Affirmative defenses as set forth in the Answer to

Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial.
This Metion is made on the grounds that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to
Defendants' strict liability and premises liability based upon Defendants' admissions.

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
0:\90\9034\Pleadings\Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.2.wpd
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Further that there is no genuine issue of fact that the dog bite by Defendants' dog was the
proximate cause of injury to the Plaintiffs. The extent of that injury and the damages is a question
for the jury.
Further, under either of these theories, there is no genuine issue that Plaintiffs or any other
person was comparatively negligent.
Plaintiffs support this Motion for Partial Summary Judgment with (1) Memorandum
Supporting Plaintiffs' Second Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, (2) Affidavit of Tamara
Andersen, (5) Affidavit ofJane L. Guidinger; and all the records on file in this"case.

Dated thisdiJ day of September, 2015.
MERRILL & MERRILL!' CHARTERED
//

_/

/
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By

)i[~7;,-fu~¥

·/~~i

Attorneys for Plain~iff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undefSiignJd, do hereby certify that a true, full and correct copy of the foregoing
document was thi~day of September, 2015, served upon the following in the manner indicated
below:
Reed W. Larsen
Javier I. Gabiola
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED
P.O. Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229

[ ]
[ .,-f
[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Telefax 235-1182

The Honorable William H. Woodland
Bannock County Courthouse
624 E. Center, Room 220
Pocatello, ID 83201

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
0:\90\9034\Pleadings\Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.2.wpd
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
STEPHEN BOSWELL and KARINA
BOSWELL, husband and wife,

)
)

)
Plaintiff,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

AMBER STEELE,
MARY STEELE,
Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO

)

County of Bannock

)

.

Case No. CV-12-4120 OC
AFFIDAVIT OF JANEL. GUIDINGER
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

:ss
Jane L. Guidinger, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
1.

I make this Affidavit upon information and belief.

2.

I have a BS degree in Zoology.

3. ·

I also have a BS degree in Secondary Education

4.

Since 1999, I am the owner and director of ODMAD Dog Training.

5.

From 1970 until present I have been a member of the Pocatello Kennel Club.

6.

From 1983 until 1993 I served as the Pocatello Ke1mel Club Training Director

Affidavit of Jane Guidinger
0:\90\9034\Fleadings\Affidavit of Jane Guidinger.wpd
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7.

From 1984 until present I am a member ofthe National Association of Dog Obedience
Instructors (NADOI).

8.

From 1981 until present! am a member of the Irish Setter Clup of America, (ISCA).

9.

From 1998 until present I am member of the Upper Snake River Valley Dog Training
Club, (USRVDTC).

10.

From 1995 until 2007 I served as a Member of the Animal Advisory Committee for
the City of Pocatello.

11.

From 1993 until 2008 I served as the Bannock County 4-H leader and dog resource
person.

12.

From 2006 until 2007 I served as Show Chairman for the Pocatello Kennel Club.

13.

From 2005 until 2013 I served as the Agility Trial Chairman for fall agility trials,
PKC.

14.

From 1983 until present I have been a professional dog trainer, completing over 100
titles with various breeds.

15.

From 1996 until present I am a Registered Pet Partner with the Delta Society.

16.

From 1981 until present I am an American Kennel Club CGC evaluator.

17.

I have reviewed the deposition of Mary Steele.

18.

I have reviewed the deposition of Amber Steele.

19.

I have reviewed the deposition of Stephen Boswell.

20.

I have reviewed the deposition of Karena Boswell.

21.

I have reviewed the deposition of Kris Kettler

22.

In my opinion, Zoey's encounter with Chris Kettler constitutes a dog bite. Zoey's

behavior in that incident is unacceptable for a domestic pet dog and constitutes vicious behavior.
23.

In my opinion, Zoey' s encounter with "Mary" as described in the Affidavit of Karena

Boswell, constitutes a dog bite. Zoey' s behavior in that incident is unacceptable for a domestic pet
dog and constitutes vicious behavior.
24.

In my opinion, Stephen Boswell's approach to Zoey on October 8, 2011, when he held

out his hand toward Zoey and had bitten, was appropriate and was neither teasing, taunting, or
threatening.
Affidavit of Jane Guidinger
0:\90\9034\Pleadings\Affidavit of Jane Guidinger.wpd
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25.

From the pictures of the area where Zoey was confined on the day Zoey bit Stephen

Boswell, Zoey had plenty of room to retreat, rather than attack Steve.
26.

In my opinion, the attack on Steve Boswell was vicious.

27.

It is my opinion that,judging from Zoey's prior history of attacks, the dog was not

property restrained and that proper precautions were not taken to avoid an injury.
DATED this_/_ day of September, 2015.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this

Affidavit of Jane Gui~inger
0:\90\9034\Pleadings\Affidavit of Jane Guidinger. wpd

Ji....

day of Septe her, 2015.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, the undersigned, do hereby certify that a true, full and correct copy of the foregoing
document was this A'4-\ day of September, 2015, served upon the following in the manner indicated
below:
Reed W. Larsen
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED
P.O. Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229

[

]

[ yJ]

[

]

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

[~~
K~-

Affidavit of Jane Guidinger
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Kent A. Higgins
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED
I 09 North Arthur - 5th Floor
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991
(208) 232-2286
(208) 232-2499 Telefax
ISB#: 3025
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
STEPHEN BOSWELLand KARINA
BOSWELL, husband and wife,
Plaintiff,

AMBER STEELE,
MARY STEELE,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)

)
)
)

Case No. CV-12-4120 OC

MEMORANDUM SUPPORTING
PLAINTIFFS' SECOND MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

)
)
)
)
)

I. INTRODUCTION

Once the pillow that rested Steve Boswell's hand became saturated with blood, it dripped a
large pool on the floor of Stev(!'s hospital room, as the back of his hand lay open from being
mangled by a dog. Zoey was the biter. Zoey lived in the house of Mary Steele, Steve's mother-inlaw. Earlier that day, Mary had asked Stephen to come pick her up and drive her to a party. Steve
obliged. When he returned Mary to her home after the party Steve experienced the injury of his
lifetime at the teeth of a vicious dog.
When Steve and Mary entered her home, Mary stopped at the entrance closet to put away her
coat. Steve proceeded, as usual, toward a child fence next to the kitchen, to allow Mary's Shih Tzu
Memorandum Supporting Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
0:\90\9034\Pleadings\Memorandum Supporting Second Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.wpd

Page I

112 of 348

into the living room. But this afternoon Mary's Shih Tzu was not alone on the other side of the
fence. Accompanying the Shih Tzu was Mary's granddaughter's Scottish Terrier, (Zoey). Mary's
granddaughter, Amber Steele, is the other Defendant.
Usually, there was only the ShijTzu on the other side of the fence. The fence was kept to
keep the ShihTzu from wetting on the carpet while Mary was away. Today, there were two dogs the
other side of the fence. When Steve approached the two dogs, the Scottish Terrier grabbed Steve's
hand with its teeth and ripped off the back of Steve's hand. Then it took the bloody piece of Steve's
skin and tussled with it on the kitchen floor.
Steve was not the first victim bitten by this Scottish Terrier. (See the Affidavit of Chris
Kettler filed as an Exhibit to the Affidavit of Reed Larsen.) Zoey was at least a third time offender,
and possibly more.
Plaintiffs bring this action on theories of common law scienter liability in tort, negligence,
premises liability, negligence per se, statutory cause of action under municipal code, and other
theories. By this Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Plaintiffs seek summary judgment on their
theories of common law scienter, negligence per se under Idaho Code § 25-2805; and statutory
liability under Pocatello Municipal Code§§ 6.04.010, et seq ..
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary Judgment shall be rendered "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, ifany, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
¢.e moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(c), Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure. The Court liberally construes the record in favor of the party opposing the motion and
draws all reasonable inferences and conclusions in that party's favor. Friel v. Boise City Hous. Auth.,
126 Idaho 484,485,887 P.2d 29, 30 (1994).
· If the evidence reveals no disputed issues of material fact, then Summary Judgment should
be granted. Loomis v. City ofHailey, 119 Idaho 434,437, 807 P.2d 1272, 1275 (1991).
The party opposing the Summary Judgment Motion "may not rest upon the mere allegations
or denials of that party's pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided
in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Rule 56(e),
Idaho Rules ofCivil Procedure. "[A] mere scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt as to the facts
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is not sufficient to create a genuine issue for purposes of summary judgment. The non-moving party
must respond to the summary judgment motion with specific facts showing there is a genuine issue
for trial."

Samuel v. Hepworth, Nungester & Lezamiz, 134 Idaho 84, 87, 996 P.2d 303, 306

(2000)(internal citations omitted).
The United States Supreme Court, in interpreting Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c),
which is identical in all relevant aspects to I.R.C.P. 56(c), stated:
In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary
judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who
fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element
essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof
at trial. In such a situation, there can be "no genuine issue as to any material fact/'
since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the
nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. The moving
party is "entitled to a judgment as a matter of law" because the nonmoving party
has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with
respect to which she has the burden of proof

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265.
273-74 (1986) (citations omitted). The language and reasoning of Celotex has been adopted in
Idaho. Dunnick, 126 Idaho at 312,882 P.2d at 479.
Boswell v. Steele, 158 Idaho 554,348 P.3d 497,502 (Ct App. 2015)
Ill. ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
DEFENDANTS ARE LIABLE IN TORT

Mary and Amber Steele are liable for Steve Boswell's injuries under common law scienter
of dangerous propensities of a domestic animal. Idaho is one ofthe oldest states to have adopted this
common law action. In McClain v. Lewiston Interstate Fair Racing Association, 17 Idaho 63 (1909),
tjie court said:

One of the early cases in this country considering the legal principles involved in
the case at bar, under the facts as alleged in the complaint, is that of Decker v.
Gammon, 44 Me. 322, 69 Am, Dec. 99, and in our opinion states the rule
correctly, as follows: "If domestic animals, such as oxen and horses, injury any
one, in person or property, if they are rightfully in the place where they do the
mischief, the owner of such animals is not liable for such injury, unless he knew
that they were accustomed to do mischief; and, in suits for such injuries, such
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knowledge must be alleged and proved, for, unless the owner knew that the beast
was vicious, he is not liable. If the owner had such knowledge, he is liable.
104 P. 1015, at 1020.
Idaho law is in full accord with the Restatement of Torts which provides:
( 1)

(2)

A possessor of a domestic animal that he knows or has reason to know has
dangerous propensities abnormal to its class, is subject to liability for harm
done by the animal to another, although he has exercised the utmost care
to prevent it from doing the harm.
This liability is limited to harm that results from the abnormally dangerous
propensity ·of which the possessor knows or has reason to know.

Restatement (Second) o/Torts, § 509 (1977).
Similarly, the Restatement (Second) o/Torts, § 513 provides:
The possessor of a wild animal or an abnormally dangerous domestic animal who
keeps it upon land in his possession, is subject to strict liability to persons coming
upon the land in the exercise of a privilege whether derived from his consent to
their entry or otherwise.
The Third Restatement takes it a step further to make it clear we are talking about strict
liability:
An owner or possessor of an animal that the owner or possessor knows or has
reason to know has dangerous tendencies abnormal for the animal's category is
subject to strict liability for physical harm caused by the animal if the harm ensues
from that dangerous tendency.

Restatement (J'hird) o/Torts, Phys. & Emot. Harm,§ 23 (2010).
Accordingly, "fault" is not at issue under Plaintiffs' First Cause of Action. What is at
issue is whether Mary Steele and/or Amber Steele knew or should have known that their dog
would bite.

In the deposition of Mary Steele, Mary says:
Q.

Do you know Vicky Cotsman [sic]?

A.

Cootsman?

Q.

Cootsman? Thank you. How do you know Vicky?
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A.

I used to work with her, and we became close friends.

Q.

Okay. And she was present that day when - when Zoey nipped the other person,
wasn't she?

A.

Yes. Yes.

Q.

Your daughter, Karina, was there also, wasn't she?

A.

Yeah.

Q.

And Amber was there?

A.

(No audible response.)

Q.

Do you remember who the person-the name of the person who got bitten that
day?

A.

I can't remember her name. She was somebody that Amber worked with or
worked for. I can't remember.

Q.

What happened after that young lady was bitten?

A.

Nothing. She just got up and finished eating.

Q.

Isn't it- isn't it true that you dressed the wound?

A.

Just a Band-Aid.

Q.

It did drew [sic] blood, didn't it?

A.

Huh?

Q.

It did draw blood, didn't it, the -

A.

A little yeh.

Also, according to the deposition of Mary Steele, she does not dispute that it was the dog she
harbored, Zoey, that did the damage to Steve Boswell's hand. See deposition page 32, line 5.
This principal of liability for domestic animals is a separate and distinct cause of action from
negligence and is not based on. the fault of the parties. It is based solely upon whether the possessor
of the dog knew that the dog had bitten before and that the dog's bite is the proximate cause of the
Plaintiffs' injuries. Boswell v. Steele, 158 Idaho 554,348 P.3d 497 (Ct. App. 2015). It has nothing
to do with whether the owner exercised ordinary care. Id. It has everything to do with whether the
owner chose to keep the animal, knowing its disposition to cause injuries. Id
Defendants try to make hay out if their only defense: lack of scienter. True, they were
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obliged to admit that on at least two prior instances the dog had bitten. But, they contend, the
two prior bites only barely broke the skin. Only a little blood was shed, and no hospitalization was
necessitated. Thus, they say they had no knowledge.
This theory, the nippy-nip theory, is insufficient to preclude summary judgment. Under the
nippy-nip theory, so long as the bite was only a little nippy-nip, and did not amputate any appendages
or require any transfusions, the defendants didn't really have notice of the dog's dangerous
disposition. This defense is insufficient as a matter oflaw, and will also be shown insufficient under
the requirements set forth by the Court of Appeals for the defense of Summary Judgment. Boswell
v. Steele, 158 Idaho 554,348 P.3d 497 (Ct. App. 2015).
Courts have found knowledge of dangerous propensities in such acts as "being territorial"
"barking when its space is invaded," "attacking another animal," "snapping," "showing its teeth"
Grillo v. Williams, 71 A.D.3d 1480, 1481, 897 N.Y.S.2d 371, 372 73 (2010); Nutt v. Florio, 75
Mass. App. Ct. 482, 488, 914 N.E.2d 963, 969 (2009). A cross and savage disposition is not
necessary to impose liability on its owner for its assault. The owner is equally responsible when the
dog as a propensity to bite only in play. The sci enter requirement is met when the owner or harborer
was put on notice that the dog could or would injure someone. Savoie v. Travelers Indem. Co. of
Hartford, Conn.,223 So. 2d432, 434 (La. Ct. App.1969) overruled by Hollandv. Buckley, 305 So.
2d 113 (La. 1974).
In Haberman v. Babai, 21 Misc. 2d 1093, 194 N.Y.S.2d 721 (Sup. Ct. 1959), the defendants
admitted the dog had bitten before, but not penetrated the skin. The court held that the lack ofproof
that those bites actually caused injuries did not overcome this convincing evidence of the animal's
propensities. Even if the bites occurred only in play rather than in anger does not negate scienter on
the part of the owner that the animal engages in behavior tending to cause harm. Ryman v. Alt, 266
N. W.2d 504 (Minn. 1978). A fortiori, defendant's proffer that Zoey was 'just being protective." is
absurdly meritless as a defense for biting people.
Defendant's 'Just a little nippy-nip" theory will not carry the day. True, the Court of Appeals
said that knowledge of vicious propensity is an issue of fact that should have prevented this court
from granting, as.it did, summary judgment against Steve Boswell and his wife. But the Appellate
Court also spelled out that an issue of fact also requires credible evidence from a non-moving party.
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Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment is supported by the Affidavits of Tamara Andersen, the
animal control officer who investigated, and the affidavit of Jane L. Guidinger. Both ofthese experts
testify that the prior bites inflicted by Zoey were evidence of vicious or harmful and inappropriate
behavior for a domestic animal. For the Defense to weather this motion for summary judgment, it
must produce, evidence - from a credible source- that just a little nippy-nip, that only draws a little
blood and can be treated with a home first-aid kit, is not notice to a dog-owner that her dog presents
a risk of injury to people.
That isn't going to happen. Accordingly, this court should grant summary judgment to the
plaintiffs on the common law scienter cause of action.
POINT TWO
PLAINTIFFS SHOULD ALSO BE GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT
FOR LIABILITY UNDER IDAHO CODE! § 25-2805

According to Idaho Code§ 25-2805:
(2) Any dog which, when not physically provoked, physically attacks, wounds, bites
or otherwise injures any person who is not trespassing, is vicious. It shall be unlawful
for the owner or for the owner of premises on which a vicious dog is present to
harbor a vicious dog outside a secure enclosure. A secure enclosure is one from
which the animal cannot escape and for which exit and entry is controlled by the
owner of the premises or owner of the animal. Any vicious dog removed from the
secure enclosure must be restrained by a chain sufficient to control the vicious dog.
Persons guilty of a violation of this subsection, and in addition to any liability as
provided in section 25-2806, Idaho Code, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. For a
second or subsequent violation of this subsection, the court may, in the interest of
public safety, order the owner to have the vicious dog destroyed or may direct the
appropriate authorities to destroy the dog.
Boswell v. Steele, 158 Idaho 554,348 P.3d 497,508 (Ct. App. 2015).

In the Appellate decision, the Court of Appeals promptly pointed out that whether Zoey was
in such an enclosure was an issue of fact that should have prevented this court from sending the
Boswells packing. The same is not true of the Defendant's defense to this Summary Judgment. The
Appellate Court also said:
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Although the dog was secured in such a fashion as to present no danger to people
outside of the house, the enclosure within the Steeles1 home was not sufficiently
secure to protect people that the Steeles allowed to enter the house, whether as
invitees or licensees. Because Mary pennitted Stephen to enter her home, the relevant
question becomes whether the gate that confined the dog to Mary1s kitchen met the
ordinance requirement that the animal be confined "in such a way that persons ... do
not have access to such animal." Plainly, the evidence shows that it did not.

Id. at 348 P .3d 497, 507 (Ct. App. 2015).
In other words, just because there is an issue of fact as to whether the toddler gate is a "secure
enclosure" the court need not deal in absurdities. The evidence shows the gate was not a secure
enclosure. The Court of Appeals already decided that. Thus, Defendant's only defense 1 to liability
under Idaho Code § 25-2805 is whether Zoey' s two prior bites constitute "wounds." Or if, just like
with the nippy-nip theory, the defense must argue that the bites were not wounds if they only drew
a little blood and only required a little rinsing and a bandage. (Thank Heavens Zoey wasn't rabid!).
Just like the court needn't indulge the absurd question of fact of whether the toddler gate was
a secure enclosure, the court also needn't engage in the senseless debate ofwhether the two dog bites
that penetrated the skin and drew blood are "wounds" for purposes of LC. 25-2805.

POINT THREE
DEFENDANTS' ARE LIABLE UNDl!R POCATl!LLO MUNICIPAL CODE,

Pocatello Municipal Code§ 6.04.010, et. seq. creates a private cause of action. Boswell v.

Steele, 158 Idaho 554,348 P.3d 497,508 (Ct. App. 2015).

1

Provocation of the two prior bites would also be a defense, but an equally ridiculous defense. As to the
bite fo Kris Kettler, see her Affidavit. And as to the bite of "Mary" Karina Boswell testified:
Q. Just to clarify a couple of things. Mr. Larsen asked you about an occasion when you personally witnessed Zoe
bite another person. To your recollection, that person's name was Mary?
A. Mary, I thought her name was Mary.
Q. Where was Mary situated?
A. She was sitting at the bistro table in a chair.
Q. And she was reaching down toward the dog?
A. Yes, she was petting the dog, she was going to pet the dog (indicating).
Q. Where was Amber situated?
A. Amber was over by the grill area about five, ten, fifteen, twenty feet· away. I don't know what the distance is.
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The PMC 6.04.010 defines dangerous animal as:
DANGEROUS ANIMAL:
A. Any animal which, when unprovoked by teasing, taunting, or a threatening manner by any person,
approaches said person in an apparent attitude of attack upon the streets, sidewalks, public grounds
or places, common areas within subdivisions or mo bile home or recreational vehicle parks, commons
grounds ofapartment buildings, condominiums, or townhouse developments, or private property not
solely owned or possessed by the owner or custodian ·of the animal.
B. Any animal with a known propensity, tendency, or disposition to attack unprovoked, to cause
injury, or to otherwise endanger the safety of human beings or domestic animals or livestock; or
C. Any animal which bites, inflicts injury, assaults, or otherwise attacks a human being or domestic
animal or livestock without justifiable provocation; or
·
D. Any animal owned or harbored primarily or in part for the purpose of fighting or any animal
trained for fighting; or
E. Any dog which has been trained as an attack dog, except dogs us~d by law enforcement agencies.
Exceptions: An animal will not be considered dangerous if it engages in any of the above listed
actions toward a person or animal that is either: a) committing a trespass or other tort upon the
premises of the animal's owner or custodian, orb) committing a crime against the animal's owner
or custodian. An animal will not be Cf?nsidered dangerous if any of the above actions occur when the
animal is being teased, tormented, or abused, or if the actions were in reaction to either a crime
·
committed by a person or an attempt by the person to commit a crime.
Pocatello Municipal Code§ 6.04.0SO(E) provides:
Owner Liability:· An adult owner/custodian of a vicious animal shall be liable for all
injuries and property damage sustained by any person or domestic animal caused by
an unprovoked attack by any vicious animal, plus all costs, civil judgment or
penalties, criminal fines, final terms, and any other penalties and order. In the event
that the owner/custodian of the vicious animal is a minor, the minor's parent or
guardian shall be so liable.
Pocatello Municipal Code leaves no doubt. It imposes liability for all damages, costs, civil
judgments, and penalties, on the owner of a dog for any attack, unless taunted, teased, threatened,
or abused. The owners of the transgressing terrier are responsible, period! unless Steve Boswell
"teased, taunted, threatened or abused" the dog. It remains on the owner to take responsibility for
the tawdry disposition of the dog.
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The affidavit of Tamara Andersen, the animal control officer who investigated, and the
affidavit of Jane L. Guidinger both conclude - with expertise - that Steve Boswell did not tease,
taunt, or threaten. It is for the defense to produce credible evidence that he did tease, taunt, or
threaten, or it the court's duty to grant summary judgment.

IV. CONCLUSION

For these reasons the Plaintiffs should be granted their motion for partial summary judgment.
DATED this

J Jday of September, 2015.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK p:C,
STEPHEN BOSWELL and KARINA BOSWELL, )
husband and wife,
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
V.

AMBER STEELE and MARY STEELE,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-12-4120

jl

DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
STRIKE/OBJECTIONS TO
AFFIDAVIT OF JANE GUIDINGER

COME NOW Defendants Amber Steele and Mary Steele, deceased, pursuant to IRCP 56(e),
submit their Motion to Strike/Objection to the Affidavit ofJane Guidinger. Specifically, Defendants
request that the Court strike or otherwise decide not to consider para~aphs 22-27 ofMs. Guidinger' s
affidavit, as Paragraphs 22-27 in the Guidinger affidavit lack foundation, contain legal conclusions,
are conclusory, speculative and inadmissible under IRE 702.
This Motion is supported by the record herein and the Memorandum in Support of
Defendants' Motion to Strike/Objections to the Affidavit of Jane Guidinger filed concurrently
herewith.
ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
STEPHEN BOSWELL and KARINA BOSWELL, )
husband and wife,
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)

v.
AMBER STEELE and MARY STEELE,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-12-4120
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MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

COME NOW Defendants, Amber Steele ("Amber") ·and Mary Steele ("Mary''), deceased,
by and through the undersigned counsel, and hereby provide the following Memorandum in
Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
I. INTRODUCTION.
The Court must deny Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, 1 which is patently
obvious from reading the Idaho Court of Appeals' decision in this matter, Boswell v. Steele, 158
Idaho 554, 348 P.3d 497 (Ct. App. 2015). Plaintiffs simply ask this Court to rehash the issues that
were addressed by the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals made it abundantly clear that it was

1Plaintiffs

are not seeking summary judgment on their claims for premises liability or
negligence, as they admit at page 2 of their Memorandum.
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for the jury to decide the Plaintiffs' claims and Defendants' defenses. Specifically, the Court of
Appeals held that, as to Plaintiffs' liability for domestic animals claim,2 "[w]hether [Zoey's biting
two other individuals prior to biting Stephen Boswell] constituted notice of vicious propensity is a
question for the jury." Boswell, 158 Idaho 561, 348 P.3d at 504. Similarly, as to Plaintiffs'
negligence per se claims pursuant to Idaho Code §25-2805 and Pocatello Municipal Code §6.04.010
et seq., the Court of Appeals held that the issues were whether Zoey was a vicious dog, whether she
was properly confined and whether Stephen Boswell provoked her. The Court concluded that the
evidence as to Zoey being a vicious dog and whether Stephen Boswell provoked her was disputed
and are questions for the jury. Id., 158 Idaho at 564-566, 348 P.3d at 507-509.
Notably missing from Plaintiffs' motion is any argument that the Court of Appeals granted
them summary judgment. It did not, for the simple reason that it held the matter was to be decided
by the jury. For these reasons, Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment must be denied.
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS.

1.

Amber owned a Scottish Terrier named Zoey that also resided at Mary's residence.

See Affidavit of Javier L. Gabiola in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
("Gabiola Aff.), Exh. A (Deposition ofMary Steele), p. 6, ll.24-25,filed 7-12-13; Affidavit ofJavier

L. Gabiola in Support of Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary
. Judgment, Exh. ](Deposition ofAmber Steele), p.64, l. 19-p.65, l.4,fiiled 7-22-13.

2While

Plaintiffs label their former strict liability claim as common law scienter, the
Court of Appeals labeled it liability for domestic animals. Boswell, 158 Idaho 559,348 P.3d at
502.
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2.

Macy and Amber did not know that Zoey was dangerous3 or vicious, 4 or that she

would bite Mr. Boswell. Mary Steele Depo., p.12, ll.5-13; p. 13, ll.10-15. Amber testified that
Zoey was not an aggressive dog, rather, a quiet dog, who did not growl, snarl or lunge at people.
Amber Steele Depo., p. 94, l.15-p.95, l.15. Chris Kettler, Amber's former friend, also testified that

she never saw Zoey bare her teeth or jump on anyone. Affidavit ofJavier L. Gabiola in Support of
Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Exhibit 2 (Chris Kettler
Deposition), p.16, ll. 8-12.

3. Prior to the incident, there had been no complaints from people, or any adjudication that
Zoey was dangerous or had bitten anyone without provocation. 5 Amber Steele Depo., p.94, l.15p.95, l.15.

4. Prior to the incident on October 8, 2011, Zoey nipped at Amber's friend, Chris Kettler,
but only because Zoey saw Ms. Kettler reach or move towards Amber and was being protective of
her. Affidavit ofChris Kettler, 'i[3, p. 2, attached to the Affidavit ofReed W. Larsen filed January 10,

3

To reiterate, as set forth in Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, under Pocatello City Code
6.04.0lOA, Band C define "dangerous" as an "animal which, when unprovoked by teasing,
taunting or a threatening manner by an person approaches said person in an apparent attitude of
attack .... or any animal with a known propensity, tendency or disposition to attack unprovoked .
. . or any animal which bites, inflicts injury, assaults or otherwise attacks a human being ...without
justifiable provocation[. ]"[Emphasis supplied].
4

_ Idaho Code § 25-2805 defines vicious as a dog, "which, when not physically provoked, physically
attacks, wounds, bites or otherwise injures any person who is not trespassing...." [Emphasis
supplied].
5

This is required under Pocatello City Code 6.04.0SOA. Also, under Idaho Code §25-28-5(2) a person
is guilty of owning a vicious dog where it is established the dog bites or injures a person, "when not
physically provoked[.]"[Emphasis supplied].
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2013; ChrisKettlerDepo.,p.14, .ll.9-16;p. 24, l.21-p.25, l.l. Zoeynipped Chris Kettler, while Chris

and Zoe were playing ball, when the ball rolled between Chris and Amber. When Chris reached to
get the ball, she reached towards Amber, and that is when Zoey nipped Chris. Chris Kettler Depo.,
p.15,l.19-p. 16, 1.2.

5. Chris Kettler further testified that she would let her grandchildren be around Zoey, as she
did not consider Zoey vicious at all, did not believe Zoey was aggressive, and that the incident
between her and Zoey was an accident. Chris Kettler Depo., p. 17, ll. 2-18; p. 25, ll. 2-4; p. 30, ll.1824. Ms. Kettler also believed that Zoey was just being protective of Amber, which, as a Scottish

Terrier, was Zoey's job. Id; Amber Steele Deposition, p. 45, l.25-p. 46,l.22.
6. When Mr. Boswell and Mary entered Mary's home after returning from the family
gathering at Plaintiffs' house, prior to the bite, Zoey was barking and growling. Mary Steele Depo,
p. 6, ll. 21-25.

7. Mr. Boswell, on his own, and without Mary's knowledge or her at her request,
approached Zoey, who was behind the gate, with his right hand in a closed fist. Stephen

Boswell Depo., p. 29, l. 7-p. 33, l.5. Mr. Boswell reached to Zoey and she bit him.

8.

Mr. Boswell admitted that there was no reason for him to go beyond the gate, and that

Mary never asked him to go to Zoey, and he decided on his own to go to Zoey. Mary Steele Depo.,
p. 12; p. 40, ll. 14-18; Stephen Boswell Depo., p. 25, ll.22-24.

9.

When Amber was gone from the home, she either kept Zoey in the basement or

behind the gate in the kitchen. AmberSteeleDepo.,p. 26, l.18-p. 27, l.5; p. 35,ll.J-17;p. 56, I. 23-p.
58, l.3; p. 65, l.25-p. 66, l. 7. Both Plaintiffs admitted that they knew that Mary and Amber kept

Zoey in the basement or behind the gate in the-kitchen, and did not think Mary did anything wrong
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in keeping Zoey in a fenced in back yard or behind the gate in her house. Stephen Boswell Depo.,

p. 13, ll. 6-7; p. 16, ll.11-19,· Karina Boswell Depo., p. 19, ll.2-6; p. 42, l.10-p. 43, l.3. Even more
telling is that Mr. Boswell admitted he did not believe Mary was negligent, as he testified, "I don't
think she [Mary} did anything wrong." Stephen Boswell Depo, p. 34, l.25-p.35, l.1. [Emphasis

added]. Mrs. Boswell admitted she still was around Zoey and did not have any concerns. Karina

Boswell Depo., p. 17, ll.19-23. Mrs. Boswell also admitted she could not say Mary's or Amber's
leaving Zoey in the kitchen behind the gate was an act of negligence, actually thought it was
reasonable to keep a gate/barrier to keep the dogs segregated, and could not be c1itical of Mary in
her actions. Id., p. 42, l.1 O-p.43, l.3. Mrs. Boswell also could not say whether the bite was
predictable to Mary or Amber. Id., p. 33, ll.1-8.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW..
Rule 56( c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment "shall be
rendered if the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter oflaw."' Smith v. Meridian Joint School Dist. No. 2, 128 Idaho 714, 718, 918
P.2d 583,587 (l996)(quoting I.R.C.P. 56(c)); see also Avila v. Wahlquist, 126 Idaho 745,890 P.2d
331 (1995). In making this detennination, a court should liberally construe the record in favor of
the party opposing the motion and draw all reasonable inferences and conclusions in that party's
favor. Smith, 128 Idaho at 718,918 P.2d at 587 (citations omitted); Boswell, supra, 158 Idaho at
558, 348 P.3d at 501. Further, the non-moving party "has the burden of presenting sufficient
evidence to establish a triable issue which arises from the facts, and a genuine issue of fact is not
created by a mere scintilla of evidence." Jarman v. Hale, 122 Idaho·952, 955-956, 842 P.2d 288,
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291-292 (Ct. App. 1992)(intemal citations omitted). However, "]i]f the moving party fails to
challenge an element or fails to present evidence establishing the absence of genuine issue of
material fact on that element, the burden does not shift to the nonmoving party, and the nomnoving
party is not required to respond with supporting evidence." Smith, supra, 128 Idaho at 719, 918 P .2d
at 588 (citing Thomson, 126 Idaho at 530, 887 P.2d at 1038)). Additionally, based on the evidence,
if reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions or draw conflicting inferences, summary
judgment must be denied. City ofChubbuck v. City ofPocatello, 127 Idaho 198, 200, 899 P .2d411,
413 (1995)(citation omitted), citing Harris v. Department ofHealth and Welfare, 123 Idaho 295,
298, 847 P.2d 1156, 1159 (1992)).
Here, again, the Court of Appeals made it unequivocally clear that the jury was to decide
Plaintiffs' claims and Defendants' defenses. As a result, Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary
judgment must be denied.

IV. ARGUMENT.
A.

AS THE COURT OF APPEALS CLEARLY HELD IT WAS FOR THE JURY
TO DECIDE THE CLAIMS AND DEFENSES IN THIS MATTER,
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY MUST BE DENIED.

1.

It is for the jury to decide whether Defendants knew Zoey was vicious and
whether Stephen Boswell provoked her.

Defendants cannot overstate that the issue as to Plaintiffs' liability for domestic animal claim
is a jury question. 6 Plaintiffs, once again, argue that Defendants are strictly liable7 and that there is

Plaintiffs posit a mertiless argument, which is supported by their own admission that
"the Court of Appeals held that lmowledge of vicious propensity is an issue offact .... "
Plaintiffs' Memorandum Supporting Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; p. 6.
6

7Plaintiffs'

citation to secondary sources, and non-binding case law from foreign
jurisdictions, offers little credence to their position. Again, as previously cited, the Restatement
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no dispute as to Defendants' knowledge as to Zoey's vicious propensity. Plaintiffs ignore the Court
of Appeals' decision in that regard, as noted by the following passage:
The Boswells identify secondary sources, as well as other jurisdictions, that
refer to the form of liability described in McClain for owners with knowledge
of an animal's dangerousness as II strict liability." We do not think it necessary
to adopt that label. It is sufficient to say that the Idaho Supreme Court has
adopted a rule that an owner of a domesticated animal will be liable for injuries
it causes if the owner had prior knowledge, or should have known, of the
animal's dangerous propensity. It is the elements of the cause of action that are

significant, not a label of strict liability or negligence.
Turning to the Boswells' amended complaint, the Boswells alleged that the Steeles
knew Zoey was a vicious animal and that Mr. Boswell had been bitten by the dog.
The Boswells presented testimony that Zoey had bitten two other individuals prior
to Zoey biting Stephen. The Steeles allege the prior incidents complained of by the
Boswells were not bites, but the dog was merely being protective by nipping at the
individuals. Whether these incidents constituted notice of vicious propensity is
a question for the jury.

Boswell, 15 8 Idaho at 561, 348 P.3d at 504 [emphasis supplied] [footnotes omitted]. It is, again,

patently obvious that the Court of Appeals held the evidence was disputed as to whether Defendants
had notice ofZoey's alleged vicious propensity, and, as the evidence is in dispute, it is up to the jury
to decide the issue. Further, the record supports that Defendants did not know that Zoey was
dangerous or vicious, or that she would bite Mr. Boswell. Mary Steele Depo, p.12, ll.5-13; p. 13,
ll.10-15. Prior to:the incident, there had been no complaints or any adjudication that Zoey was

of Torts cited by Plaintiffs has not been adopted by Idaho, nor has strict liability. As to the nonbinding case law cited by Plaintiffs, in Minnesota, New York and Massachussetts, the courts held
it was a jury question in determining an owner's knowledge of an animal's vicious propensities,
see, Grillo v. Williams, 71 A.D 3d 1480, 1481 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2010); Nutt v. Florio, 914 N.E. 2d
963, 968 (Mass. Ct. App. 2009); Ryman v. Alt, 26 N.W. 2d 504, 508 (Minn. 1978)and that
provocation was a defense, see, Haberman v. Babai, 194 N.Y.S. 2d 721, 723 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
Louisiana adopted strict liability in Holland v. Buckley, 305 So. 2d 113, 119 (La. 1974), which
Idaho has not adopted as noted by the Court of Appeals in this case.
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dangerous or had bitten anyone without provocation. Zoey nipped at a friend of Amber, Chris
Kettler, but only because Zoey saw Ms. Kettler reach or move towards Amber and was being
protective ofher. Affidavit ofChris Kettler,

13, p.2, attached to the Affidavit ofReed W Larsen filed

January 10, 2013. Also, prior to the incident, Mary never saw Zoey bear her teeth. Mary .Steele
Depo., Exh. A., p. 26, ll.2-3.
Additionally, as the Court of Appeals held, it was disputed whether Stephen Boswell
provoked Zoey. Boswell, 158 Idaho at 564-566, 348 P.3d at 507-509. On this issue, the record
shows there is evidence Mr. Boswell did provoke her. When Mr. Boswell and Mary returned, they
entered Mary's home, and, prior to the bite, Zoey was barking and growling. Mary Steele Depo.,
p. 6, ll. 21-25. Mr. Boswell, on his own, and without Mary's knowledge or her at her request,

approached Zoey, who was behind the gate, with his right hand in a closed fist. Stephen

Boswell Depo., B., p. 29, l. 7-p. 33, 1.5. Mr. Boswell reached to Zoey and she bit him. Mr. Boswell
admitted that there was no reason for him to go beyond the gate, and that Mary never asked him to
go to Zoey, and he decided on his own to go to Zoey. Mary Steele Depo.,

P: 12, ll.21-24; p. 40, ll.

14-18; Stephen Boswell Depo., p. 25, ll.22-24. Given these facts, and the Court of Appeals'
decision, this Court must deny Plaintiffs' motion.
2.

A genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Zoey was a vicious dog,
whether she was properly confmed and whether Stephen Boswell provoked her,
thereby precluding summary judgment on Plaintiffs' negligence per se claims.

Once again, Plaintiffs' motion must be denied as to its negligence per se claims pursuant to
Idaho Code §25-2805 and Pocatello Municipal Code 6.04.0SO(E) and 6.04.010. The Court of
Appeals again held that it was for the jury to decide those issues. As to Idaho Code §25h2805, the
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Court of Appeals stated as follows:
Idaho Code § 25-2805 also relates to securing a vicious dog. Idaho Code §
25-2805(2) provides:
(2) Any dog which, when not physically provoked, physically attacks, wounds,
bites or otherwise injures any person who is not trespassing, is vicious. It shall be
unlawful for the owner or for the owner of premises on which a vicious dog is
present to harbor a vicious dog outside a secure enclosure. A secure enclosure is one
from which the animal cannot escape and for which exit and entry is controlled by
the owner of the premises or owner ofthe animal. Any vicious dog removed from the
secure enclosure must be restrained by a chain sufficient to control the vicious dog.
Persons guilty of a violation of this subsection, and in addition to any liability as
provided in section 25-2806, Idaho Code, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. For a
second or subsequent violation of this subsection, the court may, in the interest of
public safety, order the owner to have the vicious dog destroyed or may direct the
appropriate authorities to destroy the dog.
The statute first defines what a vicious dog is, and then sets out the requirements of
how such a dog must be secured. Whether the dog was vicious and whether it was
properly confined in a secure enclosure, as contemplated by the statute, are
questions for the jury.

Boswell, 158 Idaho at 565,348 P.3d at 508 [emphasis supplied]. Again, the Court clearly held that
the jury is to decide the vicious propensity and secure enclosure issues.
Likewise, the Court of Appeals also held it was a jury question to decide Plaintiffs' claims
under the Pocatello Municipal Code:
The Boswells argue that PMC 6.04.050(E) creates a private cause of action where an
owner of a dangerous animal causes injuries. Pocatello Municipal Code 6.04.0SO(E)
states:
E. Owner Liability: An adult owner/custodian of a dangerous animal shall be liable
for all injuries and property damage sustained by any person or by any animal caused
by an unprovoked attack by any dangerous animal, plus all costs, civil judgments
or penalties, criminal fines, final tenns, veteri11ary fees, shelter impound fees, and any
other penalties and orders. In the event that the owner/custodian of the dangerous
animal is a minor, the minor's parent or guardian shall be so liable.
The PMC 6.04.010 defines dangerous animal as:
DANGEROUS ANIMAL:
A. Any animal which, when unprovoked by teasing, taunting, or a threatening
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manner by any person, approaches said person in an apparent attitude of attack upon

the streets, sidewalks, public grounds or places, common areas within subdivisions
or mobile home or recreational vehicle parks, commons grounds of apartment
buildings, condominiums, or townhouse developments, or private property not solely
owned or possessed by the owner or custodian of the animal.
B. Any animal with a known propensity, tendency, or disposition to attack
unprovoked, to cause injury, or to otherwise endanger the safety ofhuman beings or
domestic animals or livestock; or
C. Any animal which bites, inflicts injury, assaults, or otherwise attacks a human
being or domestic animal or livestock without justifiable provocation; or
D. Any animal owned or harbored primarily or in part for the purpose of fighting or
any animal trained for fighting; or
E. Any dog which has been trained as an attack dog, except dogs used by law
enforcement agencies.
348 P.3d 509
Exceptions: An animal will not be considered dangerous if it engages in any of the
above listed actions toward a person or animal that is either: a) committing a trespass
or other tort upon the premises of the animal's owner or custodian, orb) committing
a crime against the animal's owner or custodian. An animal will not be considered
dangerous if any of the above actions occur when the animal is being teased,
tormented, or abused, or if the actions were in reaction to either a crime committed
by a person or an attempt by the person to commit a crime.

***

As to whether Zoeywas provoked, the Steeles argue thatthe undisputed evidence

shows Stephen provoked Zoey by approaching the dog with a closed fist while
Zoey was barking and growling. However, as we have already concluded, this
evidence was disputed. Stephen's testimony that the dog was excited to see him and

was wagging her tail was sufficient to put this fact at issue. Extending a closed hand
towards what appears to be a friendly dog to allow the dog to sniff the hand does not
undisputedly amount to provocation. Additionally, as discussed previously, it is
disputed whether Zoey had previously bitten others unprovoked. Thus, it is
disputed whether Zoey would be considered a dangerous animal under this code
section.

Boswell, 15 8 Idaho at 565-66, 348 P.3d at 508-09 [emphasis supplied]. Again, the record shows that

Mr. Boswell approached Zoey, who was growling, with a closed fist. The Court of Appeals held that
this was an issue of fact. As a result, the Court must deny Plaintiffs' motion.
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V. CONCLUSION.

Based on the foregoing, Defendants respectfully request that the Court deny Plaintiffs'
motion for partial summary judgment.
DATED this {!Iday of September, 2015.
CHARTERED

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

4.

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day ofSeptember, 2015, I served a true and correct
copy of the above and foregoing document to the following person(s) as follows:
Kent A. Higgins
Merrill & Merrill, Chartered
P.0. Box 991
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991

~U.S. Mail/Postage Prepaid
[]
[]
[]

Hand Delivery
Overnight Mail
csimile \ 232-2499

NOTE: one duplicate copy of all motions, and any opposition thereto, together with supporting
memorandum, affidavits and documents, and trial brief, shall be emailed to
brandy@bannockcounty.us
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Reed W. Larsen (3427)
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED
151 North 3rd Avenue, 2nd Floor
P.O. Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229
Telephone: (208) 235-1145
Facsimile: (208) 235-1182
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH WDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

p:,;

STEPHEN BOSWELL and KARINA BOSWELL, )
)
husband and wife,
)
Plaintiffs,
)

v.
AMBER STEELE and MARY STEELE,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-12-4120 $C

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
STRIKE/OBJECTIONS TO
AFFIDAVIT OF JANE GUIDINGER

COME NOW Defendants Amber Steele and Mary Steele, deceased, pursuant to Idaho Rule
of Civil Procedure 56(e), submit their Motion to Strike/Objection to the Affidavit ofJane Guidinger
("Guidinger Affidavit").
I. INTRODUCTION.

Paragraphs 22-27 in the Guidinger affidavit lack foundation, contain legal conclusions, are
conclusory, speculative and inadmissible under IRE 702. Ms. Guidinger's opinions as to Zoey's
behavior being "vicious" and not properly restrained are legal conclusions. Furthermore, Ms.
Guidinger, while stating she is a dog trainer, does not identify how she has any expertise in what
constitutes a "dog bite" or what is vicious conduct of a dog. Nor does Ms. Guidinger lay any
foundation for how she has any expertise in how she can reach the conclusion that Stephen Boswell's
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approaching Zoey with a closed fist was not threatening to Zoey or a provocation. In essence, Ms.
Guidinger is asking this Court to consider that she is an expert in knowing what Zoey was thinking
when she was approached in a provoking manner by Mr. Bosell. As such, paragraphs 22-27 of her
affidavit violate Rule 56(e) and Idaho Rule of Evidence 702, and should be stricken from the record.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW.

Rule 56(e)I.R.C.P. 56(e) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge,
shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated
therein .

. Additionally, Idaho Rule of Evidence 401 provides:
Relevant Evidence 11 means evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.
11

Rule 402 provides:
All relevant evidence is admissible except as otherwise provided by these
rules or by other rules applicable in the courts of this state. Evidence which
is not relevant is not admissible.

Further, as to testimony of witnesses, lay and expert testimony "is governed by the rules of
evidence regarding the opinion testimony oflaywitnesses and experts under Idaho Rules ofEvidence

701 and 702." I.R.E. 702 provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
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However, expert testimony that is based on speculation, is not admissible under Rule 702.
Speculation, as it relates to expert testimony is defined as ''the art of theorizing about a matter as to
which evidence is not sufficient for certain knowledge." Karlson v. Harris, 140 Idaho 561, 564, 97
P.3d 428,432 (2004).
An expert opinion that is speculative or unsubstantiated byfactsin the record
is inadmissible because it would not assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or determine a fact that is at issue. Expert opinion that merely
suggests possibilities would only invite conjecture and may be properly
excluded."
Id. [Emphasis added] [Internal citations omitted]. See also Jones v. Crawforth, 147 Idaho 11,205

P .3d 660 (2009) (expert opinions are only admissible if they assist the trier of fact in understanding
the evidence or determining an issue of fact); Weeks v. E. Idaho Health Servs., 143 Idaho 834, 838,
153 P.3d 1180, 1184 (2007) (expert opinion that is speculative, conclusory or unsubstantiated by
facts in the record does not assist the jury and is inadmissible).
III. ARGUMENT.
A. Paragraphs 22-27 of the Guidinger Affidavit should be stricken.

Paragraphs 22-27 ofMs. Guidinger' s affidavit contain legal conclusions, are conclusory, lack
foundation and are based on speculation. Ms. Guidinger says therein that Zoey' s conduct was
vicious, that her prior actions were dog bites, that Mr. Boswell did not approach her in a threatening
manner, that Zoey had room to retreat, and that Zoey was not properly restrained.
Ms. Guidinger offers no foundation whatsoever as to what training or expertise she has in
being able to conclude that a dog's conduct is vicious or what constitutes a dog bite.. There is no
paragraph in Ms. Guidinger's affidavit identifying how her obedience training gives her any
expertise to conclude what a vicious dog is or what constitutes a dog bite.
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Further, paragraphs 22-27 are based on pure speculation. Ms. Guidinger has never examined
or conducted any personal evaluation of Zoey, and, in essence, she is trying to say that Zoey had the
propensity or habit of biting people, without foundation, which led to Mr. Boswell's being bitten;
which violates IRE 404. Thus, her opinions lack foundation and are conclusory, as she offers no
foundation as to how she could ever endeavor to get into a dog's mind to know how a dog perceives
a threat, and conclude that a dog, including Zoey, was not threatened or perceived a person's conduct
as a threat. Her conclusions are exactly the type of statements that are inadmissible under IRE 702.
Additionally, Ms. Guidinger offers nothing more than legal conclusions. Whether a dog is
vicious or has vicious propensities, whether a dog is properly restrained, and whether proper
precautions were taken are specifically defined in Idaho Code §25-2805 and Pocatello Municipal
Code6.04.0I0. Thus, Ms. Guidinger.is clearly interpreting the law, and her attempt to offer legal
opinions is prohibited. She is neither a lawyer nor a judge.
For these reasons, the Court must strike paragraphs 22-27 of Ms. Guidinger's affidavit.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /!{.day of September, 2015.
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED

By~

REWiiEN
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

J!{_

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of September, 2015, I served a true and correct
copy of the above and foregoing document to the following person(s) as follows:
Kent A. Higgins
Merrill & Merrill, Chartered
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991

[)9[]
[]
[]

U.S. Mail/Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivery
Overnight Mail
Facsimile\ 232-2499
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF BANNOCK
STEPHEN BOSWELL, ETAL.

I

Plaintiff,

vs.

Case No: CV-2012-0004120-PI
MINUTE· ENTRY & ORDER

AMBER DAWN STEELE, ETAL.,
Defendant.
THE PARTIES came before the Court on the 29th day of September, 2015 for
hearing on Plaintiff's Motion_ for Partial Summary Judgment and Defendant's. Motion to
Strike the Affidavit of Jane Guidinger. Kent H_iggins appeared_ in.persor on behalf of the
Plaintiff. Reed Larsen and Javier Gabiola appeared in person on behalf of the Defendant.
Hearing proceeded before the Court on the record. At the conclusion of argument,
the Court DENIED the Motion to Strike the Affidavit and further DENIED the Motion for
Summary Judgment.
DATED this

d •9' tt£"---day of September, 2015 .

uJ~-lf({~
LAND . .. - - . ..''

WILLIAM HW~O
District Judge

~

\,(

; :.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

~

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of September, 201515, I served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing document upon each of the following individuals
in the manner indicated.

Kent A Higgins
Merrill & Merrill Chrtd
PO Box 991
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991

~ U.S. Mail

Reed Larsen
Cooper & Larsen
PO Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229

OU.S. Mail
Ii{! E-Mail
Hand Deliver

E-Mail
D Hand Deliver
0Fax:

D

0Fax:
....

Robert Poleki
CLERK OF THE COURT ·
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Kent A. Higgins

MER.RILL & MERRILL6 CHARTERED

i 09 North Arthur ~ 5th Floor
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991
(208) 232-2286
(208) 232-2499 Telefax
ISB#: 3025
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
STEPHEN BOSWELLand KARINA
BOSWELL, husband and wife,

Plaintiff,
AMBER STEELEt
MARY STEELE,
Defendants.

)
)
)

Case No. CVwl2-4120 OC

)
)

MEMORANDUM SUPPORTING
) PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR :PARTIAL
) SUMMARY ,JUDGMl!NT
)

)
)
)
)

L IN'IRODUC:r10N
Plaintiffs bring this action on theories ofstrict liability in tort. negligenee, premises liability,
negligence per se~ statutory liability, and other theories. By this Motion for Partfatl Sum.tnary
Judgment Plaintiffs seek swmnary judgment against Defendants' Third, Fourth and Fifth Defenses

as being inapplicable to theories of sttict liability, premises liability and strict statutory liability.

1

Upon reviewing the ordinance, .it is apparent that PMC 6.04.0SO(E) creates a private cause af
action when a dangerous anjmal., ad defined in PMC ti.04.0 lo. causes injury. The district court doeis not appear to
have addressed this ordinance as a standalone canse of action. In their amended complaint, the Boswells included
th.e ordinance under the headin;s strict liability, negli.gence per se, and premises liability. By reversing the dismissal
of this portion of the J3c:tSwcW s amended complal~ we .simply hold that the ordinance provides a standalone cause
of.action. Bonvellv. St,ele, 158 ldabo :5S4, 138 P.3d 497 (Ct. App. 201.S) .

Memorandum Supporting Motion for Partial Sunu11ary Judgment
0:\90\9034\Ptcadin,g,s\Mcmorandum Supporting Mott(1n fur Partial SutmDaty Jud,pnent..Swp.:l.wpd

Page- 1
142 of 348

~"1-f J. ,:J

II. STANDARD OF Rll!VIEW

Suuunary Judgment shall be rendered ''if the pleadings~ deposjtions, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any. show that there is no genuine issue as to any .material fa.ct and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.11 Rule 56(c), Idaho .Rules of Cti,•il

Pmcedure. The Court Ube.rally construes the record in favor of the party opposing the motion and
draws all reasonable inferences and conclusions in that party's :favor. Friel v. Boise City l-J.'ous. Auth.,
126 Idaho 484, 485i 887 P.2d. 29, 30 (1994).

' !

If the evidence reveals no disputed issues of material fact, then Summary Judgn:1ent s.hotlld
be granted. Loomis v. City of Hailey, 119 Idahll 434,437, 807 P.2d 1272, 1275 (1991).
The party opposing the Summary Judgment Motion "may not rest upon the mere allegations
or denials of that party1s pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavits or as other.vil;e provided
in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Rule 56(e),

Idaho Rules ofCtvil Procedure. '~[A] mere sch1tma of evidence or only slight doubt as to the facts
i.s not sufficient to create a genuine issue for purposes of summary judgme11.t. The non-moving party
mu.st respond to the summary judgment motion with specific facts showing there is a ge:nuine issue
for trial."

Samuel v. Hepworth, Nungester & Lezamiz, 134 Idaho 84, 87r 996 P.2.d 303, 306

(2000)(intemal. citations omitted).
Ill. ARGUMl!NT

In .Boswell v. Steele, 158 Idaho 554, 138 P.3d. 497 (Ct. App. 2015) the Idal10 Court. of
Appeals aptly noted:
The distinction between a strk.1 liability cause of action and a negligence
cause of action may lie in the type of contributory negligence allowed as defense.
Compare Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 515 with 4 am.Jur. 2d Animals § 67.
However. this Court has not been asked to address tbe law governing any defen.se to
liability in this case, and we make no comment on its application.
The Court of Appeals appropriately deferred on the applicability of comparative negligence
to Plaintiffs' causes of actio.n tmtil after this Court di.d so first. Plaintiffs now ask thi~1 Court to do
so, and to rule as a matter oflaw that Defendants' Third, Fourth and Fifth Affinnativ,: Defenses are
inapplicable.
Memorandum Supporting Motion fol' Partial Summary Judgment
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DEFENDANTS' THlRD, FOURTH AND FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES .ARE
INAPPLICABLE TO THIS MATT.BR
Defendants have raised the following defenses.

THIRD DEFENSE
Plaintiffs' Am.ended Complaint is barred or sb.ould otherwise e dimi11ished according to the
comparative negligence of the Plaintiffs which rtegligence is gre~J.ter than any n.egligence on the part
of the Defendants, said nesJ.igence on the part of the Defendants being expressly de'nied.
FOURTII DEFENSE
The dog maintained by the Defend.ants was not vicious. but was .inappropriately provoked.
while it was properly contained and confined within the house of the Defendants.

FIFTH DEFENSE
Plaintiff was a trespasser in the area whel:re Plainti.ff recei.ved his injury as he was not i,1wited
to go to the area of the house where he was at the time the incident took place, which area v.ras wi

area where the dog was specifically confined.
1.. Contributory Negligence is not a Proper Defense.

Idaho recognizes strict liability {n tort as a separate and distinct cause ofaction to negligence.

Chancler v. Am. Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., 109 Ida.ho 841, 846, 712 P.2d 542. 547 (1985). In
Chancier the court said:

P1·osser and Keeton on the Law ofTort:,;,§ 101, p. 708 (5th ed. 1984). points out that
at least two separate independent theories of recovery are available to plaintiffs who
have suffered. physican injury from a defective product. These two theor.ies are
negligence and strict liability. Numerous courts have reached this same conclusion.
See Mays v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 233 Ka.1.1. 38, 661 P.2d 348 (1983); ,Barry v. .Don Hall
Laboratories, 56 Or.App. 518,642 P.2d685 (I982);Shell Oil Co. V. .Gutien·ez., 581
P.2d 271, 119 Ariz. 426 (App. 1978); Ftrst National Bank in Albuquerque v. Nm·-Am
Agricultural Products, Inc., 88 N.M. 74,537 P.2d 682 (App. 197). cert, denied, 89
N.M. 29,536 P. 2d 1085.
Chancier v. Am. Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., 109 Idaho 841, 846~ 71.2 P.2d 542,547 (1985).
Idaho Code§ 6-801 provides for the statutory parameters of comparative ~1.E~gligence. It
provides:

Con1ributory negligence of comparative responsibility shall not bar recovery in an
Memorandum Supporting Motion for Partial Sunnmary Judgment
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action by any person or his legal representative to recover damages for negligence,
gross negHgence or comparative resportsibility resulting in death or in injury to
person or p.roperty, if such negligence or comparative responsibiU.ty was not as gr1!:at
as the negligence, gross negligence or comparative responsibility of. the ·person
againstwhomrecovmyis sought, but any d ~ s allowed shall be diminished in {he
proportion to the amoimt of negligence or comparative responsibility attrlbutablei to
the person recovering. Nothing contaim~d herein shall create any new legal theory,
cause of action, or legal defense.
S.L. 1972, ch. I86t § 1, S.L. 1987, ch. 278 §2.
By its terms, comparative negligence or comparative responsibility applies only in actions

for negligence. .Uniformly, states with similar statutes are in accordance, that comparative
negligence is not an issue in an acti.on for strict liability in tort. Shipler v. Gen Motors Corp.• 271
Neb. 194~ 215, 710 N.W.2d 807, 829 (2006); .Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353
(1974); Phillips v. Duro-Last Roofing. Inc., 806 P.2d 834 (1991).
Contributory Negligence also does not apply in matters ofpremjses liability.
According to the Restatement Second of Torts:
The possessor of an abnormally dangerous dog who keeps it upon land in his
possession, is subject to strict liability to persons coming upon the land. iu the
exercise of a _privilege whether derived from his consent to their en.try or otherwise.

Restatement (Second) o/Torts § 513 (1977).
Applying the law to the cunw.t factst Mla:ry Steele acknowledged i.n her deposition that Zoey
was kept at he.r house despite the fac:t that Amber and she knew Zoey would bite. (Steeli= Deposition
page 34, line 7 through page 35, line 13.)
Under these ci.rcumstances, Mary Steele is liable under the premises liability ·of Count IV of
Plai,ntiffs' Amended Complaint. iJTespective of comparative negligence.

Plaintiffs also have raised a separate cause of action for liabHity pursuant to Pocatello
Municipal Code 6.04.0SO(E). According to the Code, the only defenses are if the~ Defend.ant,
taunted, threatened or teased the dog before getting bitten..
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;?. Defendants' Fourth Affirmative Deftnse fa Al.so Inapplicable.
The Court also already ruled that Zoe was not properly confined. "'Because Mary permitted
Stephen "to enter· her home, the relevant g_uestion becomes whether the gat-e that confined the dog in
Mary~ s kitchen met the ordinance requirement that the animal be confined 11in such a way that

persons ... do not have access to such animal." Plainly, the evidence shows that it did not.

3, Defendants' Fifth Affirmative Defense is Also Inapplicable.
The Court of Appeals already rules that Steve Boswell was not a trespasser in the Steele
home. Accordingly, Defendants' Fifth Affinnative Defense is not an appropriate d.efense.
IV. CONCLUSION

For these reasons the Plaintiffs should be granted theinnotion for partial sumrnaryjudgm.ent.
DATED this£ day ofNove1nber, 2015.

NlERRil,L & MERRILL, CHARTERED
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Kent A.
Attorney for Plaintiff
;

CERT.IFICATE OF SERVICE
I, the undersigned, do hereby certify that a trne, full and correct copy of the foregoing
document was this~ day ofNovember~ 2015. served upon tlle following i.n the manner indicated
below:

Reed W. Larsen
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED

[
[

P.O. Box 4229
.Pocatello, ID 83205A229

[ !J Overnight Delivery
[ ../J Telefax

The Honorable William H. Woodland
Bannock County Courthouse
624 E. Center, Room 220
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Kent A. Higgins
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED
109 North Arthur ~ 5th Floo~
P.O. Box 991 .
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991
(208) 232~2286

(208) 232-2499 T~lefax.
ISB#: 3025
Attorneys for Plain.tiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TH)~
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
STEPHEN BOSWELLand KAR1NA
BOSWELL, husband and v..ife,

)
)

)
Plaintif±~

Case No. CV-12A120 QC

)

) MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUJlMARY
) JUDGMENT

AMBER STEELE,
MARY STEELE,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)

Pursuant to Rule 56, Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiffs move this Cotlrt for partial
summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs against Defendants~ Third, Fourth end Fifth Affirmative
defenses as set forth in the Answer to Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, insofar .a.s they apply
to Counts I. 3 and 51 and under Pocatello Municipal Code strict statutory liability (,f Plaintiffs'

Complaint.
This Motion is xnade on the grounds that there is no genuine issue of raateriaL :fact as to the
legal exclusion of sucl1 defenses on those counts.

Motion for .Partial Summar')' Judgment
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Further, there is no gen.uine issue of fa(:t that the dog bite by Defendants' dog was the
proximate cau.:jle ofinjury to the Plaintiffs. The extent of that injury and the damages is a question

for the jury.
Further, under. either of these theories, there is no genuine issue that Plaintiffs or any other

person was compm:atively negligent.
Plaintiffs support this Motion for Partial Summary .Judgment with (1) fvfeinorandum

Supporting Plain.tiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, (2) Affidavit of Chris Kettler, (3)
Deposition of Mmy Steele, and (4) Affuiavit of tamara Andersen.
Dated this):i._ day ofNovembex\ 2015.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, the undersi.~ed~ do hereby certify that a ~ full and correct copy of the foregoing
document was this / day ofNovember, 2015., served upon the following in. the manner indicated
below:
Reed W. Larsen

COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED
P.O. Box 4229
PocateUoi ID 83205-4229

] U.S. Mail
] Hand Delivery
[ .} Overnight Delivery
[/J Telefax

The Honorable William H. Woodland
Bannock County Courthouse
624 E. Center, Room 220
Pocatello1 ID 83201

[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Delivery
[%Telefax 4
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Kent A. Higgins
MERRJLL & MERRILL, CHARTERED
109 North Arthur-5th Floor
P.O. Box.991
]Pocatello, ID 83204-0991
(208) 232-2286
{208) 232-2499 Telefax
ISB#: 3025
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
STEPHEN" BOSWELLand KARINA_
BOSWELL, husband and wife.

)
)

)
:Plai.ntiff,

Case No. CV-12-4120 OC

)

)

NOTICE OF HEARING ON MOTION

) FORPARTIALSUMMARY
AMBER STEELE,
MARY STEELE,
Defendants.

)

,JUDGMENT

)
)
)
)

)

TO:

DEFENDANTS AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD -

YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE the Plaintiffs, tltrough their counsel ofrecord, Merrill
& Merrill, Chartered. will call up for hearing Plaintiffs 1 Motio.n for Partial Summary Judgment on
Thursday, December 17, 2015, at the hour of 10:00 a.m., or as soon. thereafter as cc,unsel can be
heard ..

DATED thisli. day of November, 2015.

MERRILL & MERRILL. CHAR.TERED
By:

.tJ~

fo,... _

Kent A. Higgins

A~ A...Ji.)y'-r
.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, the undej~e~ do hereby certify that a trUe, full and correct copy of_ the foregoing
document was this
day ofNovem.ber~ 2015 1 served upon the following in the mannel indicated
below:

Reed W. Larsen
Javiel: I. Gabiola
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED
P.O. Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229

[
[
[

The Honorable Willi.am H. Woodland

[

Bmmock County Courthouse
624 E. Center. Room 220
Pocatello, ID 83201

] U.S. Mail
] Hend Delivery
~ Overnight Delivery
[ r1 Telefax 235-1182

] U.S. Mail
[ _J Hand Delivery
{ ] Overnight Delivery
[ ] Telefax

d_e~
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Kent A. Higgins

Notice of Hearing on Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
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Kent A. Higgins, ISB #3025
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED
109 North Arthur - 5th Floor
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991
(208} 232-2286
(208) 232-2499 - Telefax
Richard A. Hearn, Esq., ISB #5574
HEARN & WOOD, LLP
1906 Jennie Lee Dr.
Idaho Falls, ID 83404
Telephone: (208) 497-0400
Fax: (208) 932-4380
Email: rick@hwlawpro.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
STEPHEN BOSWELL and KARENA
BOSWELL, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,

Case No. CV-12-4120-0C

NOTICE OF APPEARANCE
OF CO-COUNSEL

AMBER STEELE, The Estate of MARY
STEELE,
Defendants.

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT Richard A. Hearn and the firm of HEARN &
WOOD, LLP hereby enter an appearance as co-counsel for and in behalf of Plaintiffs Stephen
Boswell and Karena Boswell in the above entitled action.
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151 of 348

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho; that on the

2nd

day of December, 2015, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be served upon the
following persons at the address below their names either by depositing said document in the
United States mail with the correct postage thereon, by hand delivery, by transmitting by
facsimile, or by placing said document in the attorney's courthouse box, as set forth below.
Reed W. Larsen
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED
P.O. Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229
Kent A. Higgins
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED
109 North Arthur - 5th Floor

[ \l U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile

h<f U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile

P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991

I
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Reed W. Larsen (3427)
Javier L. Gabiola (5448)
COOPER & LARSEN-, CHARTERED
151 North 3rd Avenue, znd Floor
P.O. Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229
Telephone: (208) 235-1145
Facsimile: (208) 235-1182

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
STEPHEN BOSWELL and KARINA BOSWELL, )
husband and wife,
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
)
)

~

AMBER STEELE and MARY STEELE,

·)

Defendants.

)

Case No. CV-12-4120 SC

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

)

COME NOW Defendants, Amber Steele ("Amber") and Mary Steele ("Mary"), deceased,
by and through the undersigned counsel, and hereby provide the following Memorandum in
Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
I. INTRODUCTION.

Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is their most recent attempt to again, rehash
the same issues the Idaho Court ofAppeals addressed and which that appellate body concluded were
jury questions. Plaintiffs continue to assert that they have a strict liability claim, which the Court

of Appeals rejected. Boswell v. Steel, 158 Idaho 554,561,348 Idaho 497,504 (Ct. App. 2015).
Further, Idaho has only adopted strict liability in products liability cases. See, Shields v. Morton
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Chemical Company, 95 Idaho 674,518 P.2d857 (1974). Again, this issue has already been decided
by the Court of Appeals, and by this Court in Plaintiffs' previous motions for summary judgment.
Furthermore, it is patently clear in reviewing Idaho's strict liability law, that comparative
fault is a valid defense to strict liability claims and premises liability claims. Plaintiffs incorrectly
assert comparative fault does not apply to strict liability or premises liability claims, which is
contrary to well established Idaho case law. Comparative fault is a valid defense to a strict liability
claim. See, Vannoy v. Uniroyal Tire Co., 111 Idaho 536, 540-542, 726 P.2d 648,652-654 (1986).
It is also well-settled that in premises liability claims, comparative fault is a valid defense. See,

Harrison v. Taylor, 115 Idaho 588,596,768 P.2d 1321, 1329 (1989). Moreover, comparative fault
is consistent with Pocatello Municipal Code 6.04.050(A)(l ), which codifies comparative fault as a
person who provokes an animal by''teasing, taunting, or ... [approaches an animal in] a threatening
manner ...."
Additionally, as to the confinement issue raised by Plaintiffs, again, both the Court of
Appeals and this Court have held that issue is for the jury. The Court of Appeals held that, before
the issue of confinement can be addressed, an animal has to be "dangerous," which ·does not apply
where the animal was provoked. Whether Zoey was dangerous, whether Mary Steele and Amber
Steel knew she was dangerous, and whether Mr. Boswell provoked Zoey are questions for the jury.

Boswell, 348 P.3d at 504-505; 507-509. Also, this Court denied Plaintiffs' last motion for partial
summary judgment, finding that the Court of Appeals made it clear this was a jury question.
As to the trespass defense, it is an issue of fact whether Stephen Boswell was trespassing
when he went into the area where Zoey was confined. Mary Steele testified that she did not know
Mr. Boswell was going into the area where Zoey was confined. Mr. Boswell also testified that he
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT- PAGE 2
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had no reason to go to where Zoey was confined. Thus, whether Mr. Boswell was trespassing is a
question for the jury to resolve.
Once again, the Court of Appeals made it abundantly clear that it was for the jury to decide
the Plaintiffs' claims and Defendants' defenses. Thus, the Court must deny Plaintiffs' motion.
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS.

1. Mary and Amber did not know that Zoey was dangerous 1 or vicious,2 or that she would
bite Mr. Boswell. See Affidavit ofJavier L. Gabiola in Support ofDefendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment(" Gabiola A.ff.), Exh. A (Deposition ofMary Steele) Mary Steele Depo., p.12, ll. 5-13; p.
13, ll.I0-15. Amber testified that Zoey was not an aggressive dog, rather, a quiet dog, who did not

growl, snarl or lunge at people. Affidavit ofJavier L. Gabiola in Support ofDefendants' Opposition
to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Sununary Judgment, Exh. 1 (Amber Steele Depo.), p. 94, l.15-p. 95,
l.15. Chris Kettler, Amber's fonner :friend, also testified that she never saw Zoey bare her teeth or

jump on anyone. Affidavit ofJavier L. Gabiola in Support of Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment, Exhibit 2 (Chris Kettler Deposition), p.16, ll. 8-12.

2. _Prior to the incident, there had been no complaints from people, or any adjudication that

To reiterate, again, under Pocatello City Code 6.04.01 O(A), (B) and (C) define "dangerous"
as an "animal which, when unprovoked by teasing, taunting or a threatening manner by an person
approaches said person in an apparent attitude of attack .... or any animal with a known propensity,
tendency or disposition to attack unprovoked ... or any animal which bites, inflicts injury, assaults
or otherwise attacks a human being ... without justifiable provocation[.]"[Emphasis supplied].
2

Idaho Code§ 25-2805 defines vicious as a dog, "which, when not physically provoked,
physically attacks, wounds, bites or otherwise injures any person who -is not trespassing...."
[Emphasis supplied].
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT- PAGE 3

155 of 348

\
Zoey was dangerous or had bitten anyone without provocation. 3 Amber Steele Depa., p.94, l.15p.95, l.15.
3. As previously asserted to the Court, prior to the incident on October 8, 2011, Zoey nipped
at Amber's fiiend, Chris Kettler, but only because Zoey saw Ms. Kettler reach or move towards
Amber an_d was being protective of her. Affidavit ofChris Kettler, 13, p.2, attached to the Affidavit
ofReed W. Larsen filed January 10, 2013; Chris Kettler Depo., p.14, ll.9-16; p. 24, l.21-p.25, I.I.
Zoey nipped Chris Kettler, while Chris and Zoe were playing ball, when the ball rolled between
Chris and Amber. When Chris reached to get the ball, she reached towards Alnber, and that is when
Zoeynipped Chris. Chris Kettler Depa., p.15,1.19-p. 16, l.2. Chris Kettler further testified that she
would let her grandchildren be around Zoey, as she did not consider Zoey vicious at all, did not
·believe Zoey was aggressive, and that the incidentbetween her and Zoey was an accident. Chris
Kettler Depa., p. 17, ll.2-18; p. 25, ll.2-4; p. 30, ll.18-24. Ms. Kettler also believed that Zoey was
just being protective of Alnber, which, as a Scottish Terrier, was Zoey's job. Id; Amber Steele
Deposition, p. 45, l.25-p. 46,l.22.
4. When Mr. Boswell and Mary entered Mary's home after returning from the family
gathering at Plaintiffs' house, prior to the bite, Zoey was barking and growling. Mary Steele Depo,
p. 6, ll. 21-25. Mary Steele testified she did not ask Mr. Boswell to go over to initiate contact with
Zoey, and that there was no reason for Mr. Boswell to go into the kitchen where Zoey was confined.
Mary SteeleDepo.,p. 12, ll.21-24; p. 14, ll. 7-14;p. 40, ll.11-16. Further, Mary Steele testified that

3

This is required under Pocatello City Code 6.04.0SOA. Also, under Idaho Code §25-2805(2)
a person is guilty of owning a vicious dog where-it is established the dog bites or injures a person,
"when not physically provoked[.]"[Emphasis supplied].
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Mr. Boswell went over to where Zoey was confined on his own. Mary Steele Depa., p. 40, ll.17-18.
5. Mr. Boswell admitted that, on his own, and without Maris knowledge or her at her
request, approached Zoey, who was behind the gate, with his right hand in a closed fist. Stephen
Boswell Depo., p._ 29, !. 7-p. 33, l.5. Mr. Boswell reached to Zoey and she bit him.

6. Mr. Boswell admitted that there was no reason for him to go beyond the gate, and that
Mary never asked him to go to Zoey, and he decided on his own to go to Zoey. Mary Steele Depa.,
p. 12; p. 40, ll. 14-18; Stephen Boswell Depa., p. 25, ll.22-24.

7. Mr. Boswell admitted he did not believe Mary was negligent, as he testified, "I don't
think she [Mary] did anything wrong." Stephen Boswell Depa, p. 34, l.25-p.35, l.1. Mrs. Boswell
admitted she still was ·around Zoey and did not have any concerns. Karina Boswell Depo., p. 17,
ll.19-23. Mrs. Boswell also admitted she could not say Mary's or Amber's leaving Zoey in the

kitchen behind the gate was an act of negligence, actually thought it was reasonable to keep a
gate/barrier to keep the dogs segregated, and could not be critical of Mary in her actions. Id., p. 42,
l.1 O-p.43, l. 3. Mrs. Boswell also could not say whether the bite was predictable to Mary or Amber.
Id., p. 33, ll.1-8.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW.
Rule 56(c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment "shall be
rendered if the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as amatteroflaw."' Smith v. Meridian Joint School Dist. No. 2, 128 Idaho 714,718,918
P.2d 583, 587 (1996)(quoting I.R.C.P. 56(c)); see also Avila v. Wahlquist, 126 Idaho 745, 890 P.2d
331 (1995). In making this determination, a court should liberally construe the record in favor of
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT-PAGE 5
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the party opposing the motion and draw all reasonable inferences and conclusions in that party's
favor. Smith, 128 Idaho at 718,918 P.2d at 587 (citations omitted); Boswell, supra, 158 Idaho at
558, 348 P.3d at SOI. . Further, the non-moving party "has the burden of presenting sufficient
evidence to establish a triable issue which arises from the facts, and a genuine issue of fact is not
created by a mere scintilla of evidence." Jarman v. Hale, 122 Idaho 952, 955-956, 842 P.2d 288,
291-292 (Ct. App. 1992)(intemal citations omitted). However, "]i]f the moving party fails to
challenge an element or fails to present evidence establishing the absence of genuine issue of
material fact on that element, the burden does not shift to the nomnoving party, and the nonmoving
party is not required to respond with supporting evidence." Smith, supra, 128 Idaho at 719, 918 P .2d
at 588 (citing Thomson, 126 Idaho at 530,887 P.2d at 1038)). Additionally, based on the evidence,
if reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions or draw conflicting inferences, summary
judgment must be denied. Cityo/Chubbuckv. City ofPocatello, 127Idaho 198,200, 899P.2d411,
413 (1995)(citation omitted), citing Harris v. Department ofHealth and Welfare, 123 Idaho 295,
298, 847 P.2d 1156, 1159 (1992)).
Here, again, the Court of Appeals made it unequivocally clear that the jury was to decide
Plaintiffs' claims and Defendants' defenses. As a result, Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary
judgment must be denied.

IV. ARGUMENT.
A.

THECOURTOFAPPEALSREJECTEDPLAINTIFFS' ASSERTION IDAHO
ADOPTED STRICT LIABILITY IN DOG BITE CASES.

Plaintiffs continue to assert that Defendants are strictly liable. Again, the Court of Appeals
rejected Plaintiffs' assertion, as noted by the following passage:

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT- PAGE 6

158 of 348

/

The Boswells identify secondary sources, as well as other jurisdictions, that
refer to the form of liability described in McClain for owners with knowledge
of an animal's dangerousness as" strict liability." We do not think it necessary
to adopt that label. It is sufficient to say that the Idaho Supreme Court has
adopted a rule that an owner of a domesticated animal will be liable for injuries
it causes if the owner had prior knowledge, or should have known, of the
animal's dangerous propensity. It is the elements of the cause of action that are

significant, not a label of strict liability or negligence.

Boswell, 158 Idaho at 561, 348 P.3d at 504 [emphasis supplied][footnote omitted].4 It is clear strict
liability has not been applied to dog bite _cases. Moreover, strict liability in Idaho only applies to
products liability cases. See, Shields, supra, 95 Idaho 674,518 P.2d 857 (1974). Plaintiffs have not
cited the Court to any decision from the Idaho appellate courts concluding that strict liability can be
asserted in a dog bite case~5 As a result, the Court should ignore Plaintiffs' continued assertions that
they have a strict liability claim. -

Plaintiffs cited to footnote 4 of the Court of Appeals' decision. See Memorandum
Supporting Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, p. 2. To the extent Plaintiffs cite that
footnote, which is dicta, as supporting their position they have a strict liability claim, this Court
cannot rely on the footnote as having any precedential value. The Idaho Supreme Court has held
that a footnote containing dicta is not a holding, and is not binding precedent. See, Shrives v.
Talbot, 91 Idaho 338,346,421 P.2d 133, 141 (1966).
4

only Idaho case cited by Plaintiffs is Chander v. American Hardware Mut. Ins. Co.,
109 Idaho 841, 712 P.2d 542 (1986). That case pertained to a strict liability claim for a defective
product in the context of determining whether the language of an insurance policy excluded
coverage for strict liability and negligence claims. Id., 109 Idaho at 846-848, 712 P.2 at 547549. Plaintiffs only rely on non-binding case law (See Memorandum Supporting Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment, p. 4), to support their position, which is in contravention to Idaho's
case law validating comparative fault as a defense in strict liability cases. Further, the nonbinding case law cited by Plaintiffs were all products liability cases, not dog bite cases. See,
Shipler v. General Motors Corp., 710 N.W. 2d 807, 818-819 (Nebr.2006)(defective car roof);
Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353, 1356 (Okla. 1974)(defective seat adjustment
mechanism); Phillips v. Duro-Last Roofing, Inc.,806 P.2d 834,836 (Wyo. 1991)(defective
roofing material)).
5The
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B.

IT IS WELL-SETTLED THAT COMPARATIVE FAULT IS A VALID
DEFENSE TO STRICT LIABILITY CLAIMS.

Plaintiffs' assertion that comparative fault does not apply in strict liability cases fails to
acknowledge and is in direct contravention to Idaho case law. It is well-established in Idaho, that
comparative fault is a valid defense to a strict liability claim. Vannoy v. Uniroyal Tire Co., 111
Idaho 536, 540-542, 726 P.2d 648,652-654 (1986). As the Idaho Supreme Court in Vannoy held:
With this Court1s adoption of strict liability in 1973, it was held that II contributory
negligence in the sense of misuse of the product, or in the sense of voluntarily
and unreasonably proceeding in the face of a known danger are good defenses
to strict liability." Shields v. Morton Chemical Co., 95 Idaho 674, 677, 518 P.2d

857. 860 (1974). This necessity of comparing the contributory negligence of one
party with the strict liability of a defendant resulted in the well-reasoned conclusion
of the United States District Court for the District of Idaho that:
"The rationale of comparative negligence was meant to apply as
well in a products liability action, such that misuse may not be an
absolute bar to recovery. Applying Idaho's comparative negligence
statute in this way is consistent with the policy underlying strict
products liability, namely the spreading of loss to manufacturers
who are best able to absorb it. Upon a fmding of blameworthy
conduct, the jury in this case was asked, consistent with Idaho
law, to assign a percentage to the causative conduct of the parties
to this lawsuit.

Vannoy, 111 Idaho at 540-541, 726 P.2d at 652-653 (citing, Sun Valley Airlines, Inc. v. AvcoLycoming Corp., 411 F. Supp. 598, 603 (D. Idaho I976)(Bold emphasis supplied)(underscore in

original)). 6 Further, the Court in Vannoy reasoned:
Prior to the enactment ofl.C. § 6-801, the Wisconsin Supreme Court had already
construed its comparative negligence statute as being equally applicable to the theory
of strict liability as well as the theory of negligence, just as the United States District
See also, Pate v. Columbia Machine, Inc., 930 F.Supp. 451,463 (D. Idaho 1996), where
the District Court cited to Vannoy as authority for concluding that comparative responsibility
applies to strict liability actions.
6
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Court for Idaho held in the Sun Valley case. See Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis.2d 443.
155 N.W.2d 55 (1967). Accordingly, comparative responsibility or comparative
causation in strict liability cases was consistent with, and indeed probably
mandated by the prior interpretation placed upon the Wisconsin version ofI.C.
§ 6-801, which the Idaho legislature adopted.

Id. [Bold emphasis supplied][Underscore in original]. Ultimately, the Idaho Supreme Court held

that comparative fault applies to strict liability claims:
Reason and consistency in statutory interpretation dictate that products liability
cases based on strict liability should be treated the same. I.C. § 6-1304,
providing for comparative responsibility in products liability actions, is
substantially identical to I.C. § 6-801 which provides for comparative
responsibility in negligence actions. They should be treated the same.

Vannoy, 111 Idaho at 542, 726 P.2d at 654[emphasis supplied].

In addition, as it relates to Plaintiffs' claims under the Pocatello ordinances and Idaho Code
§25-2805(2), comparative fault is a valid defense, and is actually codified therein. Provocation is
codified within Pocatello Municipal Code 6.4.050(A)(l ), and defined as a person who provokes an
animal by"teasing, taunting, or ... [approaches an animal in] a threatening manner .... " Likewise,
Idaho Code §25-2805(2) has also codified comparative fault in the form ofprovocation, as evidenced
by its language, "when not physically provoked." This is consistent with the Idaho Court of
AppeaPsdecisioninBootsv. Winters, 145 Idaho 389,395, 179P.3d352, 358 (Ct. App. 2008)which
acknowledged provocation was a defense in a dog bite case. There, the Court, citing to Idaho Code
§25-2805(2) noted the statute provides that provocation is a defense, due to its specific language,
"when not physically provoked." Provocation is certainly a comparative fault defense and a valid
defense against Plaintiffs' claims. As a result, the Court must deny Plaintiffs' motion.
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C.

COMPARATIVE FAULT IS A DEFENSE IN PREMISES LIABILITY
CLAIMS.

Plaintiffs incorrectly assert: "Contributory Negligence also does not apply in matters of
premises liability." Not only do Plaintiffs fail to cite to any authority for this assertion, it is contrary
to Idaho case law.

In Harrison v. Taylor, 115 Idaho 588, 768 P.2d 1321(1989), the Idaho

Supreme Court held that comparative fault is a defense in premises liability actions. In that case, the
Court dispensed with the open and obvious danger defense as a complete bar to a
negligence/premises liability claim, reasoning that Idaho's comparative responsibility replaced that
doctrine. The Court held:
Today's opinion harmonizes our case law with the comparative negligence statute
passed by the legislature in 1971. We have been already operating in the context of
comparative negligence; now the legislative policy expressed in I.C. § 6-801 will
operate freely. The jury will compare the owner or.occupier ofland's behavior
versus that of invitees who come upon the premises. Disputes in this area will
normally present ajury question under particular facts, unless reasonable minds could
not differ.

Id., 115 Idaho at 596, 768 P.2d at 1329 [emphasis supplied][internal citation omitted]. Clearly,

comparative 'responsibility applies to premises liability claims. And, as asserted earlier, the Pocatello
ordinances and Idaho statute as to animal liability cited by Plaintiffs state provocation is a defense.

See, Pocatello Municipal Code§§ 6.04.0JOA, Band C 6.04.050(E) andJdaho Code§ 25-2805(2) at
footnotes 1-3, supra.
D.

WHETHER ZOEY WAS PROPERLY CONFINED IS A JURY QUESTION.

Plaintiffs, again, raise the issue as to Zoey' s confinement. That determination hinges on
whether Mary and Amber knew Zoeywas vicious or dangerous and whether Mr. Boswell provoked
Zoey. All of these issues were deemed by the Court of Appeals to be jury questions.
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To reiterate, the Court of Appeals held that whether Mary and Amber knew Zoey was
vicious or dangerous are jury questions:

Turning to the Boswells' amended complaint, the Boswells alleged that the Steeles
knew Zoey was a vicious animal and that Mr. Boswell had been bitten by the dog.
The Boswells presented testimony that Zoey had bitten two other individuals prior
to Zoey biting Stephen. The Steeles allege the prior incidents complained of by the
Boswells were not bites, but the dog was merely being protective by nipping at the
individuals. Whether these incidents constituted notice of vicious propensity is
a question for the jury.

Boswell, 158 Idaho at 561, 348 P.3d at 504 [emphasis supplied][footnotes omitted]. Again, it is
patently obvious that the Court of Appeals held the evidence was disputed as to whether Mary and
Amber had notice of Zoey' s alleged vicious propensity, and, as the evidence is in dispute, it is up
to the jury to decide the issue.
Additionally, the language of the Idaho Code §25-2805 and Pocatello Municipal Code
6.04.0SO(E) and 6.04.010, when applied to the facts of this case, makes it obvious it is a jury
question as to whether Zoey was vicious or properly confined, both of which hinge on whether Mr.
Boswell provoked her, as the Court of Appeals concluded. As to Idaho Code §25-2805, the Court
of Appeals stated as follows:
Idaho Code § 25-2805 also relates to securing a vicious dog. Idaho Code §
25-2805(2) provides:
(2) Any dog which, when not physically provoked, physically attacks, wounds,
bites or otherwise injures any person who is not trespassing, is vicious. It shall be
unlawful for the owner or for the owner of premises on which a vicious dog is
present to harbor a vicious dog outside a secure enclosure. A secure enclosure is one
from which the animal cannot escape and for which exit and entry is controlled by
the owner of the premises or owner ofthe animal. Any vicious dog removed from the
secure enclosure must be restrained by a chain sufficient to control the vicious dog.
Persons guilty of a violation of this subsection, and in addition to any liability as
provided in section 25-2806, Idaho Code, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. For a
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second or subsequent violation of this subsection, the court may, in the interest of
public safety, order the owner to have the vicious dog destroyed or may direct the
appropriate authorities to destroy the dog.
The statute first defines what a vicious dog is, and then sets out the requirements of
how such a dog must be secured. Whether the dog was vicious and whether it was
properly confined in a secure enclosure, as contemplated by the statute, are
questions for the jury.

Boswell, 158 Idaho at 565,348 P.3d at 508 [emphasis supplied]. Again, the Court clearly held that
the jury is to decide the vicious propensity and secure enclosure issues.
Likewise, the Court of Appeals also held it was a jury question to decide the issues of
confinement, viciousness/dangerous and provocation under the Pocatello Municipal Code:
The Boswells argue that PMC 6.04.050(E) creates a private cause of action where an
owner of a dangerous animal causes injuries. Pocatello Municipal Code 6.04.050(E)
states:
E. Owner Liability: An adult owner/custodian of a dangerous animal shall be liable
for all injuries and property damage sustained by any person or by any animal caused
by an unprovoked attack by any dangerous animal, plus all costs, civil judgments
or penalties, criminal fines, final tenns, veterinary fees, shelter impound fees, and any
other penalties and orders. In the event that the owner/custodian of the dangerous
animal is a minor, the minor's parent or guardian shall be so liable.
The PMC 6.04.010 defines dangerous animal as:
DANGEROUS ANIMAL:
A. Any animal which, when unprovoked by teasing, taunting, or a threatening
manner by any person, approaches said person in an apparent attitude of attack upon
the streets, sidewalks, public grounds or places, common areas within subdivisions
or mobile home or recreational vehicle parks, commons grounds of apartment
buildings, condominiums, or townhouse developments, or private property not solely
owned or possessed by the owner or custodian of the animal.
B. Any animal with a known propensity, tendency, or disposition to attack
unprovoked, to cause injury, or to otherwise endanger the safety of human beings or
domestic animals or livestock; or
C. Any animal which bites, inflicts injury, assaults, or otherwise attacks a human
being or domestic animal or livestock without justifiable provocation; or
D. Any animal owned or harbored primarily or in part for the purpose of fighting or
any animal trained for fighting; or
E. Any dog which has been trained as an attack dog, except dogs used by law
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enforcement agencies.
348 P.3d 509
Exceptions: An animal will not be considered dangerous ifit engages in any of the
above listed actions toward a person or animal that is either: a) committing a trespass
or other tort upon the premises of the animal1s owner or custodian, orb) co1mnitting
a crime against the animal's owner or custodian. An animal will not be considered
dangerous if any of the above actions occur when the animal is being teased,
tormented, or abused, or if the actions were iri reaction to either a crime committed
by a person or an attempt by the person to commit a crime.

***

As to whether Zoey was provoked, the Steeles argue that the undisputed evidence

shows Stephen provoked Zoey by approaching the dog with a closed fist while
Zoey was barking and growling. However, as we have already concluded, this
evidence was disputed. Stephen's testimony that the dog was excited to see him and

was wagging her tail was sufficient to put this fact at issue. Extending a closed hand
towards what appears to be a friendly dog to allow the dog to sniff the hand does not
undisputedly amount to provocation. Additionally, as discussed previously, it is
disputed whether Zoey had previously bitten others unprovoked. Thus, it is
disputed whether Zoey would be considered a dangerous animal under this code
section.

Boswell, 158 Idaho at 565-66, 348 P .3d at 508-09 [ emphasis supplied]. Again, the record shows that
Mr. Boswell approached Zoey, who was growling, with a closed fist.
The record supports Mary's and Amber's position that neither of them knew that Zoey was
dangerous or vicious, or that she would bite Mr. Boswell. Mary Steele Depo, p.12, ll.5-13; p. 13,

ll.10-15. Prior to the incident, there had been no complaints or any adjudication that Zoey was
dangerous or had bitten anyone without provocation. Zoey nipped at a friend of Amber, Chris
Kettler, but only because Zoey saw Ms. Kettler reach or move towards Amber and was being
protective of her. Affidavit ofChris Kettler, ,3, p.2, attached to the Affidavit o/Reed W. Larsen.filed

January 10, 2013. Also, prior to the incident, Mary never saw Zoey bear her teeth. Mary Steele
Depo., Exh. A., p. 26, ll.2~3. Further, as the Court of Appeals held, and as argued in Plaintiffs'
second motion for partial summary judgment, it was disputed whether Stephen Boswell provoked
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Zoey. Boswell, 158 Idaho at 564-566, 348 P.3d at 507-509. On this issue, the record shows there
is evidence Mr. Boswell did provoke her. When Mr. Boswell and Mary returned, they entered
Mary's home, and, prior to the bite, Zoeywas barking and growling. Mary Steele Depa., p. 6, ll.
21-25. Mr. Boswell, on his own, and without Mary's knowledge or her at her request,

approached Zoey, who was behind the gate, with his right hand in a closed fist. Stephen
Boswell Depa., B., p. 29, l. 7-p. 33, l.5. Mr. Boswell reached to Zoey and she bit him. Mr. Boswell

admitted that there was no reason for him to go beyond the gate, and that Mary never asked him to
go to Zoey, and he decided on his own to go to Zoey. Mary Steele Depa., p. 12, ll.21-24; p. 40, ll.
14-18; Stephen Boswell Depa., p. 25, ll.22-24.

The Court of Appeals held all of these questions had to be decided by the jury. As a result,
the Court must deny Plaintiffs' motion.

E.

WHETHER MR. BOSWELL TRESPASSED INTO WHERE ZOEY WAS
CONFINED IS ALSO A JURY QUESTION.

The record establishes that Mr. Boswell was not asked by Mary Steele to go to the area where
Zoey was confined. Mary Steele did not know Mr. Boswell would go to Zoey's area, especially
when Zoey was barking and growling. When Mr. Boswell and Mary entered Mary's home after
returning from the family gathering at Plaintiffs' house, prior to the bite, Zoey was barking and
growling. Mary Steele Depa, p. 6, ll. 21-25. Mary Steele testified she did not ask Mr. Boswell to
go over to initiate contact with Zoey, and that there was no reason for Mr. Boswell to go into the
kitchen whereZoeywas confined. MarySteeleDepo.,p.12, ll.21-24;p.14, ll.7-14,·p. 40, ll.11-16.
Further, Mary Steele testified that Mr. Boswell went over to where Zoey was confined on his own.
Mary Steele Depo.,p. 40, ll.17-18.
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Furthermore, Mr. Boswell, on his own, and without Mary's knowledge or her at her request,
approached Zoey, who was behind the gate, with his right hand in a closed fist. Stephen Boswell
Depo., p. 29, l. 7-p. 33, l.5. Mr. Boswell reached to Zoey and she bit him. Mr. Boswell also

admitted that there was no reason for him to go beyond the gate, and that Mary never asked him to
go to Zoey, and he decided on his own to go to Zoey. Mary Steele Depo., p. 12; p. 40, ll.. 14-18;
Stephen Boswell Depo., p. 25, ll.22-24.

All of this testimony establishes that whether Mr. Boswell became a trespasser is a question
for the jury to decide, not this Court on summary judgment. As a result, Plaintiffs' motion must be
denied.
V. CONCLUSION.

Based on the foregoing, Defendants respectfully request that the Court deny Plaintiffs'
Motion for Partial Summary judgment.
DATED this

3

day of December, 2015.
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED

Bi/fJ_~,/

-E~D-W~.LA_R_S_E_N_ _ _ __

,-~...,,...f.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

.3

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of December, 2015, I served a true and correct
copy of the above and foregoing document to the following person(s) as follows:
Kent A. Higgins
Merrill & Merrill, Chartered
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991

[ ~ U.S. Mail/Postage Prepaid
[]
Hand Delivery
[]
Overnight Mail
Facsimile\ 232-2499

[V

NOTE: one duplicate copy of all motions, and any opposition thereto, together with supporting
memorandum, affidavits and documents, and trial brief, shall be emailed to
brandy@ban'nockcounty.us
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Kent A. Higgins
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED
109 North Arthur - 5th Floor
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991
(208) 232-2286
(208) 232-2499 Telefax
ISB#: 3025
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

STEPHEN BOSWELL and KARINA
BOSWELL, husband and wife,
Plaintiff,

AMBER STEELE,
MARY STEELE,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-12-4120 OC

REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

REPLY
The issue before the Court is an issue oflaw-not of feelings. It is an inquiry as to: What
is the law.
And the law is this: There is no such defense as "comparative negligence" at common law.
It does not exist. Where the defense of comparative negligence exists at all, it exists by virtue of a
statute- in contravention of the common law. If it exists by statute, it is no broader-than the scope
of the statute. That is the law.
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Idaho has two comparative negligence statutes. They read as follows:
Idaho Code § 6-801. Comparative negligence or comparative responsibility - Effect of
contributory negligence.

Contributory negligence or comparative responsibility shall not bar recovery in an
action by any person or his legal representative to recover damages for negligence,
gross negligence or comparative responsibility resulting in death or in injury to
person or property, if such negligence or comparative responsibility was not as great
as the negligence, gross negligence or comparative responsibility of the person
against whom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed shall be diminished in the
proportion to the amount of negligence or comparative responsibility attributable to
the person recovering. Nothing contained herein shall create any new legal theory,
cause of action, or legal defense.
Idaho Code§ 6-1404 Comparative responsibility

Comparative responsibility shall not bar recovery in an action by any person or his
legal representative to recover damages for product liability resulting in death or
injury to person or property, if such responsibility was not as great as the
responsibility of the person against whom recovery is sought, but an damages
allowed shall be diminished in the proportion to the amount of responsibility
attributable to the person recovering.
There you have it. Comparative responsibility in Idaho applies in two types or causes of
action: Negligence and products liability. It does not apply to trespass, or conversion, or defamation,
or damage to reputation. It does not apply to invasion of privacy, or fraud, to malicious prosecution
or tortious interference, or nuisance. It does not apply to breach of contract, or quiet title, or
condemnation, or foreclosure. And it does not apply to injury by a domestic animal with known
vicious propensities; or to a private cause of action created by city statute against an animal owner
for injury by the animal, unless - and to the extent - the city ordinance so provides. The last
sentence of the statute says: Nothing contained herein shall create any new legal theory, cause

of action. or legal defense.
But wait! Comparative fault does not even apply in products liability cases except to certain
enumerated acts, e.g., "use of a product with a known defective condition," or "intentional misuse."
(Idaho Code § 6-1405) The law is not -- as defendants would have it - that in each and every tort
case, each and every plaintiff must loose out on recovery to the extent of plaintiffs own mistakes.
That is not the law.
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Comparative Negligence Is Not a Defense to Injury Caused by Domestic Animals with
Known Dangerous Propensities.

A.

Plaintiffs have five causes of action. None of Plaintiffs' causes of action sound in products
liability. Only two sound in negligence. To these two, Idaho Code§ 6-801 comparative negligence
would apply. To the other three comparative negligence would not a1;mly. .
The specific enumeration ofthe types of action to which comparative negligence would apply
is also the exclusion of all others. Alliance for Prop. Rights & Fiscal Responsibility v. City ofIdaho
Falls, 742 F.3d 1lOO, 1101 (9th Cir. 2013). The very fact that Idaho included Idaho Code§ 6-1404

and 1405 to specify products liability as a type of action where comparative negligence would apply
means that the application of comparative fault is not "fairly implied" in all tort actions by virtue of
I.C. § 6~801. Ifby virtue ofl.C. §" 6-801 comparative negligence applied to every action that even
vaguely resembled a tort, then there would be no need for LC.§ 6-1404.
Plaintiffs, Steve and Karena Boswell are not asking this court to recognize anything more
than what the Court of Appeals recognized in its opinion:
The distinction between a strict liability cause of action and a negligence cause of
action may lie in the type of contributory negligence allowe~ as a defense.
Compare Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 515 with 4 Am.Jur.2dAnimals § 67.
However, this Court has not been asked to address the law governing any defense
to liability in this case, and we make no comment on its application.
Boswell v. Steele, 158 Idaho 554, 348 P.3d 497, 504 (Ct. App. 20I5)(emphasis added).

Plaintiffs, Steve and Karena Boswell are not asking this court to recognize anything more
than what has been recognized by the Supreme or Appellate Courts of the other jurisdictions that
have addressed this issue:
Similarly, we conclude that the dog-bite statute does not allow for
consideration of any comparative negligence on the part of the
dog-bite victim, excluding possibly where the negligence may
relate to the defense of provocation.
Hill v. Sacka, 256 Mich. App. 443,451, 666 N.W.2d 282, 289 (2003)(emphasis

added).
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Allocation-of-fault statutes are not auplicable in dog-bite actions
under liability statutes like 9 Del. C. § 913 unless expressly
stated.28 Even when comparative negligence may be a defense, the
bar is high. 29 Delaware's comJJarative negligence statute is
narrowly constructed. and its aJJJJlication is limited to actions
based in negligence.·
Russo v. Zeigler, 67 A.3d 536, 541 (Del. Super. 2013).(emphasis added).

The Legislature is presumed to know language used in a statute,
and if a subsequent act on the same or similar subject uses different
tenns in the same connection, the court must presume that a change
in the law was intended. Hall v. City of Omaha, 266 Neb. 127,663
N.W.2d 97 (2003). We conclude that the Legislature intended to
exclude the defense of contributo,:y negligence in strict liability
action£
·
Shipler v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 Neb. 194,218, 710 N.W.2d 807, 830

(2006). (emphasis added).
The Boswell's position, is consistent with the proper application of comparative
responsibility. It is the law.
Dog bite liability is defined by the Idaho Supreme Court as follows:
If domestic animals, such as oxen, horses, dogs, etc., injure any one in person or
property ... the owner is not liable for such injury unless he knew that such

animal was accustomed to do such mischief, and, in suits to recover damages for
such injury, knowledge must be alleged and proved, for, unless the owner knew
that such animal was vicious or possessed such traits, he is not liable. If, however,
he had such knowledge, he is liable.
McClain v. Lewiston Interstate Fair & Racing Ass'n, 17 Idaho 63, 104 P. 1915,
1016 (1909).

Plaintiffs refer to this as strict liability in tort. Defense relentlessly remind us that the
Court of Appeals did not call this strict liability in tort. The Defense would do well to remember
that the Court of Appeals also did not say that it was not strict liability in tort. The Court of
Appeals did recognize that the landmark Idaho case of McClain is sound Idaho law. At least two
other jurisdictions and four scholarly articles recognize that by virtue of McClain Idaho is a strict
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liability dog bite jurisdiction. Hunt v. Hazen, 197 Or. 637, 639-40, 254 P.2d 210,211 (1953);
Barber v. Hockstrasser, 136 N.J.L. 76, 80, 54 A.2d 458, 560 (Sup. Ct. 1947). Allison E. Butler,
33 Causes ofAction 2d 293 (Originally published in 2007) p. 52; Adam P. Karp, J.D., M.S. 38
Causes ofAction 2d 281 (originally published in 2008) p. 42; 38 Causes of Action 2d 281
[Cumulative Supplement] p. 5; George Ducker, Ph.D. Esq., Animal Wrongs: On Holding
Animals to (and Excusing Them from) Legal Responsibility for Their Intentional Acts. 2 JAnimal
L. & Eth. 91, 121 (2007).

By whatever name you call it, "dog bite liability" or "strict liability" it is still recognized
in 48 out of 50 states as "strict liability." McClain is, after all, ail Idaho Supreme Court decision.
McClain is, after all, cited authoritatively for the proposition that Idaho is a strict liability dogbite
jurisdiction. So no matter whether the Court of Appeals is reticent to call it "strict liability" or
just "dogbite liability" it is the exact same doctrine. And the Court of Appeals never said it is
not.
The important point is that it is not an action in negligence and it is not an action in
products liability. It is an action in "dog bite liability." And thus neither Idaho Code§ 6-801
nor Idaho Code § 6-1404 apply comparative negligence as a defense.
B.

Comparative Negligence is not a defense to the standalone cause of action created by
Pocatello Municipal Code §§ 6.04.010 et. Seq.

Likewise, The Pocatello Municipal Code says if your dog bites someone Y?U are.fully
responsible. The only exceptions - the only defenses - are taunted, teased, or threatened.
Pocatello Municipal Code Pocatello Municipal Code§§ 6.04.010 et seq is its own
separate and distinct cause of action. Against the arguments of the defense that it was not a cause
of action, the Court of Appeals found that it was:
Upon reviewing the ordinance, it is apparent that PMC 6.04.0SO(E) creates a
private cause of action when a dangerous animal, and defined in PMC 6.04.010,
causes injury. The district court does not appear to have addressed this ordinance
as a standalone cause of action. In their amended complaint, the Boswells
included the ordinance under the headings strict liability, negligence per se, and
premises liability. By reversing the dismissal of this portion of the Boswell's
amended complaint, we simply hold that the ordinance provides a standalone
cause ofaction. Boswell v. Steele, 158 Idaho 554,138 P.3d 497 (Ct. App. 2015)
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It is not an action for negligence. It clearly has nothing to do with the negligence of the
dog owner. It has everything to do with ownership of the dog. It has three defenses: that the dog
was taunted, teased, or threatened. That is it! That is all! It is not an action in products liability
or negligence. Comparative negligence does not apply.
C.

Comparative Negligence is not a defense to the standalone cause of action of
premises liability of a dogowner.

That leaves the action for premises liability. The Court of Appeals held that the
Plaintiffs' action for premises liability was improperly dismissed. What the Court of Appeals did
not do was go the step further to tell us whether or not Idaho will or will not apply Restatement

(Second) at Torts §513 (1977), the Restatement for premises liability concerning a dog bite
which reads as follows:
The possessor of wild animal or an abnormally dangerous domestic animal who
keeps it upon land in his possession, is subject to strict liability to persons coming
upon the land in the exercise of a privilege whether derived from his consent to
their entry or otherwise.
·

Restatement (Second) ofTorts § 513 (1977).
The Court of Appeals left it for this District Court to make the first call on whether that
Restatement will apply in Idaho. Butthat is an easy call! Since 1970, the Idaho Supreme Court
has cited the Restatement (Second)ofTorts over 240 times. (See Addendum 1). Out of those 240
times, with only three exceptions 1 this Court has consistently cited the Restatement
authoritatively, as a correct statement ofidaho Law.
Dogbite premises liability is more than plain ordinary premise liability. By virtue of the

Restatement, it is strict liability in tort. It is neither sounding in products liability nor in
negligence, so comparative negligence does not apply. The Court of Appeals, appropriately went
no further than it needed to reverse the prior judgment, but it never said Idaho would not adopt

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 513 (1977).

1 Hopper

v. Swinnerton, 155 Idaho 801, 317 P.3d 698, 705 (2013), reh'g denied (Feb. 12, 2014); State v.
Corbus, 150 Idaho 599, 605-06, 249 P.3d 398, 404-05 (2011); Keller v. Holiday Inns, Inc., Idaho 5~3, 595, 691.
P.2d 1208, 1210 (1984).
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According to the Restatement Idaho premises liability for dogbite injury is strict liability.
It is not products liability. It is not negligence. No common law doctrine of comparative
negligence applies. There is none. No statutory applies. It is not within the confines of either
I.C. § 6-801 or Idaho Code§ 6-1404
A. Idaho Is a Strict Liability State in More Ways than One.

The Defense argues that Idaho only recognizes strict liability in products liability cases.
(See Defendants' memorandum page 1). Actually, Idaho recognizes strict liability in a myriad of
circumstances. For example, Idaho recognizes strict liability at common law of a bailee for the
misdelivery of goods. Quinto v. Millwood Forest Products, Inc., 130 Idaho 162,938 P.2d 189
(1997).
Idaho recognizes strict liability at common law of a corporation for the crimes of its
agent. State v. Adjustment Dep't Credit Bureau, Inc., 94 Idaho 156, 158-59, 483 P.2d 687, 68990 (1971).
Idaho recognizes strict liability at common law for commercial carriers who fail to safely
transport goods. McIntosh v. Oregon R. & Nav. Co., 17 Idaho 100, 105 P.66 (1909).
Idaho recognizes strict liability at common law for livestock dealers who fail to pay for
purchased cattle. US. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Clover Creek Cattle Co., 92 Idaho 889, 452
P.2d 993 (1969).
Under Idaho Code § 6-320 Idaho recognizes strict liability for a landlord who fails to
keep the premises safe for tenants. (Jesse v. Lindsley, 149 Idaho 70,233 P.3d 1 (2008)).
Under Idaho Code§ 6-210 Idaho recognizes strict liability of a parent for harm done by a
minor child.
Under Idaho Code § 25-2806 Idaho recognizes strict liability of an owner of a dog that
injures poultry or livestock.
In the criminal realm, Idaho recognizes strict liability for injury caused by a defendant
guilty of aggravated DUI, LC. § 18-8006. State v. Robinett, 141 Idaho 110, I 06 P.3d 436 (2005);
Idaho recognizes strict liability without criminal negligence for failure to affix illegal drug
stamps. State v. RomeroMGarcia, 139 Idaho 199,204, 75 P.3d 1209 (Ct. App. 2003); for
vehicular manslaughter, Haxforth v. State, 117 Idaho 189, 786 P.2d 580 (1990); for statutory·
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rape, State v. Stiffler, 117 Idaho 405,410, 788 P.2d 220 (1990); for sale of securities when not
licensed, State v'. Montgomery, 135 Idaho 348, 17 P.3d 292 (2001); and for driving without a·
valid driver's license. State v. Taylor, 139 Idaho 402, 80 P.3d 338 (2002).
An employer is also strictly liable for statutory penalties for f~lure to secure payment for

workers compensation. Heese v. A & T Trucking, 102 Idaho 598,635 P.2d 962 (1981).
Last, and most importantly, Idaho recognizes common law strict liability, and strict
premises liability, in dogbite cases when an owner or harborer of a dog knows or ought to know
the dog will cause injury. McClain v. Lewiston Interstate Fair & Racing Ass 'n, 17 Idaho 63,
104 P. 1015 (1909).

In McClain the Idaho Supreme Court declared:
If domestic animals, such as oxen and horses, injure any one,[sic] in person or
property, if they are rightfully in the place where they do the mischief, the owner
of such animals is not liable for such injury, unless he knew that they were
accustomed to do mischief; and, in suits for such injuries, such knowledge must
be alleged and proved, for, unless the owner knew that the beast was vicious, he is
not liable. If the owner had such knowledge, he is liable.
104 P. at 1016.
Although the wording is not word-for-word exactly the same, the sentiment of the
declaration oflaw is identical to that of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 513 (1977):
The possessor of a wild animal or an abnormally dangerous domestic animal who
keeps it upon land in his possession, is subject to strict liability to persons coming
upon the land in the exercise of a privilege whether derived from his consent to
their entry or otherwise.
The sentiments of both statements are identical. Under either the declaration oflaw in

McLain, or the declaration oflaw in the Restatement (Second) ofTorts§ 513 (1977), the outcome.
is the same. The harborer of the dog is strictly liable to anyone coming onto the property whether
invitee or licensee if the dog is known to bite.
The Defense's opening declaration is: "Idaho has only adopted strict liability in products

liability cases" But such is not true in Idaho.
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CONCLUSION
The Plaintiffs pose three causes of action that neither sound in products liability nor in
negligence. Idaho's comparative negligence statutes apply only to products liability and to actions
sounding in negligence. Neither statute "shall create any new legal theory, cause of ~ction, or legal

defense." There is no common law doctrine of comparative negligence. There is no statutory
comparative negligence outside of products liability or negligence, and it is not the Court's
prerogative to legislate such. The bottom line is that Defendants' defenses of comparative
negligence do not apply to three out of the five Plaintiffs' causes of action.
Accordingly, as to those three causes of action, the defense ofcomparative negligence should
be stricken.
Respectfully submitted this J.!j__ day of December, 2015.
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ADDENDUM!
Idaho Case Law Recognizing·
The Restatement (Second) Torts, and The Restatement (Third) Torts
as Authoritative law in Idaho.
Massey v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 156 Idaho 476, 328 P.3d 456,460 (2014)
Beers v. Corp. ofPresident of Church ofJesus Christ ofLatter-Day Saints, 155 Idaho 680,316 P.3d 92, 98 (2013)
Frogley v. Meridian Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2, 155 Idaho 558,569, 314 P.3d 613, 624 (2013)
Washington Federal Sav. v. Van Enge/en, 153 Idaho 648, 289 P.3d 50 (2012);
Hopperv. Swinnerton, 155 Idaho 801, 317 P.3d 698, 705 (2013), reh'g denied (Feb. 12, 2014)
Kerr v. Bank ofAm., Idaho, N.A., 37754, 2011 WL 11047661 (Idaho Ct. App. Nov. 22, 2011)
State v. Corbus, 150 Idaho 599, 605-06, 249 P.3d 398, 404-05 (2011)
Weitz v. Green, 148 Idaho 851,865,230 P.3d 743, 757 (2010)
Daleiden v. Jefferson Cnty. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 251, 139 Idaho 466,470, 80 P.3d 1067, 1071 (2003)
Doe v. Haw, CV OC 0205441D, 2003 WL 21015134 (Idaho Feb. 5, 2003)
State v. Sibley, 138 Idaho 259,263, 61 P.3d 616, 620 (Ct. App. 2002)
Zimmerman v. Volkswagen ofAm., Inc., 128 Idaho 851,854, 920 P.2d 67, 70 (1996)
Manning v. Twin Falls Clinic & Hosp., Inc., 122 Idaho 47, 51-52, 830 P.2d 1185, I 189-90 (1992)
Idaho First Nat. Bankv. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 285, 824 P.2d 841, 860 (1991)
Murray v. Farmers Ins. Co., 118 Idaho 224,227, 796 P.2d 101, 104 {1990)
Bowlingv. JackB. Parson Companies, 117 Idaho 1030, 1031, 793 P.2d 703, 704 (1990)
Powellv. Nietmann, 116 Idaho 590,604, 778 P2d 340,354 (1989)
Brown's Tie & Lumber Co. v. Chicago Title Co. ofIdaho, 115 Idaho 56, 59, 764 P.2d 423,426 (1988)
Jacobsen v. City ofRathdrum, 115 Idaho 266,278, 766 P.2d 736, 748 (1988)
Kearney v. Denker, 114 Idaho 755, 758, 760 P.2d 1171, 1174 (1988)
Myers v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Products, Inc., 114 Idaho 432, 435, 757 P.2d 695, 698 (Ct. App. 1988)
Arnoldv. Diet Ctr., Inc., 113 Idaho 581, 585, 746 P.2d 1040, 1044 (Ct. App. 1987)
Sidwell v. William Prym, Inc., 112 Idaho 76, 78-79, 730 P.2d 996, 998-99 (1986)
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O'Neilv. Schuckardt, 112 Idaho 472,475,733 P.2d693, 696 (1986)
McPheters v. Peterson, 108 Idaho 107, 109, 697 P.2d 447, 449 (1985)
Luzar v. W. Sur. Co., 107 Idaho 693, 696, 692 P.2d 337, 340 (1984)
Runcorn v. Shearer Lumber Products, Inc., 107 Idaho 389,394,690 P.2d 324,329 (1984)
McEnroe v. Morgan, 106 Idaho 326,330,678 P.2d 595,599 (Ct. App. 1984)
Cheney v. Palos Verdes Inv. Corp., 104 Idaho 897, 902, 665 P.2d 66 I, 666 (1983)
Le/iefeldv. Johnson, 104 Idaho 357,385,659 P.2d 111, 139 (1983)
Obray v. Glick, 104 Idaho 432,434, 660 P.2d 44, 46 (1982)
Volkv. Baldazo, 103 Idaho 570,572,651 P.2d 11, 13 (1982)
Millers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. of Texas v. Ed Bailey, Inc., 103 Idaho 377,381,647 P.2d 1249, 1253 (1982)
Bakerv. BurlingtonN., Inc., 99 Idaho 688,692, 587 P.2d 829,833 (1978)
State ex rel. Evans v. Spokane lnt'l R. Co., 99 Idaho 197, 199, 579 P.2d 694, 696 (1978)
Ryals v. Broadbent Dev. Co., 98 Idaho 392,396,565 P.2d 982,986 (1977)
Ralphs v. City ofSpirit Lake, 98 Idaho 225,231,560 P.2d 1315, 1321 (1977)
McAlvain v. Gen. Ins. Co. ofAm., 97 Idaho 777,781,554 P.2d 955,959 (1976)
Easterv. McNabb, 97 Idaho 180,182,541 P.2d 604,606 (1975)
Hoffman v. Simplot Aviation, Inc., 97 Idaho 32, 35,539 P.2d 584,587 (1975)
Bushong v. Kamiah Grain, Inc., 96 Idaho 659, 661, 534 P.2d 1099, 1101 (1975)
Munson v. State, Dep't ofHighways, 96 Idaho 529,533,531 P.2d 1174, 1178 (1975)
Taylor v. K. T. V. B., Inc., 96 Idaho 202, 205, 525 P.2d 984, 987 (1974)
Twin Falls Farm & City Distrib., Inc. v. D & B Supply Co., Inc., 96 Idaho 351,359,528 P.2d 1286," 1294 (1974)
Rindlisbaker v. Wilson, 95 Idaho 752, 759, 519 P.2d421, 428 (1974)
Shields v. Morton Chem. Co., 95 Idaho 674,676, 518 P.2d 857, 859 (1974)
Weeks v. M-P Publications, Inc., 95 Idaho 634,636,516 P.2d 193, 195 (1973)
S. H. Kress & Co. v. Godman, 95 Idaho 614,617,515 P.2d 561,564 (1973)
Robinson v. Williamsen Idaho Equip. Co., 94 Idaho 819,823,498 P.2d 1292, 1296 (1972)
Cox v. Stolworthy, 94 Idaho 683, 690, 496 P.2d 682, 689 (1972) overruled by Cheney v. Palos Verdes Inv. Corp.,
104 Idaho 897, 665 P.2d 661 (1983)
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Openshaw v. Oregon Auto. Ins. Co., 94 Idaho 335,338,487 P.2d 929,932 (1971)
Davis v. McDougall, 94 Idaho 61, 63,480 P.2d 907, 909 (1971)
Smith v. State, 93 Idaho 795,804,473 P.2d 937, 946 (1970)
Mooney v. Robinson, 93 Idaho 676,679,471 P.2d 63, 66 (1970)
Printcraft Press, Inc. v. Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc., 153 Idaho 440,283 P.3d 757 (2012);
Carrillo v. Boise Tire Co., Inc., 152 Idaho 741, 274 P.3d 1256 (2012);
Beaudoin v. Davidson Trust Co., 151 Idaho 701,263 P.3d 755 (2011);
WescoAutobodySupply, Inc. v. Ernest, 149 Idaho 881,243 P.3d 1069,( 2010);
Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 243 P.3d 642 (2010);
Castorena ·v. General Elec., 149 Idaho 609, 238 P .3d 209 (2010);
Mortensen v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 149 Idaho 437, 235 P.3d 387 (2010);
Weinstein v. Prudential Property and Gas. Ins. Co., 149 Idaho 299, 233 P.3d 1221 {2010);
Schmechel v. Dille, 148 Idaho 176, 219 P.3d 1192 (2009);
Harrison v. Binnion, 147 Idaho 645, 214 P.3d 631 (2009);
Gray v. Tri-Way Const. Services, Inc., 147 Idaho 378,210 P.3d 63 (2009);
Johnson v. McPhee,147 Idaho 455,210 P.3d 563 (Idaho App 2009);
Cramer v. Slater, 146 Idaho 868, 204 P.3d 508 (2009);
Jones v. Health South Treasure Valley Hosp., 147 Idaho 109, 206 P.3d 473 (2009);
BECO Const. Co., Inc. v. J-U-B Engineers, Inc., 145 Idaho 719, 184 P.3d 844 (2008);
Losserv. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008);
Baccus v. Ameripride Services, Inc., 145 Idaho 346, 179 P.3d 309 (2008);
Steedv. Grand Teton Council of the Boy Scouts ofAmerica, Inc., 144 Idaho 848, 172 P.3d 1123 (2007);
Dopp v. Idaho Com'n ofPardons and Parole, 144 Idaho 402, 162 P.3d 781 (2007);
McKinley v. Guaranty Nat. Ins. Co., 144 Idaho 247, 159 P.3d 884 (2007);
Nation v. State, Dept. ofCorrection, 144 Idaho 177, 158 P .3d 953 (2007);
Rees v. State, Dept. ofHealth and Welfare, 143 Idaho 10, 137 P.3d 397 (2006);
Alderson v. Bonner, 142 Idaho 733, 132 P.3d 1261 (Idaho App. 2006);
O'Guin v. Bingham County, 142 Idaho 49, 122 P.3d 308 (2005);
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Quinto v. Millwood Forest Products, Inc., 130 Idaho 162, 938 P.2d 189 (Idaho App. 1997);
Idaho State Bar v. Topp, 129 Idaho 414, 925 P.2d 1113 (1996);
Yoakum v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 129 Idaho 171, 923 P.2d 416 (1996);
Brooks v. Logan, 127 Idaho 484,903 P.2d 73 (1995);
Doe v. Sisters ofHoly Cross, 126 Idaho 1036, 895 P.2d 1229 (Idaho App. 1995);
Ambrose By and Through Ambrose v. Buhl Joint School Dist. No. 412, 126 Idaho 581,887 P.2d 1088 (Idaho App.
1994);
Oats v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 126 Idaho 162, 879 P.2d 1095 (1994);
Teply v. Lincoln, 125 Idaho 773, 874 P.2d 584 (Idaho App. 1994);
Spence v. Howell, Not Reported in P.2d (1994);
Morgan v. State, Dept. ofPublic Works, 124 Idaho 658,862 P.2d 1080 (1993);
Malmin v. Engler, 124 Idaho 733, 864 P.2d 179 (Idaho App. 1993);
Mitchell v. Valerio, 124 Idaho 283, 858 P.2d 822 (Idaho App. 1993);
Neal v. Neal, 125 Idaho 627, 873 P.2d 881 (Idaho App. 1993);
Barab v. Plumleigh, 123 Idaho 890, 853 P.2d 635 (Idaho App. 1993);
Podolan v. Idaho Legal Aid Services, Inc., 123 Idaho 937,854 P.2d 280 (Idaho App. 1993);
Ostrander v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. ofIdaho, Inc., 123 Idaho 650, 851 P.2d 946 ( 1993);
Litchfleldv. Nelson, 122 Idaho 416, 835 P.2d 651 (Idaho App. 1992);
Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc. v. Krueger,124 Idaho 501,861 P.2d 71 (Idaho App. 1992);
Bethel v. Van Stone, 120 Idaho 522, 817 P.2d 188 (Idaho App. 1991 );
Maselliv. Ginner, 119 Idaho 702, 809 P.2d I 181 (Idaho App. 1991);
Diamond v. Farmers Group, Inc., 119 Idaho 146, 804 P.2d 319 (1990);
Brown v. Matthews Mortuary, Inc., 118 Idaho 830, 801 P.2d 37 (1990);
White v. University ofIdaho, 118 Idaho 400, 797 P.2d 108 (1990);
R. G. Nelson, A.LA. v. Steer, 118 Idaho 409, 797 P .2d 117 {1990);
Sharp v. W.H Moore, Inc., 1I 8 Idaho 297, 796 P.2d 506 (1990);
Hudson v. Cobbs, 118 Idaho 474, 797 P.2d 1322 (1990);
Evans v. Twin Falls County, 118 Idaho 210, 796 P.2d 87 (1990);
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Peterson v. Idaho First Nat. Bank, 117 Idaho 724, 791 P.2d 1303 (1990);
Olsen v. J.A. Freeman Co., 117 Idaho 706, 791 P.2d 128 (1990);
McGill v. Frasure, 117 Idaho 598, 790 P.2d 379 (Idaho App. 1990);
Nettleton v. Thompson, 117 Idaho 308, 787 P.2d 294 (Idaho App. 1990);
Marty v. State, 117 Idaho 133, 786 P.2d 524 (1989);
Hilden v. Ball, 117 Idaho 314, 787 P.2d 1112 (1989);
Fagundes v. State, 116 Idaho 173, 774 P.2d 343 (Idaho App. 1989);
Idaho Bank & Trust Co. v. First Bancorp ofIdaho, 115 Idaho 1082, 772 P.2d 720 (1989);
White v. University ofIdaho, 115 Idaho 564, 768 P.2d 827 (Idaho App. 1989);
Wiseman v. Schaffer, 115 Idaho 537, 768 P.2d 800 (Idaho App. 1989);
Harrison v. Taylor, 115 Idaho 588, 768 P.2d 1321 (1989);
Jensen v. Westberg, 115 Idaho 1021, 772 P.2d 228 (Idaho App. 1988);
Brown's Tie & Lumber Co. v. Chicago Title Co. <;/Idaho, 115 Idaho 1021 764 P.2d 423 (1988);
Hughes on Behalf ofHughes v. Union Pacific R. Co., 114 Idaho 466, 757 P.2d 1185 (1988);
Bates v. Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center, 114 Idaho 252, 755 P.2d 1290 (1988);
Badell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 765 P.2d 126 (1988);
Lindquist v. Albertsons, Inc., 113 Idaho 830, 748 P.2d 414 (Idaho App. 1987);
Peone v. Regulus Stud Mills, Inc., 113 Idaho 374, 744 P.2d 102 (1987);
Ransom v. City a/Garden City, 113 Idaho 202, 743 P.2d 70 (1987);
Tusch Enterprises v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37, 740 P.2d 1022 (1987);
Lunav. Shockey Sheet Metal & Welding Co., 113 Idaho 193, 743 P.2d 61(1987);
J.MF. Trucking, Inc. v. Carburetor & Elec. ofLewiston, Inc., 113 Idaho 797, 748 P.2d 381 (1987);
Borchardv. Wefco, Inc., 112 Idaho 555,733 P.2d 776, (1987);
Toner v. Lederle Laboratories, a Division ofAmerican Cyanamid Co., 112 Idaho 328, 732 P.2d 297, 55 USLW
2456, Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 11,284 (1987);
Tucker v. Palmer, 112 Idaho 648, 735 P.2d 959(1987);
White v. Unigard Mut. Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 94, 730 P.2d 1014 (J. 9876);
Crosby v. Rowand Machinery Co., 111 Idaho 939, 729 P.2d414(Idaho App. 1986);
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Sliman v. Aluminum Co. ofAmerica, 112 Idaho 277, 731 P.2d 1267, Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 11 (1986);
Oppenheimer Industries, Inc. v. Johnson Cattle Co., Inc., 112 Idaho 423, 732 P.2d 661(1986);
Frantz v. Parke, I 11 Idaho 1005, 729 P.2d 1068 (Idaho App. 1986);
Herrerav. Conner, 111 Idaho 1012, 729P.2d 1075(IdahoApp.1986);
Edmark Motors, Inc. v. Twin Cities Toyota, Inc., 111 Idaho 846, 727 P.2d 1274(Idaho App. 1986);
Quickv. Crane, III Idaho 759,727 P.2d 1187 (1986);
Gissel v. State, 111 Idaho 725, 727 P.2d I 153 (I 986);
Rawson v. United Steelworkers ofAmerica, 111 Idaho 630, 726 P.2d 742 (1986);
Sterling v. Bloom, 111 Idaho 211, 723 P.2d 755 (1986);
Jerome Thriftway Drug, Inc. v. Winslow, 110 Idaho 615, 717 P.2d 1033 (1986);
Stewart Title ofIdaho, Inc. v. Nampa Land Title Co., Inc., 110 Idaho 330, 715 P.2d 1000 (1986);
Doe v. Durtschi, llO Idaho 466, 716 P.2d 1238 (1986);
Vannoy v. Uniroyal Tire Co., 111 Idaho 536, 726 P.2d 648 (1985);
Daniels v. Byington, 109 Idaho 365, 707 P.2d 476 (Idaho App. 1985);
Boise Car and Truck Rental Co. v: Waco, Inc., 108 Idaho 780,702 P.2d 818 (1985);
Price v. Aztec Ltd., Inc., 108 Idaho 674, 701 P.2d 294 (Idaho App. 1985);
Carpenter v. Double R Cattle Co., Inc., 108 Idaho 602, 701 P.2d 222 (1985);
Brown v. Fritz, 108 Idaho 357,699 P.2d 1371 (1985);
Rojas v. Lindsay Mfg. Co.,108 Idaho 590, 701 P.2d 210 (1985);
Shields v. Martin, I 09 Idaho 132, 706 P.2d 21 {1985);
Fish Breeders ofIdaho, Inc. v. Rangen,Jnc., 108 Idaho 379, 700 P.2d 1(1985);
Gill v. Brown, 107 Idaho 1137, 695 P.2d 1276 (Idaho App. 1985);
Merritt/or Merrittv. State, 108 Idaho 20,696 P.2d 871(1985);
Chancier v. American Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., 107 Idaho 953,694 P .2d 1301 (Idaho App. 1985);
Riggs v. Colis, 107 Idaho 1028, 695 P.2d 413 (Idaho App. 1985);
Carroll v. United Steelworkers ofAmerica, 107 Idaho 717,692 P.2d 361(1984);
Mortensen v. Chevron Chemical Co., 107 Idaho 836,693 P.2d 1038 (1984);
Blake v. Cruz, 108 Idaho 253,698 P.2d 315 (1984);
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Steiner Corp. v. American Dist. Telegraph, 106 Idaho 787, 683 P.2d 435 (1984);
Challis Irr. Co. v. State, 107 Idaho 338,689 P.2d 230(1daho App. 1984);
Davis v. Gage, 106 Idaho 735,682 P.2d 1282 (Idaho App. 1984);
Western Idaho Production Credit Ass'n v. Simplot Feed Lots, Inc., 106 Idaho 260,678 P.2d 52 91984);
Wing v. Clark's Air Service, Inc., 106 Idaho 806, 683 P.2d 842 (1984);
Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 249, 678 P.2d 41(1984);
Keller v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 105 Idaho 649, 671 P.2d 1112(1daho App. 1983);
McBride v. Ford Motor Co., 105 Idaho 753, 673 P.2d 55 (1983);
Lasselle v. Special Products Co., 106 Idaho 170, 677 P.2d 483 (1983);
Carpenter v. Double R Cattle Co., Inc., 105 Idaho 320,669 P.2d 643 (1983);
Dujfv. Bonner Bldg. Supply, Inc., 105 Idaho 123,666 P.2d 650(1983);
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF BANNOCK
STEPHEN BOSWELL, ETAL. ,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No: CV-2012-0004120-PI
MINUTE ENTRY & ORDER

AMBER DAWN STEELE, ETAL.,
Defendant.
THE PARTIES came before the Court on the 21st day of December, 2015 for
hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. Kent Higginas and Richard Hearn
appeared in person on behalf of the Plaintiff. Reed Larsen and Javier Gabiola appeared
in person on behalf of the Defendant.
Hearing proceeded before the Court on the record. After hearing argument from
counsel, the Court took the matter under advisement with a written decision to be issued.
DATED this

~ .J....._day of December, 2015.

WILLIAM HWODLAND
District Judge

Case No.: CV-2012-0004120-PI
MINUTE ENTRY & ORDER
Page 1 of 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of December, 2015, I served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing document upon each of the following individuals in the
manner indicated.
Kent A Higgins
Merrill & Merrill Chrtd
PO Box 991
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991

D U.S. Mail
IZ! E-Mail
D Hand Deliver

Reed Larsen
Cooper & Larsen
PO Box4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229

D U.S. Mail
IZ! E-Mail
D Hand Deliver

0Fax:

0Fax:

Robert Poleki
CLERK OF THE COURT -

Case No.: CV-2012-0004120-PI
MINUTE ENTRY & ORDER
Page 2 of 2
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Reed W. Larsen (3427)
Javier L. Gabiola (5448)
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED
151 North 3i·d Avenue, 211d Floor
P.O. Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229
Telephone: (208) 235-1145
Facsimile: (208) 235-1182

By~·

·', ·-.,·...,.~.
·1-·u; Y
- ··-..

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
STEPHEN BOSWELL and KARINA BOSWELL, )
)
husband and wife,
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
v.
)
AMBER STEELE and MARY STEELE,
)

Case No. CV-2012-4120-PI

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME

)
)

Defendants.

The Couit, having considered Defendants• Motion to Shorten Time, and good cause
appearing therefore,

IT I_S HEREBYORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendants' Motion to
Shorten Time is GRANTED. The hearing on Defendants' Motions in Limine sha11 be held on
Wednesday, January 13, 2016 at 9:00 a.m. or as soon thereafter as counsel can be heard.
DATED this

7

day of January, 2016.

By

Jt)~ I I . I t ' ~
WILLIAM H. WOODLAND
District Judge

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME~ PAGE 1

189 of 348

1.:-C!

...
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

7

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of January, 2016, I served a true and correct
copy of the above and foregoing document to the following person(s) as follows:
Kent A. Higgins
Merrill & Merrill, Chartered
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, ID 83204-099 l

U.S. Mail/Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivery
[]
Overnight Mail
~ Facsimile\ 232-2499

Richard A. Hearn
Heam & Wood, LLC
1906 Jennie Lee Drive
Idabo Falls, ID 83404

[]
[]

U.S. Mail/Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivery
Overnight Mail

[]

U.S. Mail!Postage Prepaid.

[]

Hand Delivery

[]
[]

[]

)0 Facsimile\ 932-4380

Reed. W. Larsen
Javier L. Gabiola
Cooper & Larsen, Chartered
P.O. Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229

[]
Overnight Mail
pFacsimile\ 235-1182

NOTE: one duplicate copy of all motions, and any opposition thereto, together with supporting
memorandum, ojfidavits and documents, and trial brief, shall be emailed to
branJfvp@bannockcou1ll.)!.., us

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO Sl·IORTE.N TIME- PAGE

2
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Kent A. Higgins
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED
109 North Arthur - 5th Floor
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991
(208) 232-2286
(208) 232-2499 Telefax
ISB#: 3025

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
STEPHEN BOSWELLand KARINA
BOSWELL, husband and wife,

)
)

)
Plaintiff,

.

)
)
AMBER STEELE,
MARY STEELE,
Defendants.

Case No. CV-12-4120 OC

)

PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED .TURY
INSTRUCTIONS

)
)
)
)
)
)

COMES NOW Plaintiffs, by and through undersigned counsel, pursuant to the Court's
Scheduling Order, Notice of Trial Setting and Pretrial Order, dated June 9, 2015, andl.R.C.P. 5 l(a),
and submit their requested jury instructions, nos 1 through 4 and Special Verdict Form.
DATED this l~ibday of January, 2016.
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED

~!JJ~tirL
Kent A. Higgins

Plaintifrs Proposed Jury Instructions
0:\90\9034\Pleadings\Plaintiffs' Proposed Jury Instructions.wpd

-

.

Page 1
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, the undersigned, do hereby certify that a true, full and correct copy of the foregoing
document was this t1-'!:ri day of January, 2016, served upon the following in the· manner indicated
below:
Reed W. Larsen
Javier I. Gabiola
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED
P.O. Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229
The Honorable William H. Woodland
Bannock County Courthouse
624 E. Center, Room 220
Pocatello, ID 8320 I

[

]

LX. ]
[
[

]
]

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Telefax 235-1182

[ J · U.S. Mail
[)c ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Delivery
[ ] Telefax

~k]

Plaintiff's Proposed Jury Instructions
0:\90\9034\Pleadings\Plaintiffs' Proposed Jury Instructions.wpd

Page 2
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PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 1
Any dog which, when not physically provoked, physically attacks, wounds, bites or otherwise
injmes any person who is not trespassing, is vicious. It shall be unlawful for the owner or for the
owner of premises on which a vicious dog is present to harbor a vicious dog outside a secme
enclosure. A secure enclosure is one from which the animal cannot escape and for which exit and
entry is controlled by the owner of the premises or owner of the animal.

Idaho Code § 25·2805(2)

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTHER
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PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 2
An owner or possessor of an animal that the owner or posse'ssor knows or has reason to know
has dangerous tendencies abnormal for the animal's category is subject to strict liability for physical

harm caused by the animal if the harm ensues from that dangerous tendency.

Restatement (I'hird) a/Torts, Phys. & Emot. Harm,§ 23 (2010).

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTHER
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PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTION 3
The possessor of an abnormally dangerous dog who keeps it upon land in his possession, is
subject to strict liability to persons coming upon the land in the exercise of a privilege whether
derived from his consent to their entry or otherwise.
Restatement (Second) o/Torts § 513 (1977).

GIVEN

REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTHER
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PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTION 4
Any animal which bites, inflicts mjury, assaults, or otherwise attacks a human being or
domestic animal without justifiable provocation is a dangerous animal.
An adult owner/custodian of a dangerous animal shall be liable for all injuries and property
damages sustained by any person or by any animal caused by an unprovoked attack by any dangerous
animal.

Pocatello Municipal Code § 6.04.050 (A)(2) and (E)

i

l
I

I

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTHER
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND
t,J I 5
I b,.. ,__j~-\h
'·'·I

FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF BANNOCK
STEPHEN BOSWELL, ETAL. ,
Plaintiff,
vs.

.
Case No:

l3Y

··s,i, I
.-,
!-1····
l I.• ..:i·''
o

~

C . _ ~ ---

CV-2012-0004120-PI

MINUTE ENTRY & ORDER

AMBER DAWN STEELE, ETAL.,
Defendant.

Plaintiff Boswell has moved the Court to strike Defendants third fourth and fifth defenses
as being inapplicable to theories of strict liability, premises liability and strict statutory liability.
Defenses have generally been available in all American jurisdictions when a person
claims injury from some interaction with a potential plaintiff. Comparative negligence in part
has been adopted to blunt the harsh results where sleight contributory negligence would defeat a
plaintiff's valid claims. Generally defenses are based on actions and responsibilities of the
plaintiff. As to dog bites American jurisdictions started with the presumption that domestic dogs
were not dangerous animals and thus the one bite rule developed. Idaho does not have a statute
that imposes strict liability for dog bites and is therefore a one bite state. Strict liability is
typically only available in cases involving products liability, dangerous activities, and some
domestic animals with known dangerous propensities. Strict liability in the general sense means
that the defendant is held liable if a certain event occurs, regardless of whether the Plaintiff's
actions otherwise could have affected and outcome.
In its remand opinion the Court of Appeals in this instant case declined to use the label of
strict liability and focused instead on the elements of the particular cause of action. The Court of
Appeals also specified a number of fact issues that are to be submitted to the jury. Clearly, some
of those contested facts relate to the actions of the Plaintiff whether they be called contributory
or effect elements of a particular cause of action.
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The elements of a general negligence tort are duty, breach, causation, damages and lack of
affirmative defense. If initial elements are met by virtue of strict liability status, that would still
leave causation and lack of affirmative defenses.
All of Plaintiffs claims sound in negligence, and are therefore subject to the defense of
comparative responsibility and actions of the Plaintiff in considering those elements of a cause of
action. Even the city ordinance lists provocation as a possible defense. Certainly many factual
issues that are to be determined by the jury relate to the actions of the plaintiff.
Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment is denied.
DATED this 15th day of January, 2016.

1/J~#~

WILLIAM H WOODLAND
District Judge

,

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

5

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the /
day of January, 2016, I served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document upon each of the following individuals in the manner indicated.
Kent A. Higgins
Merrill & Merrill Chrtd
PO Box 991
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991

0U.S.Mail
~E-Mail
D Hand Deliver
0Fax:

Reed Larsen
Cooper & Larsen
POBox4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229

0U.S.Mail
~ E-Mail
D Hand Deliver

0Fax:

Robert Poleki
CLERK OF THE COURT

~

a[~
Deputy Clerk
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Reed W. Larsen (3427)
Javier L. Gabiola (5448)
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED
151 North 3n1 Avenue, 2nd Floor
P.0. Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229
Telephone: (208) 235-1145
Facsimile: (208) 235-1182

/:;;;(:~:~~,

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH IDDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
STEPHEN BOSWELL and KARINA BOSWELL, )
husband and wife,
)

Case No. CV-2012-4120-PI

)

Plaintiffs,

)
)

v.

DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY
INSTRUCTIONS

)
)

AMBER STEELE and MARY STEELE,

)
)
)

Defendants.

COME NOW Defendants, by and through undersigned counsel, pursuant to the Court's
Scheduling Order, Notice of Trial Setting and Initial Pretrial Order, dated June 9, 2015,·and I.R.CP.
51(a), and submit their requested jury instructions, Nos. 1 through 30 and Special Verdict Form.
DATED this

J1 day of January, 2016.
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED

~

ByLA

::.iii>w.iiisEN

DEFENDANTS'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTlONS- PAGE

1
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

JJ_

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of January, 2016, I served a true and correct
copy of the above and foregoing document to the following person(s) as follows:
Kent A. Higgins
Merrill & Merrill, Chartered
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991
Richard A. Hearn
Heam & Wood, LLC
1906 Jennie Lee Drive
Idaho Falls, ID 83404

rV U.S. Mail/Postage Prepaid
[]
[]
[J

Hand Delivery
Overnight Mail
Facsimile\ 232-2499

[V-U.S. Mail/Postage_ Prepaid
[]
Hand Delivery
[]
Overnight Mail
[]
Facsimile\ 932-4380

NOTE: one duplicate copy of all motions, and any opposition thereto, together with supporting
memorandum, affidavits and documents, and trial brief, shall be emailed · to
brandyp@bannockcounty.us

DEFENDANTS'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - PAGE 2
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DEFENDANTS' INSTRUCTION NO. 1
These instructions explain your duties as jurors and define the law that applies to this
case. It is your duty to determine the facts, to apply the law set forth in these instructions to those
facts, and in this way to decide the case. Your decision should be based upon a rational and
objective assessment of the evidence. It should not be based on sympathy or prejudice.
It is my duty to instruct you on the points of law necessary to decide the case, and it is ·
your duty to follow the law as I instruct. You must consider these instructions as a whole, not
picking out one and disregarding others. The order in which these instructions are given or the
manner in which they are numbered has no significance as to the importance of any of them. If
you do not understand an instruction, you may send a note to me through the bailiff, and I will try
to clarify or explain the point further.
In determining the facts, you may consider only the evidenqe admitted in this trial. This

evidence consists of the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits admitted into evidence, and any
stipulated or admitted facts. While the arguments and remarks of the attorneys may help you
understand the evidence and apply the instructions, what they say is not evidence. If an attorney's
argument or remark has no basis in the evidence, you should disregard it.
The production of evidence in court is governed by rule of law. At times during the trial,
I sustained an objection to a question without permitting the witness to answer it, or to an offered
exhibit without receiving it into evidence. My rulings are legal matters, and are solely my
responsibility. You must not speculate as to the reason for any objection, which was made, or
my ruling thereon, and in reaching your decision you may not consider such a question or exhibit
or speculate as to what the answer or exhibit would have shown. Remember, a question is not
1
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evidence and should be considered only as it gives meaning to the answer.
There were occasions where an objection was made after an answer was given or the
remark was made, and in my ruling on the objection I instructed that the answer or remark be
stricken, or directed that you disregard the answer or remark and dismiss it from your minds. In
your deliberations, you must not consider such answer or remark, but must treat it as though you
had never heard it.
The law does not require you to believe all of the evidence admitted in the course of the
trial. As the sole judges of the facts, you must determine what evidence you believe and what
weight you attach to it. In so doing, you bring with you to this courtroom all of the experience
and background of your lives. There is no magical formula for evaluating testimony. In your
everyday affairs, you determine for yourselves whom you believe, what you believe and how
much weight you attach to what you are told. The considerations you use in making the more
important decisions in your everyday dealings are the same considerations you should apply in
your deliberations in this case.
IDJI 1.00

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED

OTHER
2
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DEFENDANTS' INSTRUCTION NO. 2

During your deliberations, you will be entitled to have with you my instructions
concerning the law that applies to this case, the exhibits that have been admitted into evidence
and any notes taken by you in the course of the trial proceedings.
If you take notes during the trial, be careful that your attention is not. thereby diverted
from the witness or his testimony; and you must keep your notes to yourself and not show them
to other persons or jurors until the jury deliberations at the end of the trial.

IDJI 1.01

GNEN

REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTHER
3
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DEFENDANTS' INSTRUCTION NO. 3
There are certain things you must not do during this trial:
1.

You must not associate in any way with the parties, any of the attorneys or their

employees, or any of the witnesses.
2.

You must not discuss the case with anyone, or permit anyone to discuss the case

with you. If anyone attempts to discuss the case with you, or to influence your decision in the·
case, you must report it to me promptly.
3.

You must not discuss the case with other jurors until you retire to the jury room to

deliberate at the close of the entire case.
4.

You must not make up your mind until you have heard all of the testimony and

have received my instructions as to the law that applies to the case.
5.

You must not contact anyone in an attempt to discuss or gain a greater

understanding of the case.
6.

You must not go to the place where any alleged event occurred.

IDJI 1.03

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTHER
4
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DEFENDANTS' INSTRUCTION NO. 4
Members of the jury, I remind you that you are not to discuss this case among yourselves
or with anyone else, nor to form any opinion as to the merits of the case, until after I finally
submit the case to you.

IDJI 1.03.1

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTHER
5
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DEFENDANTS' INSTRUCTION NO. 5
Whether a party has insurance is not relevant to any of the questions you are to decide.
You must avoid any inference, speculation or discussion about insurance.

IDJI 1.04

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTHER
6
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DEFENDANTS' INSTRUCTION NO. 6
Any statement by me identifying a claim of a party is not evidence in this case. I have
advised you of the claims of the parties merely to acquaint you with the issues to be decided.

IDJI 1.05

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTHER
7
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DEFENDANTS' INSTRUCTION NO. 7
In deciding this case, you may not delegate any of your decisions to another or decide any

question by chance, such as by the flip of a coin or drawing of straws. If money damages are to
be awarded or percentages of fault are to be assigned, you may not agree in advance to average
the sum of each individual juror's estimate as the method of determining the amount of the
damage award or percentage of negligence.

IDJI 1.09

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTHER

8
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DEFENDANTS' INSTRUCTION NO. 8

If it becomes necessary during your deliberations to communicate with me, you may send
a note signed by OJ?.e or more of you to the bailiff. You should not try to communicate with me
by any means other than such a note.
During your deliberations, you are not to reveal to· anyone how the jury stands on any of
the questions before you, numerically or otherwise, unless requested to do so by me.

IDJI 1.11

I
GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTHER

9
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DEFENDANTS' INSTRUCTION NO. 9
I have given you the rules of law that apply to this case. I have instructed you regarding
matters that you may consider in weighing the evidence to determine the facts. In a few minutes
counsel will present their closing arguments to you and then you will retire to the jury room for
your deliberations.
Each of you has an equally important voice in the jury deliberations. Therefore, the
attitude and conduct of jurors at the beginning of the deliberations are important. At the outset of
deliberations, it is rarely productive for a juror to make an emphatic expression of opinion on the
case or to state how he or she intends to vote. When one does that at the beginning, one's sense
of pride may be aroused and there may be reluctance to change that position, even if shown that it
is V\!I'ong. Remember that you are not partisans or advocates, but you are judges. For you, as for
me, there can be no triumph except in the ascertainment and declaration of the truth.
Consult with one another. Consider each other's views. Deliberate with the objective of
reaching an agreement, if you can do so without disturbing your individual judgment. Each of
you must decide this case for yourself; but you should do so only after a discussion and
consideration of the case with your fellow jurors.

IDJI 1.13

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED·
OTHER
10
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DEFENDANTS' INSTRUCTION NO. 10
Members of the Jury: In order to return a verdict, it is necessary that at least three-fourths
of the jury agree. Your verdict must represent the considered judgment of each juror agreeing to
it.

It is your duty, as jurors, to consult with one another and to deliberate with a view to

reaching an agreement, if you can do so without violence to individual judgment. Each of you
must decide the case for yourself, but do so only after an impartial consideration of the evidence
with your fellow jurors. In the course of your deliberations, do not hesitate to reexamine your
own views and change your opinion if-convinced it is erroneous. But do not surrender your
honest conviction as to the weight or effect of evidence solely because of the opinion of your
fellow jurors, or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict.
You are not partisans. You are judges - judges of the facts. Your sole interest is to
ascertain the truth from the evidence in the case.

IDJI 1.13.1

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTHER
11
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DEFENDANTS' INSTRUCTION NO. 11
On retiring to the jury room, select one of your number as a foreperson, who will preside
over your deliberations.
An appropriate form of verdict will be submitted to you with any instructions. Follow the

directions on the verdict form, and answer all of the questions required of you by the instructions
on the verdict form.
A verdict may be reached by three-fourths of your number, or nine of you. As soon as
nine or more of you shall have agreed upon each of the required questions in the verdict, you
should fill it out as instructed, and have It signed. It is not necessary that the same nine agree on
each question. If your verdict is unanimous, your foreperson alone will sign it; but if nine or
more, but less than the entirejury, agree, then those so agreeing will sign the verdict.
As soon as you have completed and signed the verdicts, you will notify the bailiff, who
will then return you into open court.

IDJI 1.15.2 (modified-gender neutral)
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DEFENDANTS' INSTRUCTION NO. 12
You have now completed your duties as jurors in this case and are discharged with the
sincere thanks of this Court. You may now discuss this case with the attorneys or with anyone
else. For your guidance, I instruct you that whether you talk to the attorneys, or to anyone else, is
entirely your own decision. It is proper for you to discuss this case, if you want to, but you are
not required to do so, and you may choose not to discuss the case with anyone at all. If you
choose to talk to someone about this case, you may tell them as much or as little as you like
about your deliberations or the facts that influenced your decisions. If anyone persists in
discussing the case over your objection, or becomes critical of your service, either before or after
any discussion has begun, you may report it to me.

IDJI 1.17
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DEFENDANTS' INSTRUCTION NO. 13
When I say that a party has the burden of proof on a proposition, or use the expression "if
you find" or "if you decide," I mean you must be persuaded that the proposition is more probably
true than not true.

mn 1.20.1
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DEFENDANTS' INSTRUCTION NO. 14
Certain evideni;e is about to be presented to you by deposition. A deposition is testimony
taken under oath before. the trial and preserved in writing and upon video tape. This evidence is
entitled to the same consideration you would give had the witness testified from the witness
stand. You will only receive this testimony in open court. Although there is a record of the
testimony you are about to hear, this record will not be available to you during your deliberations.

IDJI 1.22
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DEFENDANTS' INSTRUCTION NO. 15
Evidence may be either direct or circumstantial. Direct evidence is evidence that directly
proves a fact. Circumstantial evidence is evidence that indirectly proves the fact, by proving one
or more facts from which the fact at issue may be inferred.

The law makes no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence as to the degree
of proof required; each is accepted as a reasonable method of proof and each is respected for
such convincing force as it may carry.

IDJI i.24.2
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DEFENDANTS' INSTRUCTION NO. 16
The plaintiff has the burden of proof on each of the following propositions:
1.

The defendants were negligent.

2.

The plaintiff was injured.

3.

The negligence of the defendants was a proximate cause of the injury to the
plaintiff.

4.

The elements of damage and the amounts thereof.

You will be asked the following question on the jury verdict form:
Was the defendant Mary Steele negligent or was the defendant Amber Steele negligent,
and if so, was their negligence a proximate cause of the injuries to the plaintiff?
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these propositions has
been proved, you should answer this question "Yes." However, if you find that any of these
propositions has not been proved, then the plaintiff has not met the burden of proof required and
you should answer this question "No."

IDJI l.41.4.1

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTHER
17

217 of 348

DEFENDANTS' INSTRUCTION NO. 17
In this case, the defendants have alleged that the plaintiff Stephen Boswell was negligent.

On this defense, the defendants have the burden of proof on each of the following propositions:
1.

The plaintiff Stephen Boswell was negligent.

2.

The negligence of the plaintiff Stephen Boswell was a proximate cause of his own
injuries.

You will be asked the following question on the jury verdict form:
Was the plaintiff S_tephen Boswell negligent, and if so was the his negligence a proximate
cause of his injuries?
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these propositions has
been proved, you should answer this question "Yes." However, if you find that any of these
propositions has not been proved, then the defendants have not met the burden of proof required
and you should answer this question "No."

IDJI 1.41.4.2
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DEFENDANTS' INSTRUCTION NO. 18

In this case, the defendants have alleged that the plaintiff Stephen Boswell provoked
defendant Amber Steele's dog, Zoey. On this defense, the defendants have the burden of proof
on each of the following propositions:
1.

The plaintiff Stephen Boswell provoked Zoey.

2.

The provocation by the plaintiff Stephen Boswell was a proximate cause of his
own injuries.

You will be asked the following question on the jury verdict form:
Did the plaintiff Stephen Boswell provoke Zoey, and if so was his provocation of Zoey a
proximate cause of his injuries?
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these propositions has
been proved, you should answer this question "Yes." However, if you find that any of these
propositions has not been proved, then the defendants have not met the burden of proof required
and you should answer this question "No."
IDJI 1.41.4.2 (modified); Idaho Code Idaho Code §25-2805(2); Pocatello City Code 6.04.0lOA,

Band C; Pocatello City Code 6.04.0SOA
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DEFENDANTS' INSTRUCTION NO. 19
The tenns "provocation," "provoke" or "provoked" are defined as an act by a person who
teases, taunts or approaches an animal in a threatening manner.

Idaho Code §25-2805(2); Pocatello City Code 6.04.0lOA, Band C; Pocatello City Code
6.04.050A
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DEFENDANTS' INSTRUCTION NO. 20

In this case, you will be given a special verdict form to use in returning your verdict. This
form consists of a series of questions that you are to answer. I will read the verdict form to you
now.
We, the Jury, answer the special interrogatories as follows:
Question No. 1: Was the Defendant Mary Steele negligent?
Answer:

Yes- - - No- - -

Question No. 2: Was the Defendant Amber Steele negligent?
If you answered both Questions 1 and 2 "No," you are done. Sign the verdict as·
instructed and advise the Bailiff. If you answer both questions "Yes," continue to the
next question.

Question No. 3: Was the Defendants Mary Steele's and Amber Steele's
negligence the proximate cause of the plaintiff Stephen Boswell's injuries:
Answer:

Yes - -

No - - -

If you answered this question "No," you are done. Sign the verdict as
instructed and advise the Bailiff. If you answered this question "Yes," continue to
the next question.
Question No. 4: Was the plaintiff Stephen Boswell negligent, and if so,
was his negligence a proximate cause of his own injuries?
Answer:

Yes - - -

No - - -

Question No. 5: Did the plaintiff Stephen Boswell provoke the dog Zoey, and, if
so, was his provocation a proximate cause of his own injuries?
Answer:

Yes- - -

No- - -

If you answered "Yes" to Question No. 4 or Question No. 5, answer Question No.6. If
you answered "No" to Question No. 4 and Question No. 5, answer Question No. 7.

Instruction for Question No. 6: You will reach this question if you have
21
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found that defendant Mary Steele and defendant Amber Steele and the plaintiff
Stephen Boswell were negligent or that plaintiff Stephen Boswell provoked the
dog Zoey, which his negligence or provocation caused his injuries. In this
question, you are to apportion the fault between these parties in terms of a
percentage. As to each party or entity to which you answered "Yes" to questions
1 through S, determine the percentage of fault for tha~ party or entity, and enter the
percentage on the appropriate line. If you answered "No" to any of the above
questions, insert a "O" or "Zero" as to that party or entity. Your total percentages
must equal 100%.
Question No. 6: What is the percentage of fault (if any) you assign to each
of the following:
To the Defendant Mary Steele
To the Defendant Amber Steele
To the Plaintiff Stephen Boswell
TOTAL MUST EQUAL

- - - -%
- - - -%
- - - -%
100%

If the percentage of fault you assigned to the plaintiff is equal to or greater
than the percentage of fault you assigned to each defendant, you are done. Sign
the verdict and advise the Bailiff. If the percentage of fault assigned to the
plaintiff is less than the percentage of fault you assigned to each defendant,
answer the next question.
Question No. 7: What is the total amount of damage sustained by the
plaintiff Stephen Boswell as a result of the accident?
Answer: We assess plaintiffs damages as follows:
1.

Economic damages, as defined in the Instructions, for Stephen
Bsowell:
$- - - - - - -

2.

Non-economic damages, as defined in the Instructions, for Stephen
Boswell:
$
------IDJI 1.43.1; Idaho Code §25-2805(2); Pocatello City Code 6.04.0IOA, Band C; Pocatello City
Code 6.04.050A
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON
STEPHEN BOSWELL AND KARENA
BOSWELL,

)
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
)
v.
)
A_MBER DAWN STEELE AND THE ESTATE)
OF MARYE. STEELE,
)
)
)
)
Defendants.

Case No. CV-12-32

SPECIAL VERDICT

We, the Jury, answer the special interro$atories as follows:
Question No. 1: Was the Defendant Mary Steele negligent?
Answer:

Yes- - - No- -

Question No. 2: Was the Defendant Amber Steele negligent?
Answer:

Yes- -

No- -

If you answered both Questions 1 and 2 ''No," you are done. Sign the verdict as
instructed and advise the Bailiff. If you answer both questions "Yes," continue to the next
question.

Question No. 3: Was the Defendants Mary Steele's and Amber Steele's
negligence the proximate cause of the plaintiff Stephen Boswell's injuries:
Answer:

Yes - -

No - -

If you answered this question ''No," you are done. Sign the verdict as
instructed and advise the Bailiff. If you answered this question "Yes," continue to
the next question.

23
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Question No. 4: Was the plaintiff Stephen Boswell negligent, and if so, was
his negligence a proximate cause of his own injuries?
Answer:

Yes - - -

No - - -

Question No. S: Did the plaintiff Stephen Boswell provoke the dog Zoey, and, if so,
was his provocation a proximate cause of his own injuries?
Answer:

Yes.
~--

No- - -

If you answered "Yes" to Question No. 4 or Question No. 5, answer Question No.6. If you
answered "No" to Question No. 4 and Question No. 5, answer Question No. 7.
Instruction for Question No. 6: You will reach this question ifyou have found
that defendant Mary Steele and defendant Amber Steele and the plaintiff Stephen
Boswell were negligent or that plaintiff Stephen Boswell provoked the dog Zoey,
which hiifhegligence or provoc~tion caused his injuries. In this question, you are to
apportion the fault between these parties in terms of a percentage. As to each party
or entity to which you answered "Yes" to questions I through 5, determine the
percentage of fault for that party or entity, and enter the percentage on the appropriate
line. If you answered "No" to any of the above questions, insert a "O" or "Zero" as
to that party or entity. Your total percentages must equal 1000/o.

Question No. 6: What is the percentage of fault (if any) you assign to each of
the following:
To the Defendant Mary Steele
To the Defendant Amber Steele
To the Plaintiff Stephen Boswell
TOTAL MUST EQUAL

- - - -%
- - - -%
- - - -%
100%

If the percentage of fault you assigned to the plaintiff is equal to or greater
than the percentage of fault you assigned to each defendant, you are done. Sign the
verdict and advise the Bailiff. If the percentage of fault assigned to the plaintiff is
less than the percentage of fault you assigned to each defendant, answer ·the next
question.

Question No. 7: What is the total amom1t of damage sustained by the plaintiff
as a result of the accident?
Answer: We assess plaintiff's damages as follows:
24
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1.

2.

in

Economic damages, as defined
the Instructions, for Stephen
$
Bsowell:
------Non-economic damages, as defined mthe Instructions, for Stephen
$
·
Boswell:

FOREPERSON

IDJI 1.43. I; Idaho Code §25-2805(2); Pocatello City Code 6.04.01 OA, Band C; Pocatello City Code
6.04.050A

GIVEN_ _ __
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OTHER,___ _ __
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DEFENDANTS' INSTRUCTION NO. 21
It was the duty of both plaintiff and defendants, before and at the time of the occurrence, to
use ordinary care for the safety of themselves.

IDJI 2.00.2
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DEFENDANTS' INSTRUCTION NO. 22
When I use the word 11 negligence11 in these instructions, I mean the failure to use ordinary
care in the management of one's property or person. The words "ordinary care" mean the care a
reasonably careful person would use under circumstances similar to those shown by the evidence.
Negligence may thus consist of the failure to do something which a reasonably careful person would
do, or the doing of something a reasonably careful person would not do, under circumstances similar
to those shown by the evidence. The law does not say how a reasonably careful person would act
under those circumstances. That is for you to decide.

IDJI2.20
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DEFENDANTS' INSTRUCTION NO. 23
When I use the expression "proximate cause," I mean a cause that, in natural or probable
sequence, produced the injury, the loss or the damage complained of. It need not be the only cause.
It is sufficient if it is a substantial factor in bringing about the injury, loss or damage. It is not a

proximate cause if the injury, loss or damage likely would have occurred anyway.
There may be one or more proximate causes ofan injury. When the negligent conduct oftwo
or more persons or entities contributes concurrently as substantial factors in bringing about an injury,
the conduct of each may be a proximate cause of the injury regardless of the extent to which each
contributes to the injury.

IDJI 2.30.2
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DEFENDANTS' INSTRUCTION NO. 24
If the jury decides the plaintiff Stephen Boswell is entitled to recover from the defendants,

the jury must determine the amount of money that will reasonably and fairly compensate the plaintiff
for any damages proved to be proximately caused by the defendant's negligence.
The elements of damage the jury may consider are:
A.

B.

Non-economic damages:
1.

The nature.of the injuries;

2.

The physical and mental pain and suffering, past and future;

3.

The impairment of abilities to perform usual activities;

4.

The disfigurement caused by the injuries;

5.

The aggravation caused to any preexisting condition.

Economic damages:
The reasonable value of necessary medical care received and expenses incurred as

a result of the injury.
Whether the plaintiff Stephen Boswell has proved any of these elements is for the jury to
decide.
IDJI 9.0l(modified)
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DEFENDANTS' INSTRUCTION NO. 25
A person who has been damaged must exercise ordinary care to minimize the damage and
prevent further damage. Any loss that results from a failure to exercise such care cannot· be
recovered.

IDil 9.14
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DEFENDANTS' INSTRUCTION NO. 26
In this action, Defendants Mary Steele and Amber St~ele claim the following:
On October 8, 2011, Plaintiff Stephen Boswell drove Defendant Mary Steele to her home
from his and PlaintiffKarena Boswell's home. Amber Steele resided at Mary Steele's home but was
not home at the time.
Both Mr. Boswell and Mary Steele entered her home. Mary Steele turned to close the door
to the home, while Mr. Boswell went to the kitchen. Defendant Amber Steele's dog, Zoey, and
Mary's pet Shih Tzu were in the kitchen, behind a gate. Zoey was barking and growling. Mr.
Boswell approached the gate, and as he did, he put his hand, in a closed fist, toward Zoey, and was
bitten. At all times, Zoey was behind the gate in the kitchen.
Defendants Mary Steele and Amber Steele believe that Mr. Boswell was either negligent in
approaching Zoey with a closed fist, while she was barking and growling, or that he provoked her,
either of which caused Zoey to bite him.
Former IDJI 104 (modified)

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTHER

31

231 of 348

DEFENDANTS' INSTRUCTION NO. 27
The owner or occupant owes a duty to warn a licensee only of dangerous existing hazards
on the land that were known to the owner or occupant and unknown to and not reasonably
discoverable by the licensee. The owner or occupant owes a duty to exercise ordinary care to avoid
exposing persons on the premises to an unreasonable risk of harm.

IDJI 3.15
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DEFENDANTS' INSTRUCTION NO. 28
A licensee is a person who goes upon the premises of another in pursuit of the visitor's
purpose, with the consent of the owner. The consent of the ·owner may be implied· from the
circumstances under which the visitor enters the premises.

IDJI 3.15.1.
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DEFENDANTS' INSTRUCTION NO. 29
The owner owes no duty to a trespasser whose presence on the premises is unknown or could
not reasonably have been anticipated. But, if the presence of the trespasser becomes known or
reasonably could have been anticipated, the owner has a duty not to injure the trespasser by any
intentional or reckless act.

IDJI 3.19.
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DEFENDANTS' INSTRUCTION NO. 30
A trespasser is a person who goes or remains upon the premises of another without
permission, invitation or lawful authority. Permission or invitation may be express or implied.
DJI 3.19.1.
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1N THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
STEPHEN BOSWELL and KARINA BOSWELL, )
)
husband and wife,
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)

v.

Case No. CV-2012-4120-PI

SPECIAL VERDICT

)

)
AMBER STEELE and THE ESTATE OF MARY )
STEELE,
)
)
Defendants.
)

We, the Jury, answer the special interrogatories as follows:
Question No. 1: Was the Defendant Mary Steele negligent?
Answer:

Yes- - - No- - -

Question No. 2: Was the Defendant Amber Steele negligent?
Answer:

Yes- - -

No- - -

If you answered both Questions 1 and 2 "No," you are done. Sign the verdict as
instructed and advise the Bailiff. If you answer both questions "Yes," continue to the next
question.
Question No. 3: Was the Defendants Mary Steele's and Amber Steele's
negligence the proximate cause of the plaintiff Stephen Boswell's injuries:
Answer:

Yes - -

No - - -

If you answered this question "No," you are done. Sign the verdict as
instructed and advise the Bailiff. If you answered this question "Yes," continue to
the next question.

SPECIAL VERDICT - PAGE 1
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Question No. 4: Was the plaintiff Stephen Boswell negligent, and if so, was
his negligence a proximate cause ofhls own injuries?
Answer:

Yes - - -

No - - -

Question No. 5: Did the plaintiff Stephen Boswell provoke the dog Zoey, and, if so,
was his provocation a proximate cause of his own injuries?
Answer:

Yes- - -

No- - -

If you answered "Yes" to Question No. 4 or Question No. 5, answer Question No.6. If you
answered "No" to Question No. 4 and Question No. 5, answer Question No. 7.
Instruction for Question No. 6: You will reach this question ifyou have found
that defendant Mary Steele and defendant Amber Steele and the plaintiff Stephen
Boswell were negligent or that plaintiff Stephen Boswell provoked the dog Zoey,
which his negligence or provocation caused his injuries. In this question, you are to
apportion the fault between these parties in terms of a percentage. As to each party
or entity to which you answered "Yes" to questions 1 through 5, determine the
percentage of fault for that party or entity, and enter the percentage on the appropriate
line. If you answered "No" to any of the above questions, insert a "0" or "Zero" as
to that party or entity. Your total percentages must equal 100%.

Question No. 6: What is the percentage of fault (if any) you assign to each of
the following:
To the Defendant Mary Steele
To the Defendant Amber Steele
To the Plaintiff Stephen Boswell
TOTAL MUST EQUAL

- - - -%
- - - -%

- - - -%
100%

If the percentage of fault you assigned to the plaintiff is equal to or greater
than the percentage of fault you assigned to each defendant, you are done. Sign the
verdict and advise the Bailiff. If the percentage of fault assigned to the plaintiff is
less than the percentage of fault you assigned to each ·defendant, answer the next
question.
Question No. 7: What is the total amount of damage sustained by the plaintiff
as a result of the accident?
Answer: We assess plaintiff's damages as follows:
SPECIAL VERDICT· PAGE 2
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1.

Economic damages, as defined in the Instructions, for Stephen
Bsowell:
$- - - - - - -

2.

Non-economic damages, as defined in the Instructions, for Stephen
$- - - - - - Boswell:

FOREPERSON

DATED this_ day of January, 2016.
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED

By_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

~

REED W. LARSEN

SPECIAL VERDICT- PAGE 3
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Reed W. Larsen (34 2 7)
Javier L. Gabiola (5448)
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED
151 North 3rd Avenue 2nd Floor
'
P.O. Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229
Telephone: (208) 235-1145
Facsimile: (208) 235-1182

IN THE DISTR1CT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
STEPHEN BOSWELL and KARINA BOSWELL,)
husband and wife,
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
v.
)
)
AMBER STEELE and MARY STEELE,
)

Case No. CV-2012-4120-PI

DEFENDANTS'SECOND
SUPPLEMENTAL PROPOSED JURY
INSTRUCTIONS

)
Defendants.

)

COME NOW Defendants, by and through undersigned counsel, pursuant to the Court's
Scheduling Order, Notice of Trial Setting and Initial Pretrial Order, dated June 9, 2015, and I.R.C.P.
51 (a), and submit their requested second supplemental jury instructions, No. 33.
DATED this,o..,I{ day of January, 2016.
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED

DEFENDANTS'S SUPPLEMll.:NTAL PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - PAGE

1
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

d/

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of January, 2016, I served a true and correct
copy of the above and foregoing document to the following person(s) as follows:
Kent A. Higgins
Merrill & Merrill, Chartered
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991
Richard A. Hearn
Hearn & Wood, LLC
1906 Jennie Lee Drive
Idaho Falls, ID 83404

[J

U.S. MaH/Postage Prepaid

[V-

Hand Delivery

[J

[]

Overnight Mail
Facsimile\ 232-2499

[]
[~
[]
[]

U,S. Mail/Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivery
Overnight Mail
Facsimile\ 932-4380

(/
NOTE: one duplicate copy of all motions, and any opposition thereto, together with supporting
memorandum, affidavits and documents, and trial brief, shall be emailed to
brandvp@bannockcountv.us

DEFENDANTS'S SUPPLEMENTAL PROPOSIW ,JURY INSTRUCTIONS - PAGE

2

240 of 348

DEFENDANTS' INSTRUCTION NO. 33

The conduct of an animal shall not be deemed dangerous if the person was committing a tort
against the animal's owner/custodian, or committing a trespass or other tort on the premises of
the animal's owner/custodian. Specifically prohibited are the following acts:
1. If unprovoked by teasing, taunting, or a threatening manner by any person,
approaching said person in an apparent attitude of attack upon the streets, sidewalks, public
grounds or places, common areas within subdivisions or mobile home or recreational vehicle
parks, common grounds of apartment buildings, condominiums, or townhouse developments, or
private property not solely owned or possessed by the owner or custodian of the animal; or
2. Biting, inflicting injury, assaulting, or otherwise attacking a human being without
justifiable provocation.

Pocatello City Code 6.04.050A(modified)
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TflPr'...~

[''' ., ..:...~ ....,.,.,,................. ,,....,,,
)tJ"'U 1 l" CLE r(t(
..
,'

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

STEPHEN BOSWELL, ETAL. ,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case.No:

CV-2012-0004120-PI

MINUTE ENTRY & ORDER

AMBER DAWN STEELE, ETAL.,
Defendant.
The above entitled matter came before this Court on the 18TH day of January,
2016, for a Jury Trial. The Plaintiff appeared by and through counsel, Kent Higgins and
Richard Hearn. The Defendant appeared by and through counsel, Reed Larsen and Javier
Gabiola.
At 9:30 a.m. Court convened. The Court introduced the case, court personnel,
and counsel to the prospective jury panel.
The deputy clerk took role of the jury panel. The following jurors were called,
sworn and seated:
1. Tamara Lish

2. Casey McCarty
3. Stacie Campbell
4. Gustave Kemdt
S. Karen Appleby
6. Angela Rodgers
7. Jaydee Olsen
8. Florencio Catorena
9. Kallie Johns
10. Sara Teferra
11. Kirsten Bringhurst
Minute Entry and Order
CV-2013-4011 OC
Page I

12. Jeff Hall
13. Brian Bader
14. Alexis Wilks
15. Lacy Orgill
16. Shaun Gregersen
17. Cameron Loper
18. Ellen Smith
19. Tanner Tingey
20. Florida Garcia
21. David Webster
22. Nadene Dutson
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23. Denise Ogden
Cameron Loper was excused for cause and Kylee Pennann was called to fill the
vacancy. Kylee Pennann was excused for cause and Larry Ward was called to fill the
vacancy. Angela Rodgers was excused for cause and Wende Leavitt was called to fill the
vacancy. The Court passed.the panel to Plaintiffs counsel Richard Heam, to examine
them on voir dire. Denise Ogden was excused for cause and Gregory Tomich was called
to fill the vacancy. Defendant's counsel Reed Larsen questioned the panel.
The panel was passed for cause. Counsel each exercised their peremptory
challenges. The following jurors were called to try this matter and administered an oath:
1. Casey McCarty
2. Karen Appleby
3. Wende Leavitt
4. Jaydee Olsen
5. Kallie Johns
6. Sara Teferra
7. Brian Bader

8. Larry Ward
9. Ellen Smith
10. Tanner Tingey
11. Florida Garcia
12. Nadene Dutson
13. Gregory Tomich

The Courttecessed for lunch at 12:30 p.m. Court reconvened at 1:45 p.m
The Court read jury instructions 1 through 8. Mr. Heam presented opening statements.
Mr. Larsen presented opening statements.

Mr. Hearn called his first witness, Stephen Boswell who was administered an oath and
testified. Mr. Hearn conducted direct examination. Plaintiffs exhibits #101, 102, 103, 104, 105,
106, 107, 108 and 109 were admitted without objection. Mr. Larsen conducted cross examination
of the witness. The Defendant's deposition was published by the Court. Redirect examination
was conducted and the witness was excused. Mr. Hearn then called Karena Boswell who was
administered an oath and testified. Mr. Heam conducted direct examination of the witness. Mr.
Larsen conducted cross examination of the witness. Redirect examination was conducted and the
Minute Entry and Order
CV-2013-4011 OC
Page2
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witness was excused.
The Court adjourned for the day at 4:32 p.m.
At 9:10 a.m., Wednesday, January 20, 2016 Court reconvened. Counsel waived roll call
of the jury. The Court read instruction #7 regarding the reading of depositions to the jury. The
Court then published the deposition of Chris Kettler and portions were read for the record. The
Court then published the deposition of Mary Steele and portions were read for the record. The
Court took a morning recess at 9:45 a.m.
Upon reconvening, Mr. Heam called his next witness, Dr. Jeffrey Stucki who was
administered an oath and testified. Mr. Hearn conducted direct examination. Plaintiffs Exhibits
#110 and #111 were admitted without objection. Mr. Larsen cross examined the witness. Brief
re-direct and re-cross were conducted. Upon completion of testimony the witness was excused
and the Court took a brief recess. Upon reconvening Mr. Hearn called his next witness, Amber
Steele who was administered an oath and testified. Mr. Hearn conducted direct examination. The
Court published the deposition of Amber Steele. Upon completion of direct examination, the
Court recessed for lunch at 11 :35 a.m.
Trial reconvened at 1:05 p.m. outside the presence of the jury. The Court showed counsel
a note he received from juror #9 regarding the height of the gate in this case. The note was
marked as Court Exhibit # 1 and counsel agreed to attempt to answer the question within
testimony. Thy jury returned to the courtroom, roll call of the jury was waived and Mr. Hearn
called Jane Guidinger, who was administered an oath and testified. Mr. Hearn conducted direct
exam of the witness. Mr. Larsen cross examined the witness and Plaintiff rested.
Outside the presence of the jury, the Court heard argument from counsel regarding a
Minute Entry and Order
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Motion for Directed Verdict. After hearing argument, the Court denied the motion.
After a brief recess, Mr. Larsen called his first witness, Amber Steele who was reminded
of her prior oath and testified. Mr. Larsen conducted direct examination of the witness.
Defendant's Exhibit #201, 202, 203 and 204 were offered and admitted without objection. Mr.
Hearn cross-examined Ms. Steele. Additional portions of the deposition of Chris Kettler were
read to the jury. The Court recessed for the day at 2:45 p.m.
Trial reconvened outside the presence of the jury at 8:45 a.m. with the Court hearing brief
argument from coW1sel regarding a potential jury instruction. The Court reserved ruling on the
issue. The jury was returned to the courtroom at 9:06 a.m. Mr. Larsen recalled Amber Steele who
was reminded of her oath and testified. Mr. Larsen conducted direct examination. Defendant's
Exhibits #208 and #209 were marked and admitted without objection. The witness was excused.
Mr. Larsen then called Dr. Julia Alpert who was administered an oath and testified.
Direct and cross examination were conducted by counsel and the witness was excused. Mr.
Larsen called his next witness Joanna Hugues who was administered an oath and testified
briefly. The video deposition of Mary Steele was then played for the jury. At the conclusion of
the video, the Defendant rested.
Plaintiff then recalled Ms. Guidinger as a rebuttal witness, who was reminded of her oath
and testified. Direct and cross examination was conducted of the witness. Plaintiff recalled
Karena Boswell who was reminded of her oath and briefly testified. When the witness was
excused, the Plaintiff rested.
Mr. Larsen then recalled Amber Steele as a sur-rebuttal witness and again rested.
Evidence concluded at 11 :40 a.m. and the jury was excused for lunch.
Minute Entry and Order
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The Court then conducted a jury instruction conference with counsel on the record. Trial was
vacated for the remainder of the day due to a bomb threat in the building and the need for being
evacuated.
Trial reconvened Friday, January 22, 2016 at 9:25 a.m. outside the presence of the jury
for final argument regarding jury instructions.
The jury was brought before the Court again at 9:47 a.m. and the Court read instructions
#9 through #26 to the jury. Each counsel gave closing arguments. The name of one juror was
drawn, Sara Teferra, to be the alternate juror.
The deputy clerk was instructed to administer an oath to the Court Marshall and the same
was done. At 11 :27 a.m., the jury retired and the Court recessed.
**During the course of deliberations, the jury sent out the following questions to the
Court:
1. If we find a breech occurred, but Eco was in part at fault for any reason, can we split
any damages or provide relief to the defendant?
Answer: No, Please refer to the damages instructions.
Jury deliberations continued witil 1:00 p.m. when the Court was informed a verdict had

been reached. The Court reconvened and asked the foreman, Karen Appleby if they had in fact
reached a verdict. Foreman, Karen Appleby, acknowledged that they.had reached a verdict.
The Court asked the deputy clerk to read the Special Verdict form and the same was
done.
We, the Jury, answer the special interrogatories as follows:
Minute Entry and Order
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Question No. 1: Was the Defendant Mary Steele negligent, and if so, was her
negligence a proximate cause of Plaintiff Stephen Boswell's injuries?
Answer:

Yes- - - No_X__

Question No. 2: Was the Defendant Amber Steele negligent, and if so, was her
negligence a proximate cause of Plaintiff Stephen Boswell's injuries?
Answer:

Yes- - -

No_X__

If you answered both Questions 1 and 2 No, you are done. Sign the verdict as
instructed and advise the Bailiff. If you answer either questions Yes, continue to the next
question.
The Court asked if counsel would like the jury panel polled, and counsel
answered in the negative. The Court then thanked the jurorsfor their service.
-Counsel was instructed by the Court to prepare an appropriate Judgment for the Court's review and signature.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this

day of January, 2016.

~Ii~()
WILLIAM H WOODLAND
District Judge

~
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _ _ day of January, 2016, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document upon each of the following individuals in the
manner indicated.

Kent A. Higgins
Merrill & Merrill Chrtd
P0Box991
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991

0U.S.Mail
~ E-Mail
D Hand Deliver

Reed Larsen
Cooper & Larsen
P0Box4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229

0U.S.Mail
~E-Mail
D Hand Deliver

0Fax:

0Fax:

Robert Poleki
CLERK OF THE COURT

By:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Deputy Clerk
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STEPHEN BOSWELL AND KARENA

l!2

CaseNo.CV-2012·~\}J

BOSWELL,

)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
V.
)
)
AMBER DAWN S1EELE AND THE ESTA1E)
OF MARYE. STEELE,
)
)
)
Defendants.
)

P/1 ,
·. ·_· /.3<

--~~
SPECIAL VERDICT

, .

)

We, the Jury, answer the special interrogatories as follows:
Question No, 1: Was the Defendant Mary Steele negligent, and if so, was her
negligence a proximate cause of Plaintiff Stephen Boswell's injuries?
Answer:

Yes___ No

V

Question No. 2: Was the Defendant Amber Steele negligent, and if so, was her
negligence a proximate cause of Plaintiff Stephen Boswell's injuries?
Answer:

Yes_ _

No

V

If you answered both Questions 1 and 2 No, you are done. Sign the verdict as
instructed and advise the Bailiff. If you answer either questions Yes, continue to the next
question.
Question No. 3: Was the plaintiff Stephen Boswell negligent, and if so,
was his negligence a proximate cause of his own injuries?
Answer:

Yes

No

Question No. 4: Did the plaintiff Stephen Boswell provoke the dog Zoey, and, if
so, was his provocation a proximate cause of his own injuries?
Answer:

Yes___

No_ __

If you answered Yes to Question No. 3 or Question No. 4, answer Question No. 5. If you
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··- -... -- . . --- -- ., ....... ----· found that defendant Mary Steele and/or defendant Amber Steele and the plaintiff
Stephen Boswell were negligent or that plaintiff Stephen Boswell provoked the
dog Zoey. In this question, you are to apportion the fault between these parties in
terms of a percentage. As to each party or entity to which you answered Yes to
questions 1 through 4, determine the percentage of fault for that party or entity,
and enter the percentage on the appropriate line. If you answered No to any of the
above questions, insert a "O" or Zero as to that party or entity. Your total
percentages must equal 100%.
Question No. 5: What is the percentage of fault (if any) you assign to each
of the following:

- - - -%
-_
-%
___
%

To the Defendant Mary Steele
To the Defendant Amber Steele
To the Plaintiff Stephen Boswell
TOTAL MUST EQUAL

100%

If the percentage of fault you assigned to the plaintiff is equal to or greater
than the percentage of fault you assigned to each defendant, you are done. Sign
the verdict and advise the Bailiff. If the percentage of fault assigned to the
plaintiff is less than the percentage of fault you assigned to each defendant,
answer the next question.
Question No. 6: What is the total amount of damage sustained by the
plaintiff as a result of the accident?
Answer: We assess plaintiff's damages as follows:
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2.

Non-economic damages, as defined in the Instructions, for
Stephen Boswell:

V
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P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991
(208) 232-2286
(208) 232-2499 Telefax
ISB#: 3025
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
STEPHEN BOSWELL and KARINA
BOSWELL, husband and wife,

)
)
)

Case No. C:V-12-4120 OC

Plaintiff,

)
)
)

IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR

AMBER STEELE,
MARY STEELE,

)
)
)
)
)
)

Defendants.

AFFIDAVIT OF TAMARA ANDERSEN
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Bannock

:ss
)

Tamara Andersen, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:

1.

I make this Affidavit upon information and belief.

2.

I have been working in the profession of care and control of dogs for at least twenty

3.

I spent two years as an Animal Control Officer of Lee County, Ft. Myers, Florida

4.

I then served as the Executive Director of the Humane Society in Ft. Myers, Florida,

years.

for three year.s.
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6.

I am nationally certified by the National Cruelty Investigators School, Levels 1 and

2, by the University ofMissouri Law E1;1forcement Training Institute. These courses train in the fields
of animal behavior, how to approach an animal, how to handle animals safely, how to assess animal
behavior and how to detennine if an animal is injured or frightened . I am also certified nationally
in course 3 in dealing with animal attacks.
7.

In my twenty years in the field of animal control, I have encountered on a daily basis,

many domestic dogs and other domestic pets.

8.

I spoke with Amber Steele on October 8, 2011, regarding the bite received by Stephen

Boswell.
9.

At the time we spoke, Amber told me that her dog (Zoey) had never bitten anyone in

the past.
10.

I have reviewed the Affidavit of Chris Kettler.

11.

The incident described in the Affidavit of Chris Kettler constitutes, in my opinion, a

previous bite.
12.

Had Amber Steele been honest with me about the Chris Kettler incident, she would

have been cited with a dangerous dog violation urider Pocatello Municipal Ordinance 6.04.050A(2).
13.

Based on my experience with domestic dogs, it is my opinion that it is unnatural

behavior for a dog to bite and injure someone under the circumstances described in Ms. Kettler's
Affidavit.
14.

Such behavior is not onlywmatural for a domestic animal, but it is also considered

dangerous when the bite is sufficient to wound or draw blood.
15.

The willingness for a dog to bite a human in the fashion explained in the Affidavit of

Chris Kettler is, in my opinion, a dangerous propensity on the part of the dog, Zoey.
16.

I'have also reviewed the deposition of Mary Steele, page 6, line 17 - page 7, line 9.

Based on my expertise and experience, there is nothing in that dialogue that would indicate the dog
was provoked.
l 7.

In my opinion, the propensity of Zoey shown in the Affidavit of Chris Kettler is the
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DATED this /Y·/i,...day of January, 2013.

W!.Hf:t~

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this

Jf ~ f January, 2013.

7Jet«1tYIJ.1,...,

kf~

· Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at Pocatello, Idaho
My Commission Expired: / z.-s -17

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, the undersigned, do hereby certify that a true, full and correct copy of the foregoing
document was this NtA day of January, 2013, served upon the following in the manner indicated
below:
Reed W. Larsen
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED
P.O. Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229

[ ---'[
[ ]
[ ]
[. '::

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
OvemightDelivery
Tel
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WILLIAM H. WOODLAND, DISTRlCT JUDGE
Brandy Peck, Deputy Clerk
Court Reporter

CASE NO.: CV~'.2012-4120-Pl,, ; ..-

~.t).: !.:i,W,; /
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CASE: BOSWELL v. STEELE, et al
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Photographs of the kitchen and gate of
Mary Steele's home (previously
stipulated to by Plaintiffs)
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Photographs of the kitchen and gate of
Mary Steele's home (previously
stipulated to by Plaintiffs)
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1?..o

1

Photographs ofMary Steele's home and
Zoey (previously stipulated to by
Plaintiffs)

'!10

204

Photograph of Zoey (previously
stipulated to by Plaintiffs)
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205

Report of Dr. Julia Alpert

206

Affidavit of Stephen Boswell in
Objection to Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment

207

Field Activity Report dated I0/8/2011
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833 North 12th Avenue
_Pocatello, Idaho 83201
208-233-6840

October 13, 2015
To Whom It May Cpncem:
This letter is in regards to :Afnber Steele's dog "Zoey," who at this tune is a 9 year old
spayed female Scottish Terrier. "Zoey" bit Stepl:i.en Boswell on October· 8, ·2011. There
is SOIDE! debate as to whether or not" "Zoey" is a viofous dog, My n~ is Dt. Jul~a:
Alpert.. I graduated from veterinary school with a cm;nbined DVM -degree from Oregon
· State University and Wa~gton State University in· May 2007. t received a .
.Bachelor's of Science in-P:sychology from the Univ~'/;ity ofVtah in May of i998.
While at Washington State University, I.wotked.at th~ Arum.a.I Behavior: s~rvice section
·of the vet school :from Spring of 1999 to .Spring of2~1. th.ave worked as a stnall .
animal veterinarian in p:n,vate practice since gra~uating from vet school, and have
owned Community Animal Hospital in Pocatello, ID since March 2001. I hav~ been a
member of the Pocatello Kennel Club since 20 I 0, have served on the board since 2011
and have been the show· ch~r-for that organiz~ti9n since :?,'013.

of

· My first interaction with ~·zoey'' Steele was on October 18th, .2011 for a rabies
vaccinatj.on and a City of Pocatello healtli clearan~: Ms. Steele requested that we

muzzle "Zoey," as sh~ was upderstand,ably nervous after therinjury to Mr. Boswell.
· Subsequently, I have seeµ. "Zoet' on November·6, 2012, January 10,~2014, October 27,
. 201~. February 13, 20 ls ·and September 17, 2015. "Ztiey" .has."not exhibited overtly
· vicious behavior during any ofmy interactions with her. During hervisits;~.will
often place a muzzle on hetr after her oral exam, but it is pl!l,ced more as a: predaution
· than in reaction to oyert"beha.vior on "Zoey's" part. Knowledge that we are working
with her dog as safely as we can also helps Ms. Steele's peace of mind.
.

I have thoroughly. read the dispositions of Mary and Amber Steele. From their
descriptions it sounds like Mr. Bo~ell put his hand over the baby gate they used to·
confine "Zoey" in the kitchen while she was barking and growling. The ba:by gate was
· apparently used to prevent inappropriate urination in the other dog and to ens~e "t4at

"Zoe;,'' was adequately conta,ined in case the front door was ~pened so she couldn't ·get
· out unexpectedly. They also tot>k steps to ensure the y!Jrd was completely fenced, at1d
had "Beware of Dog:" si,ms clearlv nm:te.rl. ont!<:irfo thfl wmi .
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adeq~atety co~olled ~d ~~ bred to. kilifoxes ~d badgers. F~o~ the description in
their dep_ositions, it 'So~ds ."l-S though Mary and Amber S~eele were' taking adequ~e
·precautions· in either housing "Zoey" downstairs in the basement; behip.d a secure
·enclosure she was unable. to jump over or in a secure.ly fenced ba.ckya,rd. From the
d~scriptions in the depositio~, Mr. Boswell approached the battier that.was used to
·conpne "ZoeY." and willingly placed his hand in her v.icinity. In Ka.en.Overall's (a
. noted veterinary behavioral expert) ·book Clinical Behavioral Medicine for 'Sm,all
Animals; she notes " .. :a qormal, nonthreatening, non-provoking human behavior m,ay
be perceived by the dog as provocative." An example of such-hum.an behavior could
be approaching the dQg tiyer the _top of a barrier·whirih it i~ protecting and putting a
hand over the top of a. dog's head.. She further states that: "Dog owners must not be
misled by the myth of the "tail-wagging dog"; a wagging tail is only an indication of
willingness to interact. A dog -tliat"is standing rigid, ~air up, esars back, barking.
growling, baring its teeth.and wagging. its tail will p~ very willing to interact in an
extremely aggressive mano.er, giyen· the appropriate' Que or. st4nu.lus." It sounds very
likely that Mr. Boswell co1.~ld have n,tlsread the cues "Zoey''
giving.

was

so

While it is veryunfortuna,te fot all.involved in this case that Mr. Bosvyell was bitten
. severely by "Zoey," this :""as the first.reported bite on h~ _re~9fd. In my profe~ion, I

certainly e:licounte; vicious dogs; I Edso enco~ter (a far larger number) dogs who.bite
eXperience, every.dog is
once a certain threshoid of negij.tiVe stimulus is reached. J;n
.dangerous and has the C!lPa'oility of l;iiting; some just reach that point sooner than
others. During my interactions with "Zoey" at.the clinic, an experience fraught with
negative stimuli for most dogs;,she 'has neyer acted aggressively or viciously. Labeling
her as such, in my expert epinion, is ·not wa.rr~ted b'y my assessment of the depositions
or ·my numerous persona~ experieo.ces with her;

my

Sine~~~~~~

Dr.f/itmtx:J·
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MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED
109 North Arthur - 5th Floor
P.0.Box 991
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991
(208) 232-2286

(208) 232-2499 Telefax
·ISB#: 3025

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

STEPHEN BOSWELL and KARENA
BOSWELL, husband and wife,

)

Plaintiff,

)

AMBER STEELE,

MARY STEELE,
Defendants.

)
)

Case No. CV-12-4120 OC

)
)
)

AFFIDAVIT OF STEPHEN BOSWELL
IN OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY

)
)
)

JUDGMENT

)
)

STATE OF IDAHO
:ss
County of Bannock
Stephen Boswell, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
1.

I make this Affidavit in response to the ac:cusations of defense that I approached the

dog Zoey with my first.
2.

I approached the dog with the back ofmy hand, not my fist.

3.

As you can see from the attached picture o,f where Zoe took offthe back ofmy hand,

it was the back of my hand, not my fist with which I approached the dog.
4.

My fingers were curled, lightly, because i:t is my understanding that one is to approach

dogs without the fingers exposed.
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DATED this 1.;i.dday of July, 2013.
Stepnen Boswell
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Notary Public for Idaho
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Residing at Pocatello, Idaho ,·
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE .
I, the undersigned, do hereby certify that a true, full and correct copy of the foregoing
document was this..23,_ day of July.2013, served upon the following in the manner indicated below:

Reed W. Larsen
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED
P.O. Box 4229

[

J/U.S. Mail

[

]

[ vJ Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

Pocatello, ID 83205-4229
[ ~

.Jent A.
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Call Desc, !DOG BITE #2011-12

Activity

CaUCodes~~

Di!IP,By ~
Dispatched .=ho=,oa=12=0...
11__,j,...ls-:43
___

:00P
__M---.

Off.~

Complainant

Responded 110/08/2011

UFName

Backup Off,

Off;

FDllow-Up

Off.

Completed

Off.

12.oa

Phone

I

;;==----------------,

Address

AptJUnlt
City I St IPOCATELLO

=:J -~

Zip Cade

Map Area

Orv. Uc.
cantactYN

H6:12:llOPM

Off.-~

Clear Cade-~

OWner

~.,..,H,AM
__-~E_R_ _ __Jf[J

DOB

Comment

1

Dispatch To
~,1-,,-s-v_E_R_D_U_G_O__---------'"·.....,-_[-

Address
Apt.lUnit
City
Zip Code

Map Area

·II§::]

Animal Information
Famliy(DC_eWX)@J·
Mix

I[) -

Breed !TER-SCOTT:
Breed2

Sex(MFU) [ ]

Sp.Ne.(VN) {!J

.I

Pet Nm. "'jz"'O"=E""V--,--,,.----,.,l
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I

IEXPIREl
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6791 _. --
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Victim
Citation Issued·

VF Name

laoSWELL _
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l!iill-1
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Address l585CRl:E

D11le/Tllm1

Apl/Unit

Type(ABCX)

City/St IPOCATELLQ

Zip Cod~ 1aa204
Orv. Lie.
Age~
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I

:I
]

i:

~-

i~

!I
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I
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DOB
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FICI. Rec. ID#

11100801!

Mstr. JD#

~I___1_46...;.,1_3__.51

On 1O/DB/11 I was dispatched to Portneuf ER in response to a report that a dog victim was being
treated at that location. I contacted the victim STEPHEN BOSWEU. and he Informed me that he
went with his wife to her mother's house at 1115 VERDUGO and wlllle there he reached over a
"baby gate" used to contain his wife's nieces dog ZOEY in tile kitchen as the dog is not friendly
with most people. He said he reached ov1:1r In an attempt to pet the dog and It bit hlin ripping a
large piece offlesh from the top of his hand. I asked lo see thewo1.mcl b:Lilhewas ~Eit·to
show to me due to the amount of bleeding. He said that it had been bl!;ie~in·g for civer. s l'loLirs and
had originally gone to one of the clinic.s but they sent him to the ER ttiey Were unable to treat
that type of irJu'Y, He lifted the pad that was covering the wound to his right hand and it
immediately started pouring blood. I was able.to see that (l,e $!<Iii about a 6-7inch circle was
missing from tt1e top of his hands. He told me that DR. WILLS had been In to see him and they
were schedUlil'lS surg1:1ry on 1D/12/11. He told me that he needed physlcal therapy before they
could remove skin from _his upper arm and re~lace the missing skin on the top of his hand.. f did
not photograph the wound b1.1t later I spoke with DR. WILLS amf-he said he normally photographs
most of his cases and would leave a copy at his office lfhe remembers to take the photographs. r
told him di.le to the bleeding I could not expect the vicHm ta \aka the pressure bandage off long
eriough to take the phoiagraph. He said lhat was a wise decision. DR. WILLS told nie that ·
normally he does not like to take photographs of dog bite victims for raw enforcement d_epartrnents
due to all of!he extra paper work it causes him. He told me to can his office on Tuesday and
asked for hlm anc::I if he remembered to take the photographs he would let me know and I could
pick them up. I Informed DR. WILLS thatthere would not be any charges filed In this case that I
wanted the photograph for future reference In case this dog bit a child In the face cir injured
another person. He said he fully understood that and did not h~e a problem providing the
photograph if he remembers to take it. I thanked DR. WILLS for calling me about the
photographs.

as

The victim was a Utile upset !IS he felt that his wife's niece should give up her dog.] asked the
viGtlm's wife If there had ever been an io_cldent in the past with t~ls d~. She told me that her niece
keeps the dog contained In the kitchen or _her room and does not allow stranger,s and mpst
relaiives to play with or pet her dog; I asked the victim why ha reachetl-over to pet the dog when
he knew It was not friendly and he said he really did not thJnk the dog would bite him. I advised the
victim that charges would not b8 filed in this case' sin¢e the dog was contained properly and at Its
awn home. The victim and his wife told me that the dog's owner AMBER STEEL!:. would probably
not cQoperate with me, I Informed them that _I woulcfcontact her at w_hlch Ull)e the aog would be
placed under quarantine and if the dog does not have a current rabies v:accinalion a citation would
be Issued. I than.keel them for their cooperation and responde4 to 1115 VERDUGO.
I called STEELE before I left the hospitE!I ai:id sh.e..w.a!ii _veiy, µp~~li:lemanding_'!o Rnowwhy the.
hospital called Animal Control on her dog since her un!)ij_ln law hact_lio buslli"5 bemg:arounc!,her
dog and reaching over the gate that she ~E!E!P!i! ihe .!;log, ~ri_faih_Ejcl with In her grandlnother's
kitchen were she lives. i told STEELE to calm down that it W1iS a slate law that any medical. facility
or doctor was required by lijw lo coritactour agency, I asked herif she was home and she_sald_
she was not that she took her dog and left because she was not going to let-~n1inal Q9n!l"Q!Jafse
her dog. I warned STEELE that If she did not return h_ome with the dog it wc~ld be !!iBl:i.:!Kt ~ f !
contacted the Pocatello Police Department. I advised her !hat the dog could be q11ara11tin.ed. at ~er
home but she would have to return home so that I could obtain the necessary fnformalicm E!ildspeak wfth her about the Incident. I Informed her that I was aware that the dog v.ias where it
should have been and the victim made the choice to reach aver tl:ie gate knowing the dog could
bite. STEELE said she would retum heme and would be there in about 20 minutes.
STEELE arrived at 1115 VERDUGO about 1Ominutes after I got there. I asked to see Iha dog to
be certain It was In her relatives SUV in a crate that she said the doA travels with her in. The doq
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and license Information. The rabies tag was from 2007 and STEELE said that the dog had not
been vaccinated since that time. The City of Pocatello dog license was also expired. 1wrote out
the quarantine order and asked her to read it before signing It. 1also gave her a dangerous dog
code and packet arid strongly urged her to read it. She signed the quarantine order and signed for
the dangerous dog packet. I advised STEELE that I would be Issuing a citation for a rabies
vaccination violation and a City of Pocatello dog license violation. She said she was a student and
had no Idea how to pay the fines. I advised her that she could purchase a city license from me at
this time but she was being charged with the rabies vaccinati011 violation. I told her that since she
was aware that her dog could easily bite she should have kept the dog's vaccinations current.
STEELE gave me her identification and I wrote out and Issued the IDAHO UNIFORM CITATION
for the rabies vaccination violation which she signed far at th!:il time. She was hesitant tc sign It
because she still though she was being charged wilh a dangerous dog violations and tile relative
she was with (another aunt) told her that the citation .... as for a rabies violaflOll only and l'iat she
was not being charged with a dangerous do,g violation, I checked my dangerous dog fist and
STEELE or her dog was not on the 11st. 1warned STEELE tnat If I returned to the shelter and
found that her dog had a history of biting I would return and issue additional .citations. 9TEaE
stated she had .never had a complaint filed against her and she dog had never bitten anyone ln
the past. She showed me tll_at she has been responsible and placed beware of dog signs in her
yard and that she keeps her. dog gated In the kitchen or keeps it In her room. She also said that
when she takes her dog out with her the dog it crated.
I advised her to make an appointment for 10/1 B/11 to get her dog cleared at Community and to
get the dog vaccinated after It Was cleared on that date. I warned her not to get the rabies
vaccination before the quarantine period and the clearance has been done. She said she would
follow my instructions. I thanked her .and thanked her aunt that was there for her help in calming
STEELE down as she was very distraught. 1reminded STEELE that if she did not follow !he
quarantine order the dog would be seized and the quarantine would be completed at the_ shelter.
STEELE said that she would follow the order to the "T". I thanked them both agai.n and cleared the
location. TA
'
11/18/2011 Community faxed over the rabies clearance. I filed under in the bite file and let K3
know via message on clip. DG
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
Stephen Boswell and Karena Boswell,

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No: CV-2012-0004120-PI
Date:

Mary Steele and Amber Steele,

Tuesday, January 19, 2016
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in these instructions to those facts, and in this way to decide the case. Your decision
should be based upon a rational and objective assessment of the evidence. It should
not be based on sympathy or prejudice.
It is my duty to instruct you on the points of law necessary to decide the

case, and it is your duty to follow the law as I instruct. You must consider these
instructions as a whole, not picking out one and disregarding others. The order in
which these instructions are given or the manner in which they are numbered has no
significance as to the importance of any of them. If you do not understand an
instruction, you may send a note to me through the bailiff, and I will try to clarify or
explain the point further.
In determining the facts, you may consider only the evidence admitted in this
trial. This evidence consists of the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits admitted
into evidence, and any stipulated or admitted facts.

While the arguments and

remarks of the attorneys may help you widerstand the evidence and apply the
instructions, what they say is not evidence. If an attorney's argument or remark has
no basis in the evidence, you should disregard it.
The production of evidence in court is governed by rule of law. At times
during the trial, I sustained an objection to a question without permitting the witness
to answer it, or to an offered exhibit without receiving it into evidence. My rulings
are legal matters, and are solely my responsibiHty. You must not speculate as to the
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your decision you may not consider such a question or exhibit or speculate as to
what the answer or exhibit would have shown.

Remember, a question is not ·

evidence and should be considered only as it gives meaning to the answer.
There might be occasions where an objection is made after an answer is
given or a remark is made, and in my ruling on the objection I instruct that the
answer or remark be stricken, or directed that you disregard the answer or remark
and dismiss it from your minds. fu your deliberations, you must not consider such
answer or remark, but must treat it as though you had never heard it.
The law does not require you to believe all of the evidence admitted in the
course of the trial.

As the sole judges of the facts, you must determine what

evidence you believe and what weight you attach to it. In so doing, you bring with
you to this courtroom all of the experience and background of your lives. There is
no magical formula for evaluating testimony.

In your everyday affairs, you

determine for yourselves whom you believe, what you believe and how much
weight you attach to what you are told. The considerations you use in malcing the
more important decisions in your everyday dealings are the same considerations you
should apply in your deliberations in this case.
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During your deliberations, you will be entitled to have with you my
instructions concerning the law that applies to this case, the exhibits that have been
admitted into evidence and any notes taken by you in the course of the trial
proceedings.
If you talce notes during the trial, be careful that your attention is not thereby
diverted from the witness or his testimony; and you must keep your notes to yourself
and not show them to other persons or jurors until the jury deliberations at the end of
the trial.
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There are certain things you must not do during this trial:
1.

You must not associate in any way with the parties, any of the

attorneys or their employees, or any of the witnesses.
2

You must not discuss the case with anyone, or permit anyone to

discuss the case with you. If anyone attempts to discuss the case with you, or to
influence your decision in the case, you must report it to me promptly.
3.

You must not discuss the case with other jurors until you retire to the

jury room to deliberate at the close of the entire case.
4.

You must not make up your mind until you have heard all of the

testimony and have received my instructions as to the law that applies to the case.
5.

You must not contact anyone in an attempt to discuss or gain a

greater understanding of the case.
6.

You must not go to the place where any alleged event occurred.
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Any statement by me identifying a claim of a party is not evidence in this
case. I have advised you of the claims of the parties merely to acquaint you with the
issues to be decided.
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Evidence may be either direct or circumstantial. Direct evidence is evidence
that directly proves a fact. Circumstantial evidence is evidence that indirectly proves
the fact, by proving one or more facts from which the fact at issue may be inferred.
The law makes no distinction between direct and circwnstantial evidence as
to the degree of proof required; each is accepted as a reasonable method of proof and

each is respected for such convincing force as it may carry.
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to decide. You must avoid any inference, speculation _or discussion about insurance.
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Certain evidence is about to be presented to you by deposition. A deposition
is testimony taken under oath before the trial and preserved upon video tape. This
evidence is entitled to the same consideration you would give had the witness
testified from the witness stand.
You will only receive this testimony in open court. Although there is a
record of the testimony you are about to hear, this record will not be available to you
during your deliberations.
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A witness who has special knowledge in a particular matter may give an opinion

on that matter. In determining the weight to be given such opinion, you should consider
the qualifications and credibility of the witness and the reasons given for the opinion.
You are not bound by such opinion. Give it the weight, if any, to which you deem it

entitled.
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owner o! a ctog 1s negligent it the owner knew or should have known of the

dog's dangerous tendencies. Similarly, the custodian of a dog is also negligent for iajuries
caused if such custodian knew or should have known of the dog's dangerous tendencies.
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You are instructed that at the time and place of the occurrence involved in this case,
Plaintiff Stephen Boswell was in law considered to be a licensee upon the premises.
A licensee is a person who goes upon the premises of another in pursuit of the visitor's
purpose, with the consent of the owner. The consent of the owner may be implied from the
circumstances under which the visitor enters the premises.
The owner or occupant owes a duty to warn a licensee only of dangerous existing hazards
on the land that were known to the owner or occupant and unknown to and not reasonably
discoverable by the licensee. The owner or occupant owes a duty to exercise ordinary care to
avoid exposing persons on the premises to an unreasonable risk of harm.
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The owner owes no duty to a trespasser whose presence on the premises is
unknown or could not reasonably have been anticipated. But, if the presence of the trespasser
becomes known or reasonably could have been anticipated, the owner has a duty not to injure the
trespasser by any intentional or reckless act.
A trespasser is a person who goes or remains upon the premises of another without
permission, invitation or lawful authority. Permission or invitation may be express or implied.
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There was a certain ordinance in force in the City of Pocatello at the time of the
occurrence in question which provided that an adult owner/custodian of a dangerous animal shall
be liable for all injuries and property damage sustained by any person or by any animal caused
by an unprovoked attack by any dangerous animal.
The ordinance specifically defines "dangerous animal" to include
A.

Any animal which, when unprovoked by teasing, taunting, or a threatening
manner by a person, approaches said person in an apparent attitude of attack.

B.

Any animal with a known propensity, tendency, or disposition to attack
unprovoked, to cause injury, or to otherwise endanger the safety of human
beings; or

C.

Any animal which bites, inflicts injury, assaults, or otherwise attacks a human
being or domestic animal or livestock without justifiable provocation.

The ordinance contains exceptions to the definition of a "dangerous animal." It provides
that an animal will not be considered dangerous if it engages in llllY of the above listed actions
toward a person or animal that is either: (a) committing a trespass or other tort upon the premises
of the animal's owner or custodian.
The ordinance contains another exception and provides that an animal will not be
considered dangerous if any of the above actions occur when the llllimal is being teased,
tormented, or abused.
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therefore, the Defendants have the burden of proving that this exception applies under the
circumstances of this case.
A violation of the ordinance is negligence.

284 of 348

INSTRUCTION NO. -13
When I say that a party has the burden of proof on a proposition, or use the expression "if
you find" or "if you decide," I mean you must be persuaded that the proposition is more probably
true than not true.
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INSTRUCTION NO. -14
It was the duty of both plaintiff and defendants, before and at the time of the occurrence,
to use ordinary care for the safety of themselves.
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INSTRUCTION NO. - 15

When I use the word "negligence" in these instructions, I mean the failure to use ordinary
care in the management of one's property or person. The words "ordinary care" mean the care a
reasonably careful person would use under circumstances similar to those shown by the
evidence. Negligence may thus consist of the failure to do something which a reasonably careful
person would do, or the doing of something a reasonably careful person would not do, under
circumstances similar to those shown by the evidence. The law does not say how a reasonably
careful person would act under those circumstances. That is for you to decide.
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INSTRUCTION NO, -16
When I use the expression "proximate cause," I mean a cause that, in natural or probable
sequence, produced the injury, the loss or the damage complained of. It need not be the only
cause. It is sufficient ifit is a substantial factor in bringing about the iajury, loss or damage.
There may be one or more proximate causes of an injury. When the negligent conduct of
two or more persons or entities contributes concurrently as substantial factors in bringing about
an injury, the conduct of each may be a proximate cause of the injury regardless of the extent to
which each contributes to the injury .
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INSTRUCTION NO. -17

In this case, the defendants have alleged that the plaintiff Stephen Boswell provoked
defendant Amber Steele's dog, Zoey. On this defense, the defendants have the burden of proof
on each of the following propositions:
1.

The plaintiff Stephen Boswell provoked Zoey.

2.

The provocation by the plaintiff Stephen Boswell was a proximate cause of his
own injuries.
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INSTRUCTION NO. -18
The terms provocation, provoke or provoked are defined as an act when a person teases,
taunts, or acts toward the animal in a threatening manner.
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INSTRUCTION NO. -19
In this case, Plaintiffs claim that the Defendants were negligent. On this claim, the
Plaintiffs have the burden of proof on each of the following propositions:
1.

That either or both of the Defendants was negligent;

2.

That the Plaintiff was injured;

3.

That the negligence of the Defendants was a proximate cause of the injury to the

Plaintiff;
4.

The elements of damage and the amounts thereof

On this claim, the Defendants have asserted the affirmative defense that Stephen Boswell
was negligent.

On this defense, the Defendants have the burden of proof on each of the

following proposition:
1.

That Plaintiff, Stephen Boswell, was negligent.

2.

The negligence of the Plaintiff Stephen Boswell was a proximate cause of his own
injuries.
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If the jury decides the plaintiff Stephen Boswell is entitled to recover from the
defendants, the jury must determine the amount of money that will reasonably and fairly
compensate the plaintiff for any damages proved to be proximately caused by the defendant's
negligence.
The elements of damage the jury may consider are:
A.

B.

Non-economic dam.ages:
1.

The nature of the injuries;

2.

The physical and mental pain and suffering, past and future;

3.

The impairment of abilities to perform usual activities;

4.

The disfigurement caused by the injuries;

5.

The aggravation caused to any preexisting condition.

Economic damages:
1.

The reasonable value of necessary medical care received and expenses
incurred as a result of the injury.

2.

The reasonable value of necessary services provided by another in doing
things for the plaintiff, which, except for the injury, the plaintiff would
ordinarily have performed
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In deciding this case, you may not delegate any of your decisions to another or decide
any question by chance, such as by the flip of a coin or drawing of straws. If money damages are
to be awarded or percentages of fault are to be assigned, you may not agree in advance to
average the sum of each individual juror's estimate as the method of determining the amount of
the damage award or percentage of negligence.
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In this case, you will be given a special verdict form to use in returning your verdict. This
form consists of a series of questions that you are to answer. I will read the verdict form to you
now.
We, the Jury, answer the special interrogatories as follows:
Question No. 1: Was the Defendant Mary Steele negligent, and if so, was her
negligence a proximate cause of Plaintiff Stephen Boswell's injuries?
Answer:

Yes___ No_ __

Question No. 2: Was the Defendant Amber Steele negligent, and if so, was her
negligence a proximate cause of Plaintiff Stephen Boswell's injuries?
If you answered both Questions 1 and 2 "No", you are done. Sign the verdict as
instructed and advise the Bailiff. If you answer both questions "Yes", continue to the
next question.
Question No. 3: Was the plaintiff Stephen Boswell negligent, and if so,
was his negligence a proximate cause of his own injuries?
Answer:

Yes

No

Question No. 4: Did the plaintiff Stephen Boswell provoke the dog Zoey, and, if
so, was his provocation a proximate cause of his own injuries?
Answer:

Yes___

No_ __

If you answered "Yes" to Question No. 3 or Question No. 4, answer Question No. 5. If
you answered "No" to Question No. 3 and Question No. 4, answer Question No. 6.
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Stephen Boswell were negligent or that plaintiff Stephen Boswell provoked the
dog Zoey, which his negligence or provocation caused his injuries. In this
question, you are to apportion the fault between these parties in terms of a
percentage. As to each party or entity to which you answered "Yes" to questions
1 through 4, detennine the percentage of fault for that party or entity, and enter
the percentage on the appropriate line. If you answered "No" to any of the above
questions, insert a "O" or "Zero" as to that party or entity. Your total percentages
must equal 100%.
Question No. 5: What is the percentage of fault (if any) you assign to each
of the following:
To the Defendant Mary Steele

_ _ _ _%

To the Defendant Amber Steele

_ _ _ _%

To the Plaintiff Stephen Boswell

_ _ _ _%

TOTAL MUST EQUAL

100%

If the percentage of fault you assigned to the plaintiff is equal to or greater
than the percentage of fault you assigned to each defendant, you are done. Sign
the verdict and advise the Bailiff. If the percentage of fault assigned to the
plaintiff is less than the percentage of fault you assigned to each defendant,
answer the next question.
Question No. 6: What is the total amount of damage sustained by the
plaintiff Stephen Boswell as a result of the accident?
Answer: We assess plaintiff's damages as follows:
1.

Economic damages, as defined in the Instructions, for Stephen
$_ _ _ _ _ __
Boswell:

2.

Non-economic damages, as defined in the Instructions, for Stephen
$_ _ _ _ _ __
Boswell:
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If it becomes necessary during your deliberations to communicate with me, you may send
a note signed by one or more of you to the bailiff. You should not try to communicate with me
by any means other than such a note.
During your deliberations, you are not to reveal to anyone how the jury stands on any of
the questions before you, munerically or otherwise, unless requested to do so by me.
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I have given you the rules of law that apply to this case. I have instructed you regarding
matters that you may consider in weighing the evidence to determine the facts. In a few minutes
counsel will present their closing arguments to you and then you will retire to the jury room for
your deliberations.
Each of you has an equally important voice in the jury deliberations. Therefore, the
attitude and conduct of jurors at the beginning of the deliberations are important. At the outset of
deliberations, it is rarely productive for a juror to make an emphatic expression of opinion on the
case or to state how he or she intends to vote. When one does that at the beginning, one's sense
of pride may be aroused and there may be reluctance to change that position, even if shown that

it is wrong. Remember that you are not partisans or advocates, but you are judges. For you, as
for me, there can be no triumph except in the ascertainment and declaration of the truth.
Consult with one another. Consider each other's views. Deliberate with the objective of
reaching an agreement, if you can do so without disturbing your individual judgment. Each of
you must decide this case for yourself; but you should do so only after a discussion and
consideration of the case with your fellow jurors.

297 of 348
-·-··-····--··-..· - - · - - · - · • · - - · · - - · · - - - - - - - - - - ~ - -

Members of the Jury: In order to return a verdict, it is necessary that at least three-fourths
of the jury agree. Your verdict must represent the considered judgment of each juror agreeing to

it. It is your duty, as jurors, to consult with one another and to deliberate with a view to reaching
an agreement, if you can do so without violence to individual judgment. Each of you must
decide the case for yourself, but do so only after an impartial consideration of the evidence with
your fellow jurors. In the course of your deliberations, do not hesitate to reexamine your own
views and change your opinion if convinced it is erroneous. But do not surrender your honest
conviction as to the weight or effect of evidence solely because of the opinion of your fellow
jurors, or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict.
You are not partisans. You are judges, judges of the facts. Your sole interest is to
ascertain the truth from the evidence in the case.
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On retiring to the jury room, select one of your number as a foreperson, who will preside
over your deliberations.
An appropriate form of verdict will be submitted to you with any instructions. Follow the
directions on the verdict form, and answer all of the questions required of you by the instructions
on the verdict form.
A verdict may be reached by three-fourths of your number, or nine of you. As soon as
nine or more of you shall have agreed upon each of the required questions in the verdict, you
should fill it out as instructed, and have it signed. It is not necessary that the same nine agree on
each question. If your verdict is unanimous, your foreperson alone will sign it; but if nine or
more, but less than the entire jury, agree, then those so agreeing will sign the verdict.
As soon as you have completed and signed the verdicts, you will notify the bailiff, who

will then return you into open court.
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Reed W. Larsen (3427)
Javier L. Gabiola (5448)
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED
151 North 3rd Avenue, 211d Floor
P.O. Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229
Telephone: (208) 235-1145
Facsimile: (208) 235-1182

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
STEPHEN BOSWELL and KARINA BOSWELL, )
husband and wife,
)

Case No. CV-2012-4120-PI

)

Plaintiffs,

)
)

v.

JUDGMENT

)
)
)
)
)

AMBER STEELE and MARY STEELE,
Defendants.

Judgment is hereby entered in favor of the Defendants and all of the Plaintiffs' claims are
dismissed with prejudice.
DATED this

fl

~lt)

day of J ~ , 2016.

u2df.t1t2'4l

DISTRICT JUDGE

Utt20-t:2~

JUDGMENT- I
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

/JJ . ~
1
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this~ day o f ~ , 2016, I served a conformed copy
of the above and foregoing document to the following person(s) as follows:
Reed W. Larsen
Cooper & Larsen, Chartered
P.O. Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229
Kent A. Higgins
Merrill & Merrill, Chartered
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, ID 83204-099 l
Richard A. Hearn
Hearn & Wood, LLC
1906 Jennie Lee Drive
Idaho Falls, ID 83404

c~

JUDGMENT-2
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!BY

........,____
OL:FUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT bF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF BANNOCK
STEPHEN BOSWELL, ETAL. ,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No:

CV-2012-0004120-PI

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER ON COSTS

AMBER.DAWN STEELE, ETAL.,
Defendant.

On January 22, 2016 a jury returned a verdict in Defendants favor. Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure 54(d)(l)(A) and (B) sets forth the basis for the Courfs determination of prevailing
party and provides that the party shall be awarded costs as a matter of right. The jury's verdict in
this case clearly demonstrates that the Defendants were the prevailing party.
Defendants have submitted a Memorandum of Costs as a Matter of Right totaling
$3459.24 Plaintiff has objected generally asserting that the costs and fees are not justifiable and
specifically to the cost for the deposition of O'Neil, the costs awarded Plaintiffs/Appellants by
the Idaho Court of Appeals, and the cost for Community Animal Expert Service. Defendants
have since withdrawn the claim for the deposition of Gavin O'Neil. As Plaintiff's prevailed on
the appeal prior to remand and trial, those costs awarded shall not now be granted Defendants.
The Community Animal Expert Services are awarded as expert witness Dr. Julia Alpert did
testify at trial and the amount of $1070 is well below the amount allowed for expert witnesses.
The Court therefore awards Defendants as the prevailing, costs as a matter of right as follows:
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Court filing fees

$66.00

.Deposition charges
Mary Steele 12-18-12

$304.30

Mary Steele videographer

$240.00

Amber Steele 7-2-13

$216.08

Stephen Boswell 5-28-13

$278.50

Karina Boswell 5-28-13

$257.50

Chris Kettler 7-2-13

$72.82

John Bilquist 11-10-15

$59.94

Community Animal Hospital expert services

$1070.00

Witness fee/travel expenses of Joanna Hugues

$21.35

Preparation/copies of photographs used as trial exhibits

$31.55

Preparation by John Young Group of DVD trial exhibit

$242.50

TOTAL COSTS AS A MATTER OF RJGHT

$2860.54

Defendants also seek discretionary costs in the amount of $1251.42 to which Plaintiffs
have objected. Of these costs the Bannock County fee of$13, the mileage reimbursement to and
from Salt Lake City of$264.19, the cost of deposition of John Bilquest of$204.75, and the
postage and photo copier cost of $486. 77 are found to be necessary and exceptional costs
reasonably incurred. The Bannock County recording was for the judgment in this case, the
deposition of John Bilquest who was an employee of Defendant's insurance carrier, was
authorized on remand by the Court of Appeals.
The deposition of Defendant Mary Steele in Salt Lake City where she was hospitalized
before her death and related costs were clearly required at trial and used by both Plaintiffs and
Defendants. The postage and photo copy amounts of $486. 73 ·is a reasonable and necessary
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amount give the four day jury trial and preparation costs of a period of three plus years since the
complaint was filed. Defendants are therefore awarded discretionary costs as follows:
Bannock County recording fee

$13.00

Mileage

$264.19

Deposition fee of John Bilquist

$204.75

Postage and photocopies

$486.73

TOTAL DISCRETIONARY COSTS

$968.67

Total costs awarded to Defendant's are $3829.21.

DATED this L\day of March, 2016.

District Judge
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _ _ day of March, 2016, I served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document upon each of the following individuals in the manner indicated.

Kent A. Higgins
Merrill & Merrill Chrtd
P0Box991
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991

Reed Larsen
Cooper & Larsen
P0Box4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229

0U.S.Mail
~E-Mail
D Hand Deliver
0Fax:

0U.S.Mail

IZI E-Mail
D Hand Deliver
0Fax:

Robert Poleld
CLERK OF THE COURT
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Kent A. Higgins
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED
109 North Arthur - 5th Floor
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991
(208) 232-2286
(208) 232-2499 Telefax
ISB#: 3025
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
STEPHEN BOSWELL and KARINA
BOSWELL, husband and wife,

)
)

)
Plaintiffs/Appellants,

)
AMBER STEELE,
The Estate of MARY STEELE,
Defendants/Respondents.

TO:

Case No. CV-12-4120 OC

)

NOTICE OF APPEAL

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS
Am~er Steele, The Estate of Mary Steele
AND .THEIR ATTORNEY
Reed W. Larsen
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED
P.O. Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229
AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:

Notice of Appeal
0:\90\9034\Appeal.2\Notice of Appeal 03-16.wpd

Page 1
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1.

The above named appellants, Stephen Boswell and Karina Boswell, appeals against

the above named respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Judgment entered Febrµ.ary, 19,
2016.
2.

The. parties have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the order described

in paragraph 1 above is appealable pursuant to Rule 1l(a)(l) of the Idaho Appellate Rules.
3.

The issues of this appeal are as follows:
(a)

Did the District Court err in iss1,1ing final judgment in favor of Defendants.

(b)

Did the District Court err in giving some of the Defendant's jury instructions
and requested Special Verdict form and failing to give some of Plaintiffs'
requested jury instructions.

(c)

Did the District Court err in reducing all of Plaintiffs' claims to simple
negligence.

4.

Has an order been entered sealing all or any portions of the record? No.

5.

A partial reporter's transcript is requested of any and all of the record discussions

regarding the jury instructions, Plaintiffs' proposed jury instructions, Defendants' proposed jury
instructions, with both sides' objections. A partial reporter's transcript is also requested of the trial.
6.

The appellants request the following documents to be included in the clerk's record

in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R., and any exhibits attached to the
documents:
a.

Briefin Support of Motion to Amend Complaint (12-24-12)

b.

Defendants' Objection to Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend Complaint (1-10-13)

c.

Memorandum in Supp01t of Defendants' Objection to Plaintiffs' Motion to
Amend (1-10-13)

d.

Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Amend Complaint (1-15-13)

e.

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (1-14-13)

f.

Memorandum Supporting Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
(1~14-13)

g.

Defendants' Resporise to Plaintiffs' Request for Hearing on Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment (7-10-13)

h.

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (7-12-13)

Notice of Appeal
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i.

Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
(7-12-13)

J.

Memorandum in Objection to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
(7-23-13)

1.

Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment(7-22-13)

m.

Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (7-30-13)

n.

Supplemental Memorandum in Support ofDefendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment and Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs'
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (8-09-13)

o.

Brief (8-12-13)

p.

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (9-02-15)

q.

Affidavit of Jane L. Guidinger in Support of Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment(9-02-15)

r.

Memorandum Supporting Plaintiffs' Second Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment(9-02-15)

s.

Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment(9-16~15)

t.

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (11-18-15)

u.

Memorandum Supporting Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
(11-18-15)

v.

Memorandum in Opposition to· Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment (11-18-15)

7.

w.

Reply Brief (12-14-15)

x.

Motion to Reconsider (1-18-16)

y.

Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider (1-18-16)

z.

Minute Entry and Order (1-22-16)

aa.

Judgment (2-19-16)

The appellant requests the following documents, charts, or pictures offered or

admitted as exhibits to be copied and sent to the·Supreme Court.
As designated in Paragraph 6.

8.

I certify:

Notice of Appeal
0:\90\9034\Appeal.2\Notice of Appeal 03-16.wpd
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(a)

That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of whom a

transcript has been requested as named below at the address set our below:
Sheri Nothelphim
Bannock County Courthouse
624 E. Center
Pocatello, ID 83201
(b)

That the clerk of the district court or administrative agency has been paid the

estimated fee for preparation of the reporter's transcript.
(c)

That the estimated fee for preparation ofthe clerk's or agency's record has been paid.

(d)

That the appellate filing fee has been paid.

(e)

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule

20 (and the attorney general ofldaho pursuant to Section 67-1401(1), Idaho Code.
~\

;-·,,

DATED this ,,.-) '{ day of March, 2016.

MERRILL&MERRlLL, CHARTERED
~

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, the undersigned, do hereby certify that a true, full and correct copy of the foregoing
document was this __,..
J ·/' day of March, 2016, served upon the following in the manner indicated
below:
Reed W. Larsen
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED
P.O. Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229

[ v]/ U.S. Mail

Sheri L. Nothelphim
Bannock County Courthouse
624 E. Center
Pocatello, ID 83201

] .· U.S. Mail
[ .,.--J Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Delivery
[ ] Telefax

Notice of Appeal
0:\90\9034\Appeal.2\Notice of Appeal 03-16.wpd

[
[
[

]
]
]

Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Telefax

[
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Reed W. Larsen (3427)
Javier L. Gabiola (5448)
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED
151 North 31'd Avenue, 2nd Floor
P.O. Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229
Telephone: (208) 235-1145
Facsimile: (208) 235-1182

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
STEPHEN BOSWELL and KARINA BOSWELL, )
husband and wife,
)
)
Plaintiffs/Appellants,
)
)
v.
)
)
AMBER STEELE and MARY STEELE,
)
)
Defendants/Respondents.
)

Case No. CV-2012-4120-PI

DEFENDANTS' REQUEST FOR
ADDITIONAL RECORD AND
TRANSCRIPT

TO: THE ABOVE NAMED PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS STEPHEN BOSWELL AND
KARINA BOSWELL AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD, KENT A. HIGGINS AND
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED, P.O. Box 991, POCATELLO, ID 83204-0991, THE
CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT AND THE COURT REPORTER.
NOTICE IS HEREBYGIVEN THAT:
Defendants/Respondents Amber Steele and the Estate of Mary Steele hereby request,
pursuant to Rule 19 of the Idaho Appellate Rules, the inclusion of the following materials and the
reporter's transcript and clerk's record in addition to that required to be included pursuant to the
Idaho Appellate Rules and the Notice of Appeal:
II
II

DEFENDANTS' REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL RECORD AND TRANSCRIPT- PAGE

1
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I.

Additional Reporter's Transcript:
a.

Reporter's Transcript of Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment held on

August 5, 2013;
b.

Reporter's Transcript ofHearing on Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider held on

January 21, 2014;
c.

Reporter's Transcript of Hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment held on September 29, 2015;
d.

Reporter's Transcript of Hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment December 21, 2015; and
e.

Reporter's Transcript of Hearing on Trial held from January 19, 2016 to

January 22, 2016.
2.

Clerk's record:
a.

Affidavit ofJavier L. Gabiola in Support ofDefendants' Motion for Summary

Judgment, with attached exhibits filed July 12, 2013;
b.

Affidavit of Javier L. Gabiola in Support of Defendants' Memorandum in

Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgement, with attached exhibits, filed July
22, 2013;
c.

Defendants' Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Affidavit Supporting Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment, filed July 22, 2013;
d.

Affidavit ofKarina Boswell in Objection to Defendants' Motion for Summary

Judgment, filed July 23, 2013;
e.

Affidavit of Steven Boswell in Objection to Defendants' Motion for Summary

Judgment, filed July 23, 2013;
DEFENDANTS' REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL RECORD AND TRANSCRIPT- PAGE 2
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f.

Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary

Judgment, filed July 30, 2013;
g.

Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendants' and Plaintiffs' Motion for

Summary Judgment, filed October 30, 2013;
h.

Notice of Appeal to Supreme Court, filed by Plaintiffs' December 3, 2013;

1.

Motion to Reconsider, filed January 3, 2014;

J.

Brief in Support of Motion to Reconsider, filed January 3, 20J4;

k.

Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to ·Motion to Reconsider, filed

January 17, 2014;

1.

Response Brief in Support of Motion to Reconsider, filed January 17, 2014;

m.

Memorandum Decision denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider, filed

February 25, 2014;
n.

Final Judgment, entered March 14, 2014;

o.

Amended Notice of Appeal, filed April 4, 2014;

p.

Reporter's Transcript on Appeal, filed May 5, 2014;

q.

Idaho Supreme Court Opinion filed April 21, 2015;

r.

Defendants' Motion to Strike Objection to Affidavit ofJane Guidinger, filed
September 16, 2015;

s.

Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment, filed September 16, 2015;
t.

Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to Strike Objection to

Affidavit of Jane Guidinger, filed September 16, 2015;

DEFENDANTS' REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL RECORD AND TRANSCRIPT- PAGE 3
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u.

Minute Entry and Order denying Motion for Summary Judgment, dated

September 29, 2015;
v.

Minute Entry and Order on Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

Denied, dated January 15, 2016;

w.

Defendants' Proposed Jury Instructions, filed January 15, 2016;

x.

Defendants' Second Supplemental Proposed Jury Instructions, filed January

21, 2016;
DATED this\ day of April, 2016.
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED

DEFENDANTS' REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL RECORD AND TRANSCRIPT - PAGE 4
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

L

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day ofApril, 2016, I served a true and correct copy
of the above and foregoing document to the following person(s) as follows:

[ty'. U.S. Mail/Postage Prepaid

·Kent A. Higgins
Merrill & Merrill, Chartered
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991

[]
[]
[]

Hand Delivery ·
Overnight Mail
Facsimile\ 232-2499

Richard A. Hearn
Heam & Wood, LLC
1906 Jennie Lee Drive
Idaho Falls, ID 83404

lV
[]
[]

U.S. Mail/Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivery
Overnight Mail
Facsimile\ 932-4380

Sheri L. N othelphim
Bannock County Courthouse
624 E Center
Pocatello, ID 83201

[]
[~
[]
[]

U.S. Mail/Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivery
Overnight Mail
Facsimile \

[]

c;fa
'
·
~

/I

.(:

.

,, .,

NOTE: one duplicate copy of all motions, and any opposition thereto, together with supporting
memorandum, affidavits and documents, and trial brief shall be emailed to
brandvp@bannockcountv.us

DEFENDANTS' REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL RECORD AND TRANSCRIPT - PAGE 5
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

-STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

STEPHEN BOSWELL and KARINA
BOSWELL, husband and wife,
Plaintiff-Appellants,

vs.
AMBER STEELE,
The Estate of MARY STEELE,-

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Supreme Court No.

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE
OF

)
)
Defendants:Respondents, )
.
.
)
)

APPEAL

____________
'

Appealed from: Sixth Ju~i~ial pistrict, Bannock County
Honorable Judge 'William

H. ··woodland presiding

Bannock Countv,.~ase N?:r;_.fY~2012-4120-PI
Order of Judgment Appealed from: Judgment filed the 19th day of February,

2016.
Attorney for Appellant: Ke:nt A. Higgins, Attorney, Merrill & Merrill, Chartered,
Pocatello
·
-_, -,- -·- ···
Attorney for Respondent:--'i:i~ea·-w. Larsen, Attorney, Cooper & Larsen, Chartered
Appealed by: Stephen Boswell and Karina Boswell
........

'

Appealed against:- Amber\;tJeJe, The Estate of Mary Steele
•

•,

I

•

,,

Notice of Appeal flied: March 29, 2016
Notice of Cross~Appeal file&· No
..

:i:·

Appellate fee pai'd: Yes
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Request for additional recotds·filed: Yes
Request for additional reporter's transcript filed: No
Name of Repo~~r.: Sheri ~~.;Nothelphim
Was District Court Reporter's transcript requested? Yes

(Seal)
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Reed W. Larsen (3427)
Javier L. Gabiola (5448)
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED
15 I North 3rd Avenue 2n<1 Floor
'
P.O. Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229
Telephone: (208) 235-1145
Facsimile: (208) 235-1182

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICJAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
STEPHEN BOSWELL and KARINA BOSWELL, )
)
husband and wife,
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
V.

)

AMBER STEELE and MARY STEELE,

)
)

Case No. CV-2012-4120-PJ

JUDGMENT.

)

Defendants.

)

This Judgment is entered in favor of the Defendants and against the Plaintiff in the amount
of $3,829.21. Plain.tiffs' co~~~,¥1~~ismissed with prejudice.
DATED this

K

d a ~ 1 , 2016.

µ}~ /1./?J~
WILLIAM H. WOODLAND
District Judge

JUDGMENT- I
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CLERK'S CERTIFICA
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
dayo Ma1eh;2016, I served a conformed copy of
the above and foregoing document to the following person(s) as follows:
Reed W. Larsen
Cooper & Larsen, Chaiiered
P.O. Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229
Kent A. Higgins
Merrill & Merrill, Chartered
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991
Richard A. Hearn
Hearn & Wood, LLC
1906 Jennie Lee Drive
Idaho Falls, ID 83404

JUDGMENT-2
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Reed W. Larsen (3427)
Javier L. Gabiola (5448)
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED
151 North 3rd Avenue, 2nd Floor
P .0. Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229
Telephone: (208) 235-1145
Facsimile: .(208) 235-1182

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
STEPHEN BOSWELL and KARINA BOSWELL, )
husband and wife,
)
)
Plaintiffs/Appellants,
)
)
~
)
)
AMBER STEELE and MARY STEELE,
)

Case No. CV-2012-4120-PI

AMENDED REQUEST FOR
ADDITIONAL RECORD AND
TRANSCRIPT

)
Defendants/Respondents.

}

TO:
THE ABOVE NAMED PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS STEPHEN BOSWELL AND
KARINA BOSWELL AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD, KENT A. HIGGINS AND
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED, P.O. BOX 991, POCATELLO, ID 83204-0991, THE
CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT AND THE COURT REPORTER.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GNEN THAT:
Defendants/Respondents Amber Steele and the Estate of Mary Steele hereby request,
pursuant to Rule 19 of the Idaho Appellate Rules, the inclusion of the following materials and the
reporter's transcript and clerk's record in addition to that required to be included pursuant to the
Idaho Appellate Rules and the Notice of Appeal:
1.

Additional Reporter's Transcript:

AMENDED REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL RECORD AND TRANSCRIPT· PAGE 1
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a.

Reporter's Transcript of Hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Swmnary

Judgment held on September 29, 2015;
b.

Reporter's Transcript of Hearing.on Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Swnmary

Judgment December 21, 2015; and
c.

Reporter's Transcript of Hearing on Trial held from January 19, 2016 to

January 22, 2016.
2.

Clerk's record:
a.

Defendants' Motion to Strike Objection to Affidavit ofJane Guidinger, filed

September 16, 2015;
b.

Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Swnmary

Judgment, filed September 16, 2015;
c.

Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to Strike Objection to

Affidavit of Jane Guidinger, filed September 16, 2015;
d.

Minute Enny and Order denying Motion for Summary Judgment, dated

September 29, 2015;
e.

Minute Entry and Order on Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

Denied, dated January 15, 2016;

f.

Defendants' Proposed Jury Instructions, filed January 15, 2016; and

g.

Defendants' Second Supplemental Proposed Jury Instructions, filed January

21, 2016.

AMENDED REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL RECORD AND TRANSCRIPT- PAGE 2

320 of 348

i
I certify that a copy of Defendants' Amended Request for Additional Record and Transcript
has been served upon the court reporter.. I further certify that Defendants' Amended Request for
Additional Record and Transcript has been served upon the Clerk of the District Court pursuant to
Idaho Appellate Rule 20.
DATED thisQ day of April, 2016.
SEN, CHARTERED

AMENDED REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL RECORD AND TRANSCRIPT· PAGE 3
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

n

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day ofApril, 2016, I served a true and correct copy
of the above and foregoing document to ~owing person(s) as follows:
Kent A. Higgins
Merrill & Merrill, Chartered
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991

[<.
[J
[]
[]

U.S. Mail/Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivery
Overnight Mail
Facsimile \ 232-2499

Richard A. Heam
Heam& Wood, LLC
1906 Jennie Lee Drive
Idaho Falls, ID 83404

[y-· · U.S. Mail/Postage Prepaid

Sheri L. Nothelphim
Bannock County Courthouse
624 E Center
Pocatello, ID 83201

w·u.s. MaiVPostage Prepaid

[]
[]
[]

[J
[]

Hand Delivery
Overnight Mail
Facsimile\ 932-4380

Hand Delivery
Overnight Mail

J?I:e~

NOTE: one duplicate copy ofall motions, and any opposition thereto, together with supporting
memorandum, affidavits and documents, and trial brief, shall be emailed to
brandyp@bannockcounty.us

AMENDED REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL RECORD AND TRANSCRIPT- PAGE 4
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Kent A. Higgins
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED
109 North Arthur - 5th Floor
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991
(208) 232-2286
(208) 232-2499 Telefax
ISB#: 3025
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
STEPHEN BOSWELL and KARINA
BOSWELL, husband and wife,

)
)

Plaintiff,

)
)
)

Defendants.

County of Bannock

AFFIDAVIT OF KENT A. HIGGINS

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

AMBER STEELE,
MARY STEELE,

STATE OF IDAHO

Case·No. CV-12-4120 QC

)
:ss
)

Kent A. Higgins, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
1.

I make this Affidavit upon my information and belief.

2.

I am the attorney for the Plaintiffs herein.

3.

Attached are the following Motions:
a.

Motion for Permission to Appeal from Interlocutory Order and for Stay

b.

Motion to Reconsider

Affidavit of Kent A. Higgins
0:\90\9034\pleadings\Affidavit of Kent A. Higgins.wpd

Page 1
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4.

These Motions were presented to the court together with Motions to Shorten Time
for these Motions to be heard.
The Court heard these Motions on January 19, 2016, prior to the jury trial. These

S.

Motions do not appear on the repository and your affiant requests that the transcript
of the hearing on these Motions be included in the transcripts for the appeal
Further your affiant sayeth naught.

6.

DATED this

d-_5

day of April, 2016.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this ~~ day of April, 2016.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, the undersigned, do hereby certify that a true, full and correct copy of the foregoing
document was this d-,; day of January, 2016, served upon the following in the manner indicated
below:
Reed W. Larsen
[ · ~ U.S.Mail
Javier Gabiola
[ ] Hand Delivery
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARIBRED
[ ] Overnight Delivery
P.O. Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229

~
~
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Kent A. Higgins
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED
109 North Arthur - 5th Floor
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991
(208) 232-2286
(208) 232-2499 Telefax
ISB#: 3025
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
STEPHEN BOSWELLand KARINA
BOSWELL, husband and wife,

)
)

)
Plaintiff,
AMBER STEELE, The Estate
MARY STEELE,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-12-4120 OC
MOTION TO RECONSIDER

COMES NOW the Plaintiffs, Stephen Boswell and Karina Boswell, by and through their
through their counsel of record, Kent A. Higgins of Merrill & Merrill, Chartered, pursuant to IRCP
Rule 59 and moves this Court to reconsider its Minute Entry & Order of January 15, 2016 for the
following reasons:
1.

The Court has not addressed Plaintiffs' argument that the Restatement (Second) of

Torts, § 509 (1977); the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 513, or the Restatement (I'hird) of Torts,
Phys. & Emot. Harm,§ 23 (2010), as to liability of dog owners;
2.

The Court's opinion says Idaho is a one bite state, and that strict liability is available
in "cases involving ... domestic animals with known dangerous propensities." But

Motion to Reconsider
0:\90\9034\Pleadings\Motion to Reconsider2.wpd
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I

\

has rejected Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment on comparative negligence.
3.

The. Court ·has· erroneously characterized all of Plaintiffs' causes of actions as
Negligence actions.
This Motion is made for these reasons and those addressed in the accompanying brief.

DATED this_ day of January, 2016.
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED

Kent A. Higgins
Attorney for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, the undersigned, do hereby certify that a true, full and correct copy of the foregoing

document was this __ day of January, 2016, served upon the following in the manner indicated
below:
Reed W. Larsen
Javier Gabiola
[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED
[ ] Overnight Delivery
P.O. Box 4229
[ ] Telefax
Pocatello, ID 83205~4229

Kent A. Higgins

Motion to Reconsider
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Kent A. Higgins
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED
109 North Arthur - 5th Floor
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991
(208) 232-2286
(208) 232-2499 Telefax
ISB#: 3025
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
STEPHEN BOSWELL and KARINA
BOSWELL, husband and wife,
Plaintiff,

AMBER STEELE, The Estate
MARY STEELE,
Defendants.

)
)

)
)

Case No. CV-12-4120 OC

)
)
)

MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO
APPEAL FROM INTERLOCUTORY
ORDERANDFORSTAY

)
)
)
)
)

COMES NOW the Plaintiffs, Stephen Boswell and Karina Boswell, by and through their
through their counsel of record, Kent A. Higgins of Merrill & Merrill, Chartered, and moves this
Court pursuant to Rule 12 (b) of the Idaho Appellate Rules, for permission to appeal this Court's
Interlocutory Decree dated January 15, 2016 This Motion is made on the grounds and for the reasons
that the Court's Minute Entry & Order filed on January 15, 2016, involves a controlling question of
law of which there is substantial grounds for difference of opinion. An immediate appeal from the
Order or Decree may materially advance the orderly litigation of this resolution of this litigation.

Motion for Permission to Appeal Interlocutory Order
0:\90\9034\Pleadings\Appeal of Interlocutory Order. wpd
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This Motion is made for these reasons and those addressed in the accompanying brief.
DATED this ~ a y of January, 2016.
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, the undersigt}y_d, do hereby certify that a true, full and correct copy of the foregoing
document was this _g-_vclay of January, 2016, served upon the following in the manner indicated
below:
Reed W. Larsen
[ ] U.S. Mail
Javier Gabiola
[ ] Hand Delivery
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED
[ ] Overnight Delivery
P.O. Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205~4229
[ ::,c] Telefax

~

Motion for Permission to Appeal Interlocutory Order
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Kent A. Higgins
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED
109 North Arthur - 5th Floor
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991
(208) 232-2286
(208) 232-2499 Telefax
ISB#: 3025
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
STEPHEN BOSWELL and KARINA
BOSWELL, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,

AMBER STEELE,
The Estate of MARY STEELE,
Defendants/Respondents.

TO:

)
)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-12-4120 OC

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL

THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS
Amber Steele, The Estate of Mary Steele
AND THEIR ATTORNEY
Reed W. Larsen
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED
P.O. Box4229
Pocatello, -ID 83 205-4 229
AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:

Notice of Appeal
0:\90\9034\Appeal.2\Amended Notice of Appeal.wpd

Pagel

329 of 348

1.

The above named appellants, Stephen Boswell and Karina Boswell, appeals against

the above named respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Judgment entered February, 19,
2016.
2.

The parties have aright to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the order described

in paragraph 1 above is appealable pursuant to Rule 1l(a)(l) of the Idaho Appellate Rules.

3.

The issues ofthis appeal are as follows:
(a)

Did the District Court err in issuing final judgment in favor of Defendants.

(b)

Did the District Court err in giving some of the Defendant's jury instructions
and requested Special Verdict form and failing to .give some of Plaintiffs'
requested jury instructions.

(c)

Did the District Court err in reducing all of Plaintiffs' claims to simple
negligence.

4.

Has an order been entered sealing all or any portions of the record? No.

5.

A partial reporter's transcript is requested of any and all of the record discussions

regarding the following:
a.

Jury instructions, Plaintiffs' proposed jury instructions, Defendants' proposed
jury instructions, with both sides' objections.

B.

A reporter's transcript of hearing on Motion to Reconsider, Motion to
Shorten Time and Motion for Permission to Appeal from Interlocutory Order
and for Stay heard before trial on 1/19/2016

C
6.

A partial reporter's transcript is also requested of the trial.

The appellants request the following documents to be included in the clerk's record

in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R., and any exhibits attached to the
documents:
a.

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (9-02-15)

b.

Affidavit of Jane L. Guidinger in Support of Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment (9-02-15)

c.

Memorandum Supporting Plaintiffs' Second Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment (9-02-15)

Notice of Appeal
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d.

Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment (9-16-15)

e.

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (11-18-1 S)

f.

Memorandum Supporting Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
(11-18-15)

g.

Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for . Partial Summary
Judgment (11-18-15)

7.

h.

Reply Brief (li-14-15)

i.

Minute Entry and Order (1-22-16)

J.

Judgment (2-19-16)

The appellant requests the following documents, charts, or pictures offered or

admitted as exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme Court.
As designated in Paragraph 6.

8.

I certify:

(a)

That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of whom a

transcript has been requested as named below at the address set our below:
Sheri Nothelphim
Bannock County Courthouse
624 E. Center
Pocatello, ID 83201
(b)

That the clerk of the district court or administrative agency has been paid the

estimated fee for preparation of the reporter's transcript.
(c)

That the estimated fee for preparation ofthe clerk's or agency's record has been paid.

(d)

That the appellate filing fee has been paid.

(e)

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule

20 (and the attorney general ofldaho pursuant to Section 67-1401(1), Idaho Code.
DATED this _ _ day of April, 2016.

MERRILL&:MERR1LL, CHARTERED
By:

Notice of Appeal
0:\90\9034\Appeal.2\Amended Notice of Appeal.wpd
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, the undersigned, do hereby certify that a true, full and correct copy of the foregoing
document was this_._ day of April, 2016, served upon the following in the manner indicated
below:

[
[

]
]
]
]

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Telefax

[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Telefax

Reed W. Larsen
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED
P.O. Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229

[
[

Sheri L. Nothelphim
Bannock County Courthouse
624 E. Center
Pocatello, ID 83201

Notice of Appeal
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IN THE DISTRICT CQY~T'OFTHE
SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
.·.·' -

STATE OF

ID.A;H:<'.}r:U~ AND FOR THE COUNlY OF BANNOCK

STEPHEN BOSWELL and -RA'RINA
BOSWELL, husband and W:ife;: i. ,'.

)
).
)
)
}

Plaintiffs-Appe_l)apts,
vs.

>-

)
)
)

AMBER STEELE,
The Estate of MARY STE~LE; · · - ·.
•. ·.'

'·. ..

..:/ t~~- -\ .r··. :-~
...... ,.,:-,:,;J ..... '. ·.. ' ·.·

-

'

Supreme Court No. 44093
AMENDED
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE
OF
APPEAL

)

Defendants~Respondents,
))
···•;i ., ," ...•. ·
'· -::_ :_;,~·< ·'. ... ·.

Appealed from:. Sixth

JudJciaLQistrict,
Bannock County
...
,

__

.·.

Honorable Judgei. Williat11 :m)tq9odland presiding·

Couh~/<:~~e N:~f '.i[;:;,)12-4120-PI .
Order of Judgfri~Rt A.pp~@W~"tit>m: Judgment 'filed the 19th day of February and
Bannock

.:· . . . . . '. -.··.

Judgment filed the

-

stb.:~·ay,;of April, 2016.

Attorney for Appellant:
Pocatello
,···:..':

KenfA~-- Higgins, Attorney, Merrill & Merrill, Chartered,

·,· . _.

Attorney for Reiponderit:/~J~dW:.
l,.arsen, Attomey, Cooper & Larsen, Chartered
.... · ·....
.. ·\:. : : .. ::
.·
..
- ..

:

.. ~ .- ~-

.. -

i · , · .....·•

Appealed by: Stephen Bo~weWand Karina Boswell

Ambe:/~t~~l~, The Estate of Mary Steele
Notice of Appeal°fil¢d: 'M~f~i,J1,, 2016 .

Appealed against~'·

AMENDED,NOT~:(:~ Qf·;~pl':~A.L ·FILED: Ap~16
Notice of Cross-Appeal

fila~;JNo:·.

Appellate fee paid: Yes
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\ ..

Request for additional records filed: YES
,·.· .·.:

Request for additional repo:rte'r's transcript filed: YES

Name of ReportefrSheri :~~th~l()him .
·. /.· <~~-} :f: 1t J_. ~~-... ;'·· ."

Was District Court Repmter's.transcript requested? Yes
Estimated Nu~~;~ ~f PaJ!t/,:-~re than 100 pages

Dated~aL\ ,Zo \~
ROBERT POLEK!,
_
. Clerk of the District Court
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Kent A. Higgins
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED
1.09 North Arthur .. 5th Floor
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991
(208) 232-2286
(208) 232-2499 telefax
ISB#: 302S
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
STEPHEN BOSWELL and KARINA
BOSWELL, husband and wife,

)
)

)
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-1.2-4120 OC

)

)
)
)
)

AMBER STEELE, The Estate of
MARY STEELE,

AFFIDAVIT OF KENT A. HIGGINS

)
)

Defendants.

)
)

STATE OF IDAHO

)

County of Bann.ock

:ss
)

Kent A. Higgins, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
1.

I make this Affidavit upon my information and belief.

2.

I am the attorney for the Plaintiffs herein.

3.

Attached are the following Motions:

a.

Motion to Reconsider

b.

Brief in Support of Motion to Reconsider

Affidavit or li'.ent A. Higgb1s
0:\90\9034\Pleadings\A.ffidavit of Kent A. Higgins 06-14-l 6. wpd
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4.

These pleadings were presented to the court on January 18, 2016

5.

The Court heard the Motion on January 19, 2016, prior to the jury trial a.nd it was
denied.

6.

The Motion and Brief do not appear on the repository an.d your afflant requests that
the transcript of the hearing

on the Motion be included in the transcripts for the

appeal
7.

Further your affiant sayeth naught.

DATED this

l:f.- day of June, 2016.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this -1.:f..J.ay of June, 2016.

Al't
Jm;A.. ~~Slo,.._~
Notuy Public for Idaho
GI

Residing at Pocatello, Idaho
My Commission Expired: (o ·· Y·

/)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, the undersigned, do hereby certify that a true, full and correct copy of the foregoing
document was this .J$.._ day of June, 2016, served. upon the following in the manner indicated.
below:
Reed W. Larsen.
Javier Gabiola
[ ~U.S.Mail
COOPER & LARSEN. CHARTERED
[ ] Hand Delivery
P.O. Box4229
[ ] Overnight Delivery
Pocatello, ID 8320S-4229

[~

~

Affidavit of Kent A. Higgins
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Kent A. Higgins
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED
I 09 North Arthur - 5th Floor
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991
(208) 232-2286
(208) 232-2499 Telefax
IS:S#: 3025
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
STEPHEN BOSWELLand KARINA
BOSWELL, husband an.d wife,
Plaintiff:

)
)
)
)

)
AMBER STEELE, The Estate
MARY STEELE,
Defendants.

Case No. CV-12-4120 QC

MOTION TO RECONSIDER

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

COMES NOW the Plaintiffs, Stephen Boswell and Karina Boswell, by aud through their
th.tough her counsel of record, Kent A. Higgins of Merrill & Merrill, Chartered, pursuant to IRCP
Rule 59 and moves this Court to reconsider its Minute Entry & Order of January l S. 2016 for the

following reasons:

1.

The Court has n.ot addressed Plaintiffs' argument that the Restatement (Second) of

Torts, § 509 (1977); the Restatement (Second) ofTorts, § 513, o.rtheRestatement (T'hird) o/Tort,,
Phys. & Emot. Harm, § 23 (2010), as to liability of dog owners;
2.

The Court's opinion says Idaho is a one bite state. and that strict Ii.ability is available

in '"cases involving ... domestic animals with known dangerous propensities." But
Motion to Reconsider
0:\90\9034\PlcsdingR\Motion to Roconaidcr.wpd
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M~~~lLL ANLJ M~K~lLL
........ ..,,~,

14:~/

has rejected P1aintiff's motion for summary judgment on comparative negligence.
3.

The Court has erroneously characterized all of Plaintiffs• ca.uses of actions as

Negligence actions.
This Motion ls made for these reasons and those addressed. in the accompanying brief.
DATED this .fl_ day of January, 2016.

MERRILL &

L, CHARTERED

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, the undersigned, do hereby certify that a tme, full and correct copy of the foregoing
document was this _fl. day of January. 2016, served upon the foUowing in the manner indicated
below:
Reed W. Larsen
.Tavler Gabiola
[ L U.S.Mail
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED
[/1 Hand Delivery
P.O. Box 4229
[ J Overnight Delivety
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229
[ J Te ax

Motion to Reeonsider
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Kent A. Higgins
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED
109 North Arthur - 5th Floor
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991
(208) 232-2286
(208) 232-2499 Te1efax
ISB#: 3025
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND fOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

STEPHEN BOSWELL and KARINA
BOS\VELL, husband and wife,

)
)

)
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-12-4120 OC

)

) BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
) RECONSIDER
AMBER STEELE, The Estate of
MARY STEELE~

Defendants.

)
)
)
)

)
)

Plaintiffs, Stephen Boswell and Karina Boswell, respectfully request that this court

reconsider its Minute Entry & Order of January 15, 2016

ARGUMENT
This is a dogbite case. lt happened on the premises of Mary Steele. The Court of Appeals

has already ruled that an issue of fact exists as to whether the original Defendants, Amber Steele and
Mary Steele~ had prior knowledge of the dogs abnormally dangerous propensities.

Brief in Support of Motion to Recon1ider

0:\90\9034\pleadings\Bricfin Support (Ir Motion to R.econsid~t2.wpd
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I

Those three facts call clearly into question the application of three Restatements of the law:

The possessor ofan abnonnally dangerous dog who keeps it upon land in hi.s
possession, is su.bj ect to strict liability to persons coming upon the land in the
exercise of a privilege whether derived from his consent to their entey· or otherwise.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 5l3 (1977);
An owner or possessor of an animal that the owner or possessor knows or has reason
to kn.ow has dangerous tendencies abnormal for the animal's category is subject to
strict liability for physical hann caused by the animal if the hann ensues fro1n that
dangerous tendency.

Restatement (J'hird) of Torts, Phys. & Emot. Harm,§ 23 (2010);
and,
( 1) A possessor a domestic animal that he knows or has reason to know has
dangerous propensities abnonnal to its class, is subject to liability for harm done by
the animal to another, although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent it from

doing the harm.
(2) This liability is limited to harm that results from the abnonnally dangerous
propensity of which the possessor knows or has reason to know.
·
Restatement (Second) ofTortsp § 509 (1977).
The parties to this action have an obligation to provide a clear record to any appellate court.
Counsel for Boswells asked this court in oral argument, as clearly as cleat can be, for a straight up,
unequivocal yes or no rulinge whether the court would recognize Restatement (Secot1.d) ofTorts §
513 (1977) as Idaho law. The court did not answer then or in its Minute Entry & Order.
BetWeen briefings and oral argument the Boswells have asked the court between a half-dozen
to a dozen times whether the court will or

wm not recognize these three Restatements as Idaho law.

The court still has not addressed any one of the three. The court's Minute Entry & Orde.r implicitly
rejects aU three Restatements, but .it also contains language like ''Idaho is a one bite state, and that
sttict liability is available in "cases involving . . . domestic animals· with known dangerous
propensities.'' This language, inconsistent with the court's rejection of Boswells Motion for

Swnmary Judgment., creates ambivalence.
The Boswells once again ask the court to respect their duty to provide a clear record. The
Boswells once again ask the court to give a straight up, unequivocal ruling on whether the court
acknowledges or rejects - as to each one and as to all three, collectively an.d individually,
Brief in Support of Motion to Jleeonslder
0 :\90\9034\l>laadingsiBrief' in Support of Motion to Rcconslderl. wpd
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Re.t:tatement (Second) of Torts § 513 (1977); .Restatement (Third} ofTortr, Phys. & Emot. Harm, §

23 (201 O); and Restatement: (Second) of Torts, § 509 (1977).
If the court acknowledges these three statemen.ts) then Boswells ask the court to modify its
Minute Entry & Order accordingly. Two of the three restatements e,q,ressly use the term ..stxict
liability." All are premised on the grounds that the cause of action. does not He in the negligence in
how the dog is kept, but in keeping the dog at all.

Similarly, if the court cannot accept that comparative negligence does not apply to the
Pocatello Municipal Code, the court should acknowledge that only acts of taunting, teasing or
threatening are comparable.
Respectfully submitted this

__R day of January, 2016.
MERRILL & MERRU...L, HARTERED
By;

Brief in Support of Motion to Reconsider
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, tbe undersigned, do hereby Certify that a true, full and correct copy of the foregoing
document was this -f¥- day of Januazy, 2016, served upon the following in the manner indicated
below:
-

Reed W. Larsen
Javier Gabiola
COOPER & LARSEN. CHARTERED
P.O. Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205·4229

[ v U.S. Mail

[ /J
[ J
[

Brief in Support of Motion to Reconsider
_
0'.\90\90341.Plelld]ngs\Briefin Support ofMotion to Reconsider2.wpd
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
STEPHEN BOSWELL and KARINA
BOSWELL, husband and wife,

)
)
)
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
) Supreme Court No. 40093
)
vs.
)
)
AMBER DAWN STEELE and
)
The Estate of MARY STEELE,
)
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE
)
Defendants-Respondents,
)
----------.)

I, ROBERT POLEK!, Clerk of the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District,
of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Bannock, do hereby certify that
the above and foregoing record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and
bound under my direction as, and is a true, full, and correct record of the
pleadings and documents as are automatically required under Rule 28 of the
Idaho appellate Rules.
I do further certify that all exhibits, offered or admitted in the aboveentitled cause, will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court along
with the court reporter's transcript and the clerk's record as required by Rule 31
of the Idaho Appellate Rules.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal

of said Court at Pocatello, Idaho, this.;;?\

d a y ~ ' 2016.

ROBERT POLEK!,
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

STEPHEN BOSWELL and KARINA
BOSWELL, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.
AMBER DAWN STEELE and
The Estate of MARY STEELE,
Defedants-Respondents,
__________

)
)
) Supreme Court No. 44093
)
)
)
)
)
) CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS
)
}

I, ROBERT POLEK!, the duly elected, qualified and acting Clerk of the
District Court of the Sixth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the
County of Bannock, do hereby certify that the following are the original exhibits
marked for identification and introduced in evidence at trial of the above and
foregoing cause, to wit:

DEFENDANT'S EXHIBITS

1.
Exhibit #201
Photographs of the kitchen and gate of Mary Steele' i;
Steele's home (previously stipulated to by Plaintiffs)
2.
Exhibit #202
Photgraphs of the kitchen and gate of Mary Steele's home
(previously stipulated to by Plaintiffs)
3.
Exhibit #203
stipulated to by Plaintifs)

Photgraphs of Mary Steele's home and Zoey (previously
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4.

Exhibit #204

Photograph of Zoey (previously stipulated to by Plaintiffs).

5.

Exhibit #205

Report of Dr. Julia Alpert.

6.

Exhibit #208

Gate Pictures.

7.

Exhibit #209

Gate Pictures.

PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBITS
1.

Exhibit #IO I

Close up of hand.

2.

Exhibit # 102

Pictures of hand with ruler.

3.

Exhibit # 103

Pictures of Steve Boswell with gate.

4.

Exhibit #104

Steve Boswell's arm in sling.

5.

Exhibit #105

Hand with tube.

6.

Exhibit # 106

Skin graftdouos site.

7.

Exhibit #107

Beware of dog sign.

8.

Exhibit #108

Beware of dog sign.

9.

Exhibit # 109

Dog (Zoey)

10.

Exhibit # 110

Medical Records.

11.

Exhibit # 111

Medical Damages.

12.

Exhibit #112

Affidavit of Tamra Andersen.
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I FURTHER CERTIFY that the above exhibits are attached to, and made a
part of, the original transcript on appeal in said cause.
IN WITNESS WHERE: I ~ereuntD

of said Court, this the

3' \

tlay o

set my hand and affixed the seal

~ A)\..\,,,.>- \. fC

, 2016.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT O"F THE
STATE OF IDAHO, _IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

STEPHEN BOSWELL and KARINA
BOSWELL, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.

)
)

Supreme Court No. 44093

)
)
)
)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

AMBER DAWN STEELE, and
The Estate of MARY STEELE,

)
)
)
Defendants - Respondents)
)

__________

I, ROBERT POLEK!, Clerk of the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District,
of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Bannock, do hereby certify that I
have personally served or mailed, by United States mail, one copy of the
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT and CLERK'S RECORD to each of the Attorneys of
Record in this cause as follows:
REED W. LARSEN
Cooper & Larsen, Chartered
Post Office Box 4229
Pocatello, Idaho 83205-4229

KENT A. HIGGINS
Merrill & Merrill, Chartered
Post Office Box 991
Pocatello, Idaho 83720-0005

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal
of said Court at Pocatello, Idaho, this _ _ day of·

(Seal)

I

2016,

ROBERT POLEK!,
---.Clerk of the District Court/ _____ --Bannock County, Idah9--·Su re

-~

~

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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